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Abstract 
Decision making w i t h adaptive u t i l i t y provides a generalisation to classical Bayesian 
decision theory, a l lowing the creation of a normat ive theory for decision selection 
when preferences are i n i t i a l l y uncertain. 
The theory of adaptive u t i l i t y was introduced by Cyer t & DeGroo t [27], but had 
since received l i t t l e a t t en t ion or development. I n par t icular , founda t iona l issues 
had not been explored and no consideration had been given to the generalisation of 
t r ad i t iona l u t i l i t y concepts such as value of i n f o r m a t i o n or risk aversion. This thesis 
addresses such issues. 
A n in-depth review of the decision theory l i tera ture is given, de ta i l ing differences in 
assumptions between various proposed normat ive theories and their possible gener-
alisations. M o t i v a t i o n is provided for generalising expected u t i l i t y theory to pe rmi t 
uncertain preferences, and i t is argued tha t i n such a s i tua t ion , under the acceptance 
of t r ad i t i ona l u t i l i t y axioms, the decision maker should seek to select decisions so as 
to maximise expected adaptive u t i l i t y . The possible applications of the theory for 
sequential decision making are i l lus t ra ted by some small-scale examples, inc luding 
examples of relevance w i t h i n re l i ab i l i ty theory. 
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This chapter offers explanat ion of the type of decision theory this thesis is concerned 
w i t h , and introduces the fundamenta l concepts of p robab i l i ty and u t i l i t y tha t are 
used to measure beliefs and preferences, respectively. Final ly , we discuss the nota-
t ional conventions tha t are to be employed th roughout , and provide an out l ine to 
the focus of subsequent chapters. 
1.1 Problem Description 
This thesis is concerned w i t h normat ive decision theory. Normat ive here is used 
to denote theories tha t describe the act ion a decision maker ( D M ) should take i f 
she agrees w i t h a small number of axioms of preference. T h a t is to say, agreement 
w i t h such axioms leads to a direct logical argument for deta i l ing a set of possible 
decisions for selection. Such axioms are created th rough philosophical consideration 
and are assumed to be in agreement w i t h the fundamenta l beliefs of a ra t ional and 
coherent D M . 
I n contrast to normat ive decision theories, descriptive decision theories seek to ex-
plain real-world selection of decisions. Descriptive decision theories employ psycho-
logical analysis in an a t t empt to explain or predict the actual actions of real-world 
DMs . Such theories are not the focus of this research, but i n Subsection 2.2.2 we 
mention some alterations tha t have been made to normat ive theories in order to 
1 
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increase their descriptive abi l i ty . 
We consider a D M facing either a sol i tary decision, or a sequence of decisions. I n the 
la t ter case, the D M observes results of previous choices before selection of the next, 
and th roughout the thesis we pe rmi t uncer ta inty over the result of decision selection. 
T h e main focus w i l l be to develop a theory tha t also permi ts i n i t i a l uncer ta inty over 
preferences, but where a D M may learn about these th rough t r i a l . 
We begin by in t roduc ing the concepts of (subjective) p robabi l i ty and u t i l i t y t ha t 
are relevant when considering decision selection. On ly a short summary is provided, 
and the interested reader is referred to more detailed accounts available in decision 
theory t ex t books such as Clemen [24], French & Rios Insua [46] or L ind ley [71]. The 
section concludes by fo rmal ly in t roduc ing the decision problem under consideration. 
1.1.1 Probability & Utility 
Uncer ta in ty over events w i l l be modelled t h rough the D M ' s degree of belief, i.e., 
assuming the D M is act ing in a ra t ional manner (later discussed in Section 2.1) 
we work w i t h the in terpre ta t ion of probability as the D M ' s subjective belief given 
her personal background knowledge and experience ( though we w i l l not fo rma l ly 
include this i n no ta t ion) . Objec t ive probabil i t ies s t i l l arise i n discussion, bu t we 
assume tha t i f events of interest refer to outcomes of fair chance mechanisms, e.g., a 
roulet te , then the D M ' s subjective p robab i l i ty w i l l agree w i t h t h a t d ic ta ted by the 
classical theory of probabi l i ty , as f i rs t developed fo l lowing correspondence between 
Pascal and Fermat in the seventeenth century (see, e.g., Hacking [52]). 
T h e arguments of authors such as de F i n e t t i [31] and Savage [89] state tha t the 
subject ive p robabi l i ty of an event h occurr ing can be elicited as follows. The sub-
ject ive p robab i l i ty of event h, denoted P{h), is the fair price, as viewed by the D M , 
for entering the bet paying one un i t i f h occurs, and no th ing otherwise. Assuming 
tha t the D M is act ing rat ional ly, i t can be shown tha t such a de f in i t ion agrees w i t h 
the D M ' s beliefs, e.g., the D M should specify a greater price i f and only i f she has 
1.1. Problem Description 3 
a greater belief i n the occurrence of h. I t can also be shown tha t this def in i t ion 
satisfies al l of Kolmogorov 's [66] axioms of p robab i l i ty for the case of a f in i te set of 
possible events (again assuming the prerequisite of a ra t ional D M ) . 
I n contrast to probabi l i t ies measuring degree of belief, a utility f u n c t i o n measures the 
D M ' s subject ive preferences over decisions and outcomes. The use of a non-linear 
func t ion for de termining the w o r t h of a reward was f i rs t suggested by Bernoul l i [18], 
and an ax iomat iza t ion for the existence of such a func t ion was later developed by 
von Neumann k, Morgenstern [101]. A u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n u is fo rmal ly defined as a 
func t ion w i t h domain the set of randomized decisions T> and co-domain the set of 
reals R, w i t h the proper ty tha t i t is i n agreement w i t h the D M ' s preferences, i.e., i f 
the D M s t r i c t ly prefers decision d\ to decision c/2, then u(d\) >u(d2). T h e u t i l i t y of a 
specific reward or decision outcome is then determined by considering the u t i l i t y of 
the degenerate decision tha t leads to tha t specific reward or outcome w i t h certainty. 
I n practice, however, u t i l i t y funct ions are considered as having domain the set of 
al l possible randomized rewards 1Z, and the u t i l i t y of a decision is then determined 
by considering the expected u t i l i t y tha t i t w i l l entai l , i.e., the u t i l i t y of the decision 
d leading to reward r w i t h p robab i l i ty P(r\d) is determined by the expectat ion 
Ylrenu(r)P(r\d) ( the sum being replaced by an integral i f beliefs are represented 
by a p robab i l i ty density func t ion ) . I n this thesis we w i l l at t imes consider bo th the 
possibilities of TZ or V for the domain of a u t i l i t y func t ion , using the relat ionship 
n( r0 ~ J2r£Ru(r)P(r\d) t o interchange f r o m one to the other. 
I n parts of the Economics l i tera ture , u t i l i t y is seen as an ord ina l concept (see A b -
dellaoui et al. [1]), hence to prevent any poten t ia l misunderstanding we w i l l make 
the fo l lowing d i s t inc t ion between a u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n and a value func t ion . A u t i l -
i t y f u n c t i o n u, o f t en referred to as a cardinal u t i l i t y func t ion , provides the 'mora l ' 
wor th of an outcome. A value f u n c t i o n v, o f t en referred to as an ord ina l u t i l i t y 
func t ion , is a more p r i m i t i v e concept tha t s imply ranks outcomes in a manner con-
sistent w i t h preferences. I n par t icular , value funct ions do not take into account 
relative s t rength of preference, and these w i l l no t be considered fu r the r (see Keeney 
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& Ra i f f a [64, Ch.3] for more in fo rmat ion on value func t ions) . 
Fundamentally, subject ive probabil i t ies and ut i l i t ies can be viewed as t w i n concepts 
(see, e.g., the discussion in French [45]). Indeed, th rough the be t t ing price interpre-
ta t ion of subjective probabi l i ty i t is d i f f i c u l t to fo rma l ly define one w i t h o u t mak ing 
expl ic i t reference to the other, and this is also the case in e l ic i ta t ion . For exam-
ple, when above we discussed the in te rpre ta t ion of subjective p robabi l i ty as a fair 
be t t ing price, the r e tu rn of the bet should actual ly have been expressed i n u t i l i t y 
units . Similar ly , when e l ic i t ing u t i l i t y values the knowledge of subjective probabi l -
ities is also required. Assuming tha t a most preferred reward r* has a u t i l i t y value 
of 1 and a least preferred reward r , has a u t i l i t y value of 0, the u t i l i t y value of any 
other reward r is equal to the subjective p robabi l i ty p such tha t the D M is indi f -
ferent between ob ta in ing r for certain, or r i sking the gamble tha t results i n r* w i t h 
p robabi l i ty p and r , otherwise. Furthermore, the work of Anscombe & A u m a n n [5] 
(discussed in Section 2.2) provides a method of def in ing subjective p robab i l i ty and 
u t i l i t y simultaneously f r o m a single preference relat ion. I n this se t t ing dua l i ty exists 
in so far tha t bo th subject ive probabil i t ies and ut i l i t ies are measured by compar ing 
preferences over gambles whose outcomes are determined by object ive probabil i t ies . 
1.1.2 Decision Selection 
Given her relevant u t i l i t y and probabi l i ty specifications, the problem of the D M is to 
select a decision d ou t of a set of possibilities V. The problem of the decision analyst 
is to determine a logical system for explaining how and why a specific choice should 
be made. There are many different types of decision problem, but throughout this 
thesis we concern ourselves w i t h the case of a single D M who is mot iva ted to select 
the decision tha t is best for her ( u t i l i t y returns only accrue to the D M ) , and where 
the outcome of a decision is selected by an unconcerned Nature . Th i s is in contrast 
to game theory where the D M faces an intel l igent and mot iva ted opponent (see, e.g., 
Luce k Ra i f f a [72]). 
We concern ourselves w i t h two situations. The first is selection of a sol i tary decision, 
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where the D M has stated belief and preference specifications before selection, and 
where the problem is completed as soon as the selection is made and re tu rn obtained. 
T h e second, more interesting, problem is when a sequence of decisions must be made. 
I n th is case, due to the ext ra i n f o r m a t i o n tha t may become available, or the relevant 
insights tha t may be made between one decision choice and the next, the D M can 
learn about l ikely decision outcome as she proceeds th rough the decision sequence. 
1.2 Outline of Thesis 
I n comparison to al ternat ive mathemat ica l disciplines, the s tudy of decision theory 
usually only requires a relat ively low level of mathemat ica l expertise. A n undergrad-
uate course in P robab i l i t y and Bayesian Statistics should be sufficient to understand 
the m a j o r i t y of this thesis, and hence we assume tha t the reader has such knowledge. 
However, though of a relat ively simple nature, i t w i l l become apparent tha t neces-
sary calculations can be tedious and t ime consuming. W h e n presented, the reader 
should be aware tha t numerical results were determined th rough use of the software 
package Maple 10. Nevertheless, a l though the technical level of the mathematics is 
low, the complexi ty of arguments and level of understanding necessary to produce 
solutions is h igh . I n reading this thesis a general unders tanding of decision theory is 
useful, but not essential, and we w i l l seek to explain the necessary decision theoretic 
terms that have been included. W h e n i t is deemed inappropr ia te to include f u l l 
replicat ion of s tandard results, the reader w i l l be directed to relevant sources. 
To ease explanat ion of the theory a number of examples w i l l be provided. Whenever 
possible, the re-examinat ion of previous examples w i l l be employed when highl ight-
ing new aspects of the theory, and i t is hoped tha t this w i l l enable f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h 
these problems. However, in special si tuations, new and dif ferent examples w i l l be 
considered when i t is believed tha t these w i l l either h ighl ight the issues in the theory 
more clearly, or i f the new example is deemed of interest itself. We w i l l mark the end 
of an example, and the re turn to general discussion, t h rough the use of a o symbol . 
1.2. Outline of Thesis 6 
We have sought to use standard decision theory no ta t ion as much as possible w i t h i n 
this thesis, however, unless mentioned otherwise, we employ a no ta t iona l convention 
such that , in general, r ight -hand subscripts denote dif ferent values for a decision 
or reward etc., or when placed beside an operator, denote the state variable tha t 
operator is connected w i t h . I n a sequential problem, r ight -hand superscripts w i l l be 
used to denote the epoch a reward or decision is being considered in . For example, 
rl is a par t icular reward value to be received i n the second per iod, whi l s t £A '[^1 is 
the expected value of Y w i t h respect to beliefs over A' . 
W h e n required, we w i l l also h ighl ight tha t we are considering funct ions or operators 
w i t h i n an adaptive u t i l i t y set t ing by placing an a i n the le f t -hand subscript posi t ion. 
For example, we dif ferent ia te a classical u t i l i t y f unc t ion f r o m an adaptive u t i l i t y 
func t ion , a concept to be fo rmal ly defined in Chapter 3, by denot ing the lat ter as 
au (a glossary of the main mathemat ica l no ta t ion employed is available at the end 
of this thesis i n A p p e n d i x A ) . Furthermore, i n keeping w i t h the t r a d i t i o n of the 
decision theory l i terature , D M s w i l l be referred to as being female, whi l s t experts 
or analysts w i l l be referred to as being male. 
The fo rma t for the remainder of this thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 offers a review 
of known decision theories for the s i tua t ion of a single D M . Chapter 3 introduces 
the adaptive u t i l i t y concept and offers mot iva t ion for its use, a l i terature review of 
adaptive u t i l i t y and s imilar theories is also provided. The con t r ibu t ion of this thesis 
to the s tudy of decision theory commences in Chapter 4, where the foundat iona l 
impl ica t ions of p e r m i t t i n g uncertain u t i l i t y are considered and i t is shown tha t a 
t r ad i t iona l system of axioms of preference is sufficient to entai l the use of maximis ing 
expected adaptive u t i l i t y as the logical decision selection rule. 
The focus of the thesis changes in Chapter 5, where ex t ra results are examined un-
der the assumption of op t ima l decision selection th rough maximisa t ion of expected 
adaptive u t i l i t y . I n par t icular , Chapter 5 considers solutions to sequential problems 
and i l lustrates possible applications of the theory for re l i ab i l i ty decision problems 
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through a couple of small hypothet ica l examples. Chapter 6 focuses on two char-
acteristics of an adaptive u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n tha t have in the past been overlooked in 
the l i tera ture , considering impl ica t ions for risk aversion and value of sample infor-
mat ion . Final ly , Chapter 7 provides concluding comments and potent ia l directions 
for fu r the r research. 
Three appendices are given at the end of the thesis. A p p e n d i x A provides a glossary 
of mathemat ica l no ta t ion employed, A p p e n d i x B provides fu r the r discussion to Ex-
ample 5.3.1, and A p p e n d i x C introduces a conjugate class of u t i l i t y funct ions tha t 
is relevant for the discussion in Section 5.1. 
Chapter 2 
Review of Decision Theory 
This chapter offers a brief review of the literature on decision making under uncer-
tainty. Section 2.1 considers the meaning of rational probability specification and 
decision selection, and also interpretations for conditional beliefs. Section 2.2 briefly 
examines some of the theories that have been suggested for solving solitary decision 
problems, and the chapter concludes wi th a discussion of issues concerning uti l i ty 
forms for sequential problems in Section 2.3. 
2.1 Rational and Coherent Decision Selection 
We begin this chapter by brief!}' reviewing the meaning of rational decision selection, 
essential in explaining why a specific decision should be selected. We also consider 
methods of specifying beliefs, and the interpretations that can be given to conditional 
probabilities. 
We make the following distinction between decisions that are admissible, and those 
that are merely feasible. A feasible decision is any that the D M can identify as 
a possible course of action. As a subset of these feasible decisions, we follow the 
suggestion of Levi [68] for stating the definition of an admissible decision. Given 
some criteria of rationality, a decision wil l be said to be admissible if and only if its 
selection does not contradict these criteria. 
8 
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Hence, admissibility is a concept that depends on the specific criteria under con-
sideration, and in this chapter we will discuss various possibilities that have been 
suggested. 
We consider a D M to be acting in a rational manner if she is acting in agreement 
with an accepted system of axioms of preference. The particular system of axioms 
considered will hence provide the meaning of rationality. Although many differing 
axiomatic systems entail the same decision selection procedure (e.g., the systems of 
Anscombe & Aumann [5] and Savage [89]), there are nevertheless varying suggestions 
that entail different decision selection procedures. A few of these will be reviewed 
in Section 2.2. 
2.1.1 Coherence 
Another concept of rationality arises when we consider the DM's belief specification, 
and following arguments by Ramsey [86, Ch.7] and de Finetti [31], we assume a D M 
is specifying rational beliefs if they are coherent. By coherent we mean that the 
DM's subjective probabilities are specified in such a way that i t is not possible for 
her to wish to enter into a bet, or a system of bets, such that regardless of which 
event takes place, the D M wil l lose (i.e., a Dutch Book can not be made against 
her). Although in this thesis we wil l take i t as granted that the D M is specifying 
coherent beliefs, this can follow automatically from acceptance of a collection of 
axioms regarding the set of bets a D M would accept (see, for example, Walley's 
axioms of desirability that are used to imply coherence [104]). 
I t can be shown (e.g., Kaplan [61, p.155]) that coherence implies that the DM's belief 
specification, assuming it is a precise specification over a finite event space, satisfies 
the Kolmogorov [66] axioms of probability. Nevertheless, we should be aware that 
the argument for coherence implying agreement with the Kolmogorov axioms does 
require that the D M cares to win bets, regardless of the amount at stake, and that 
she has an indifference to gambling. This will not be true for most real-world DM's, 
and is a difference between normative and descriptive theories. For the purpose of 
2.1. Rational and Coherent Decision Selection 10 
this thesis, we will imagine the D M is specifying coherent subjective probabilities. 
2.1.2 Imprecision 
Frequently, decision theories make an a priori assumption that the D M is able to 
fully express her beliefs and preferences through precise probability and uti l i ty state-
ments. However, this can sometimes be an ambitious and unreasonable assumption. 
Whilst the focus of research in this thesis is based on the assumption of precise belief 
specifications, i t will nevertheless be beneficial to review the meaning of imprecise 
probabilities and utilities in order to comment on some of the decision theories that 
have been designed to incorporate them. 
Theories that imprecisely quantify uncertainty, sometimes referred to as non-additive 
or generalised theories, generalise classical results by permitting the D M to remain 
vague or even ignorant about actual probabilities or utilities. Though consideration 
of such a problem appears as early as the work of Boole [20], recent works such 
as Augustin [7] and Walley [104] (in the case of imprecise probabilities), and Far-
row &t Goldstein [40] and Moskowitz et al. [80] (in the case of imprecise utilities) 
demonstrate that this is still an area of interesting and active research. 
Taking the subjective definition for the probability of an event h, P(h), as being the 
fair price for entry into the bet paying one unit if h occurs and nothing otherwise, an 
often used method of permitting imprecision is to accept that this fair price may be 
difficult to identify. Instead a D M may only be willing to fix a maximum price P_(h) 
for which she is happy to buy into the bet, and a higher value P(h) representing 
the minimum price she would be happy to sell the bet for. For prices between P_(h) 
and P{h) the D M may not wish to commit to any fixed strategy. 
The quantities P_(h) and P{h) are, respectively, interpreted as the lower and upper 
subjective probabilities for the occurrence of event h. Provided P(h) ^ P{h), there 
will be a whole class V of distributions which satisfy the constraints set out by the 
DM's betting behaviour, and only in the case that P(h) = P(h) for all events h wi l l 
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V reduce to containing a single distribution. In the more general case a D M must 
consider how best to select a decision when she only has the information concerning 
the set of possible distributions V and nothing more. 
Imprecise utilities may also originate in a similar way, where only known bounds 
are stated for the uti l i ty value of a relevant reward. Alternatively, and as mentioned 
in Subsection 1.1.1, we can note that fundamentally utilities and probabilities may 
be seen as twin concepts that are both derived from a stated preference ordering. 
Yet if only a partial ordering of preferences is used, only imprecise probabilities and 
utilities wil l be available (see, e.g., Seidenfeld et al. [93]). That is not to say that 
the use of imprecise probabilities necessitates the requirement for imprecise utilities 
and, for example, the works of Boole [20], Walley [104], and Williams [107] all deal 
with imprecise probability and precise ut i l i ty simultaneously. 
Whilst from a decision analysis context i t is ideal to have known and precise prob-
ability and uti l i ty specifications, there are several arguments as to why this is not 
always the case, and Walley [104, Ch. l ] provides a good overview in the case of 
probabilities. Levi [69] claims that a bounded rationality prevents DMs from fully 
comprehending all that is necessary for precision, and often required calculations 
are beyond computational abilities. Indeed, if a prior analysis identifies a unique 
decision that is optimal under all possible distributions that satisfy the constraints 
of imprecision, then the extra effort required in identifying a precise specification is 
just not needed. 
2.1.3 Conditional Probabilities 
Before discussing solutions to the general decision problem under consideration, we 
should first review the possible interpretations of conditional probability. That is to 
say, what is the interpretation of the conditional probability of event h2 being true 
given that event hi is true, to be denoted by P(k2\hi). 
Providing P{h\) > 0, we formally define P ( / i 2 | / i i ) to be the numerical quantity 
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P(h2 f l h\)/P(h\), with P(h2 n hi) being the probability of the compound event 
h2 n hi that is true if and only if both events h2 and hi are true. However, there are 
various suggestions for its meaning (see, e.g., the discussion in Kadane et al. [59]). 
The 'called-off gamble' interpretation arises from extending the subjective theories 
that view probability as a fair betting price, and is present in works such as de 
Finetti [31] and Savage [89]. Here one views P(h2\hi) as the fair price for the bet 
paying one unit if h2 is true and nothing otherwise, but where the bet is cancelled 
if hi is not found to be true. 
As Kadane et al. [59] note, an alternative 'temporal updating' view is a common 
Bayesian interpretation for when dealing with sequential problems. I t assumes that 
either P(/i2 | / i i) is the probability the D M expects to assign to h2 in the case she 
learns //.] is true and nothing else, or that i t is the probability the D M will assign 
to h2 in the case she learns hi and nothing more. In this thesis we seek to develop 
a strategy for sequential decision making from the view of a D M who is about to 
select her first decision and wil l view P{h2\hi) as meaning the former of these. 
Finally, 'hypothetical reasoning' is the view taken by Kadane et al. [59], and con-
siders P{h2\hi) to be the DM's current hypothetical belief in h2 if she were to place 
herself in the imagined world in which hi is true. This differs from the 'called-off 
gamble' interpretation by requiring the D M to hypothesise hi as certain. I t differs 
from 'temporal updating' because the D M is not seeking to predict how she wil l 
update her beliefs at some future time. 
Though we follow a 'temporal updating' view of conditional probability, there are 
arguments claiming it is equivalent to the 'called-off gamble' interpretation. Gold-
stein agrees with the 'called-off gamble' interpretation, and discusses a notion of 
'temporal coherence' in [49,50]. In [49], Goldstein claims that, if a D M wishes to act 
coherently and avoid a 'temporal' sure loss, then i t is irrational for her to propose 
that she now believes h. has probability P{li), but that at a well-defined future time 
t, her beliefs wil l change to PL{h) with E[Pl{h)\ ^ P{h). 
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This argument can then be extended to conditional proabilities. I f a D M considers 
that an unobserved event hi is relevant for establishing beliefs over event h2, and as 
such, states conditional probability P(h2\h\), then Goldstein [50] argues that, at a 
future well-defined time the D M may revise beliefs to Pl{h.2\h\), but that current 
beliefs should be such that P(li2\hi) = E[P((h2\hi)\hi]. The connection with the 
'temporal updating' view arises when time /, is considered to be the point when the 
D M wil l know whether hi is true or false. 
2.2 Solitary Decision Problem 
Having briefly outlined the meaning of rationality as acting in accordance with an 
agreed system of axioms of preference together with specification of coherent beliefs, 
we now focus attention on suggestions that have been given for solving the solitary 
decision problem. 
2.2.1 Subjective Expected Utility Theory 
The most popular and famous solution to the decision problem under considera-
tion is that provided by Subjective Expected Uti l i ty (SEU) theory. This solution 
dictates that, given a set of feasible decisions V and a ut i l i ty function u that is in 
agreement with the DM's preferences over V, the D M should select that decision 
d! = argmax,/ ep a(d). However, and as discussed in Subsection 1.1.1, i t is usual to 
consider a uti l i ty function u as representing preferences over a reward space 1Z. In 
this case, and given a probability distribution P(r\d) capturing the DM's beliefs over 
the relevant outcome for each feasible decision d, the admissible decisions are those 
that maximise expected utility. In the case of a finite reward space the admissible 
decisions are thus those that maximise Ylren u{r)P{r\d)-
The maximisation of SEU was first proposed as a selection technique by Bernoulli 
in 1738 [18], however, not until 1947 was an axiomatic formulation created by von 
Neumann & Morgenstern [101], who provided such an axiomatization for when deci-
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sions are equivalent to lotteries with objective probabilities, each with finite support 
(i.e., the set of possible rewards 71 is finite). 
In what follows we employ a notational convention in which '>:' , V and ' ~ ' are 
binary relations used to represent the DM's preferences between two decisions or re-
wards. In particular, dy >z d2 represents the situation in which the DM's preferences 
are such that decision d\ is deemed at least as preferable as decision d2. Similarly, 
d\ >- d2 represents the situation in which the D M strictly prefers decision d\ to deci-
sion d2, and c/i ~ d2 represents the situation in which the D M is indifferent between 
d\ and d2. The notation ad\ + (1 — a)d2, wi th a G [0,1], wil l be used to represent 
that decision which pays reward r G TZ with probability aP{r\d\) + (1 — a)P(r\d2). 
With this notation in mind a list of axioms concerning the DM's preference relations 
that is similar to von Neumann &; Morgenstern's, but which is in fact that given by 
Jensen [57], is as follows: 
• A l Completeness: >z is a complete semi-ordering and the set of feasible deci-
sions V is a closed convex set of lotteries. 
• A2 Transitivity: >z is a transitive relation. 
• A3 Archimedian: If di,d2,d3 G V are such that d\ >- d2 >- d3, then there is an 
a, P G (0,1) such that adi + (1 - a)d:i y d2 y (5dx + (1 - 0)d3. 
• A4 Independence: For all d\,d2, d3 G V and any a € (0,1], 
d\ h. d2 ad^ + (1 - a)di > ad2 + (1 - a)d3. 
This axiomatization leads to the same uti l i ty representation theorem over the closed 
convex set of feasible decisions V that was first derived by von Neumann &: Mor-
genstern (though von Neumann & Morgenstern's result also holds for all possible 
finite-support lotteries over the reward set TV), and indeed there are additional al-
ternative axiomatizations that also perform the same task (see Fishburn [42] for a 
more general review). 
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The Completeness axiom simply states that a comparison using the preference re-
lation >z can be made between any two decisions in the set T>, i.e., for any two 
decisions d\ d" £ P, at least one of d' > d" or d" > d! is true, whilst the Transitivity 
axiom states that if dx >z d2 and d2 >z d,3, then dq >z d,3 for all dud2,d3 € V. The 
Archimedian axiom works as a continuity axiom for preferences, and as with the 
Completeness and Transitivity axioms, draws little objection. 
The Independence axiom, however, draws criticism in certain circles. I t effectively 
claims that preferences between two decisions are unaffected if they are both com-
bined in the same way wi th a third decision. Nevertheless, one should remember 
that von Neumann &; Morgenstern's axiomatization is developed only for decisions 
that are equivalent to objective lotteries, and in this setting, Independence is simply 
claiming that preference relations between two decisions should remain constant if 
there is a chance that neither decision (lottery) will be played, but rather that some 
other lottery will be played instead. Even so, i t is still the axiom that is altered 
most frequently when non-SEU theories are suggested. 
I f a D M agrees to a similar system of axioms as that given above, then von Neumann 
& Morgenstern proved that there exists a unique (up to a positive linear transfor-
mation) uti l i ty function u, with domain the convex set T>+ of finite support lotteries 
over TZ and co-domain K, satisfying the following two properties: 
1. For all di,d2eV+, u(di) > u{d2) O d{ >z d2. 
2. For all d\. d2 EV+ and any a £ (0,1), u(adx + (1 — a)d2) = au(di) + (1 - a)u(d2). 
The first of these properties states that the ut i l i ty function is in agreement with the 
DM's preferences and, in particular, a lottery wil l have the largest uti l i ty value if and 
only if the D M ranks i t as her preferred choice. The second property explains why 
utilities have a cardinal meaning, and do not simply rank lotteries, hence differing 
them from value functions. I t also explains how utilities for non-degenerate lotteries 
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can be formed from utilities for degenerate lotteries, and hence gives rise to the 
expected uti l i ty representation when one considers a ut i l i ty function as a function 
that takes its domain to be the set TZ of possible rewards. Of course the above 
properties also hold true for the closed convex subset of feasible decisions (lotteries) 
V. 
Unfortunately, von Neumann & Morgenstern's theory is unable to deal with situa-
tions where the outcomes of decisions are not determined by objective probabilities, 
e.g., horse races. This situation was later resolved by Savage [89], whose list of seven 
postulates (axioms) of rational choice permitted subjectivity in beliefs. Savage con-
sidered a different setup where, given a set of possible states of nature (possible 
event outcomes) S and a set of consequences (rewards) F, decisions were seen to be 
arbitrary functions from S to F. 
Axiomatizations that permitted subjective beliefs, but were instead based on devel-
oping the objective theory of von Neumann & Morgenstern, were also later devel-
oped. Hence, rather than reviewing the relatively complicated theory of Savage, we 
will instead briefly review the somewhat simpler theory of Anscombe &; Auraann [5]. 
Anscombe & Aumann extended the von Neumann &; Morgenstern axioms, and thus 
also required the presence of lotteries with objective probabilities. For this reason 
Anscombe & Aumann's theory should be seen as an intermediate theory between 
the ful ly objective setting of von Neumann k. Morgenstern and the fully sub jective 
setting of Savage. Anscombe & Aumann achieved the introduction of subjective 
beliefs by viewing decisions as functions that mapped event outcomes to the simple 
lotteries considered by von Neumann & Morgenstern. The D M could then have 
subjective beliefs over what would be the actual event outcome (e.g., the horse that 
wins the horse race). 
Anscombe &; Aumann use the representation of von Neumann &; Morgenstern in 
two ways, matching up the two systems of preferences. The first way is to consider 
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a uti l i ty function over roulette (objective) lotteries that pay rewards in the form of 
horse (subjective) lotteries which then pay out another roulette lottery. The second 
way is to consider standard von Neumann &; Morgenstern roulette lotteries. Using 
the notation whereby [R{1). • . . , R{n)] represents the horse lottery paying roulette 
R.(i) if event i is true, and where (7^ 1 O i , . . . ,pmOm) represents the roulette lottery 
paying the solitary outcome Oj with probability pi} Anscombe & Aumann use the 
following two additional axioms to generate their required ut i l i ty representation: 
• A5 Monotoniaty: I f Ri(i) >z /?2('^), then 
\R{1),. . . , / ? , ( » ) , . . . , R(n)] h [R(l),..., R2(i),..., R(n)]. 
. A6 Reversal: ( P l [ / ? i ( l ) , . . . , ^ ( n ) ] , . . . , p m [ / ? 7 7 1 ( l ) , . . . , / ^ ( n ) ] ) ~ 
[{piRl(l), . . . .,PrnRm{l)), ••• , ( p i . . . ,PmRm{n))]-
Monotonicity simply states that if two horse lotteries are identical except for the 
returns associated with one outcome, then preferences between these horse lotteries 
are dependent on preferences between the returns associated with that outcome. 
Reversal is an axiom stating that, if the return to be received depends on the outcome 
of both a horse lottery and a roulette lottery, then i t makes no difference in which 
order these two types of lottery are played. 
Anscombe & Aumann demonstrated that the logical implication of agreeing to all 
six Axioms A1-A6 is that, not only do subjective probabilities actually exist (though 
previous authors dating back to the work of Ramsey [86] have provided alternative 
arguments for this), but also there exists a unique (up to a positive linear transfor-
mation) ut i l i ty function agreeing with the DM's preferences for the situation where 
probabilities of outcomes are subjective. Thus no longer does one require the as-
sumption that probabilities are objective and imposed externally. 
2.2.2 Alternatives to S E U 
The use of maximising SEU as the normative theory in decision selection is not 
without criticism, as various authors criticise one or more of the axioms it is based 
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upon. The first, and possibly most famous criticism, is that given by Allais [3]. 
Allais claims that perfectly rational people do make decision selections that are 
not in keeping with those dictated by the maximisation of SEU. Further studies 
by authors such as Kahneman &; Tversky [60], Ellsberg [38] and Fellner [41] also 
expand upon Allais' objection. 
An illustration of Allais' criticism, often referred to as the Allais paradox, can be 
given by considering the following pair of choices: 
Choice 1: / i pays £4000 with probability 0.8, £0 otherwise. 
1,2 pays £3000 for certain. 
Choice 2: / 3 pays £4000 with probability 0.2, £0 otherwise. 
U pays £3000 with probability 0.25, £0 otherwise. 
An investigation by Kahneman &; Tversky [60] shows that DMs commonly hold a 
preference for l2 over / ] , whilst simultaneously preferring 1$ over / 4 . However, there 
is no possible util i ty function that can accommodate this. 
Such a combination of preferences violates the Independence axiom of expected 
uti l i ty theory. Indeed, in this example the only difference between lotteries ^ and 
/ 3 , or between l2 and / 4 , is a common increased chance of receiving £0. This is a 
descriptive shortcoming of what is deemed a normative theory. Nevertheless, Allais 
argues that the Independence axiom should not be seen as a normative axiom of 
rational choice. He claims it is not enough to consider the expected util i ty return 
of a decision, but that higher moments taking into account variation or dispersion 
should also be considered. 
Allais claims that the uti l i ty of a lottery should be some functional of the probability 
density, and that the D M should have a preference for security in the neighbourhood 
of certainty. He proposed a system which concentrates on the dispersion of rewards 
around their mean, replacing the Independence axiom with Iso-Variation, an axiom 
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that requires the D M to select decisions not only on the basis of maximising ex-
pected value, but also taking into account second and higher order moments of the 
distribution of possible rewards. 
An alternative theory, also motivated by real-world observations and by similar 
contradictions to SEU as demonstrated by the Allais paradox, is that of Kahneman 
& Tversky's Prospect Theory [60]. Prospect Theory, like the theory of von Neumann 
& Morgenstern, is concerned with the selection of ob jective lotteries, but rather than 
using such objective probabilities to weight the ut i l i ty of rewards, i t uses some non-
linear function of them. 
Kahneman & Tversky argue that instead of maximising SEU, DMs are subject to 
a Certainty effect (where DMs overweight outcomes that are highly probable and 
underweight outcomes that are very unlikely) and an Isolation effect (were DMs 
ignore common elements of decisions), both of which are incompatible with the 
Independence axiom. Further developments can be found in Tversky & Kahneman 
[99] and Wakker & Tversky [102]. 
In its original form, Prospect Theory made a distinction between two phases of a 
DM's choice process. First a D M performs a preliminary analysis of the offered 
choices with the aim of yielding a simpler representation of the problem, a so-called 
'editing phase'. Later the D M evaluates the edited choices and the one with the 
maximum valuation is selected. The editing phase wil l code (turn outcomes into 
gains or losses, rather than final states of wealth), cancel (ignore components shared 
in choices), simplify (values are rounded up or down), and finally remove dominated 
alternatives (even if they were not dominated before simplification). 
Once the editing phase is complete, Prospect Theory evaluates a score for each 
decision that is determined through a weighted average of the util i ty of possible 
outcomes. However, instead of weighting by the probability of those outcomes, 
Prospect Theory uses a non-linear scale that reflects the psychological impact of 
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the probability which, for example, will overweight high probabilities and under-
weight low ones (see Kilka & Webber [65] for an elicitation suggestion). As is to be 
expected, Prospect Theory's departures from SEU can lead to some objectionable 
consequences, and as Kahneman &; Tversky [60] note, intransitivities and violations 
of dominance mean it should primarily be seen as a descriptive theory. 
Prospect Theory is known as a rank-dependent model of choice under uncertainty. 
The defining property of such a model is that cumulative probabilities are trans-
formed by a non-linear weight function in order to account for real-world inconsis-
tencies to SEU theory. Further extensions for when decisions are not lotteries with 
specified objective probabilities are suggested by Schmeidler [92] (Choquet SEU 
Theory) and Wakker & Tversky [102] (Cumulative Prospect Theory). 
Proponents of SEU theory, however, offer their own arguments as to why non-SEU 
theories should not be seen as normative, and how SEU can accommodate so-called 
paradoxes of the theory. De Finetti [32] and Amihud [4] argue against the claim that 
the dispersion of uti l i ty values should be considered, with de Finetti stating that 
utilities themselves were introduced to accommodate riskiness in extreme values. 
Luce &: von Winterfeldt [73] argue that DMs may be attempting to behave in ac-
cordance with SEU theory, even if they are likely to fail in more complex situations. 
Allais' objection is that SEU theory does not correspond to observed results, yet 
this may be due to a bounded rationality, as suggested by Levi [69]. 
Amihud [4] also notes that the Allais Par adox can be resolved by use of uti l i ty func-
tions that are contingent upon the decision making history of the D M . Such history 
dependent utilities exempt the D M from consistency of preferences between peri-
ods, instead only requiring consistency within each period itself. Further solutions 
in agreement with SEU theory are provided by Morrison [79] and Markowitz [74, 
pp.220-223]. Indeed, Luce &; von Winterfeldt [73] show that if the participants of 
Kahneman & Tversky's survey did not treat both choices simultaneously and in-
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dependency, but instead conditioned utilities on the first choice before making the 
second, than a ut i l i ty function agreeing with observed results can be found. 
A final alternative theory that we will mention as an alternative to SEU is the Info-
Gap theory of Ben-Haim [14]. Info-Gap decision theory is a non-probabilistic theory 
that suggests the D M seek to be robust against failure. Unlike SEU, it permits the 
D M to tackle decision problems without requiring a ful l probabilistic description 
of events. Instead a best estimate is provided and uncertainty is incorporated by 
accepting this best estimate could be incorrect by various degrees. A minimum 
required reward level is specified, and the decision is selected that maximises the 
chance of achieving this level, i.e., the most robust decision is suggested. 
2.2.3 Generalisations of S E U 
The use of the maximisation of SEU as a decision selection technique requires that 
the D M can specify precise and correct beliefs and preferences. However, as men-
tioned in Subsection 2.1.2, this can be quite a difficult task. For this reason recent 
research has been focused on finding decision theories that remain in the spirit of 
maximising SEU, but which also permit the D M to be vague in elicitation. 
Kadane et al. [58] provide an overview of how differing axiomatic formulations man-
age to cater for the situation in which only imprecise probability specifications are 
provided. Generally, such axiomatizations arise through weakening the Complete-
ness axiom of von Neumann & Morgenstern. This axiom is sometimes deemed to 
be too restrictive and enforces the D M to state and commit to preference rankings 
between any two decisions, not permitting indecision or non-comparability between 
options. Instead, when wishing to deal with imprecise probabilities, the Complete-
ness axiom is often weakened by replacing it wi th one that only calls for a strict 
partial ordering. Yet, if one makes such a replacement to the Completeness axiom, 
then no longer is i t required that the D M rank all decisions, and so no longer is she 
necessarily able to determine which decision should be selected. There are, how-
ever, several suggested rules for selecting decisions when a complete ranking is not 
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provided, and we now briefly review these. 
The r -Maximin choice rule permits imprecise probabilities and its motivation for 
selection is similar in manner to the Maximin choice rule that was pioneered by 
Wald [103]. Under this rule, given a convex set V of probability distributions that 
satisfy the constraints of the DM's imprecise probability specifications, each feasible 
decision is ranked by considering the smallest SEU value that is possible when we 
are free to choose any element of V. The decision that has the largest minimum 
value is then selected, and in the case of ties, rankings are considered by repeating 
the process, but where for each decision the 'worst' distribution is eliminated from 
V before again finding the smallest possible SEU, etc. 
Obviously in the case of V containing just a single distribution, the r -Maxi inin choice 
rule returns to classical maximisation of SEU. However, when V contains more than 
one distribution, r -Maximin seeks to protect against worst possible outcomes, and 
as such, is considered a robust method of decision selection (similar to the Info-Gap 
theory discussed in Subsection 2.2.2). 
An axiomatization of the r -Maximin choice rule is provided by Gilboa &; Schmei-
dler [47]. Gilboa & Schmeidler use Axioms A1-A3, A5, and A6, however, the In-
dependence axiom is kept only for decisions with certain consequences, and when 
decisions have uncertain outcomes, i t is replaced by an axiom of Uncertainty Aver-
sion: 
• Uncertainty Aversion: For all d\,d2 G V and a € (0,1), 
di ~ d2 => ad\ + (1 - a)d2 >z d\. 
Gilboa & Schmeidler claim that an intuitive objection to the Independence axiom 
is that i t ignores the phenomenon of hedging (a preference for spreading bets), and 
Uncertainty Aversion specifically states that hedging is never less preferred to not 
hedging. 
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An alternative choice rule for when probabilities are imprecise is Maximality, which 
dates back to at least the work of Condorcet [30], and which has been further 
discussed, for example, in the works of Sen [94] and Walley [104]. Under this choice 
rule a decision is admissible if and only if there exists no other feasible decision that 
has a higher SEU value for every possible distribution in the set V. Hence, unlike 
T-Maximin, Maximality does not guarantee a complete ranking of decisions, and 
often a D M wil l find that the set of admissible decisions is not much reduced from 
the set of feasible decisions, especially if beliefs are quite imprecise and vague. 
Again Maximality wil l reduce to the classical maximisation of SEU if there is only 
one distribution in the set V• When V contains more than one distribution, however, 
Maximality only seeks to reduce the set of feasible decisions to a set of admissible 
ones by removing those decisions where i t is known that, regardless of which dis-
tribution in V is considered, there exists a decision that wil l always have greater 
SEU. An axiomatization of Maximality is offered by Seidenfeld et al. [93] who, un-
like in the axiomatization of T-Maximin, retain the Independence axiom. Instead a 
slight alteration is made to the Archimedian axiom and the Completeness axiom is 
changed to a strict partial ordering axiom. Another, earlier, axiomatization is also 
provided by Walley [104]. 
The last choice rule we review for when probabilities are imprecise is Expectation 
Admissibility, or E-Admissibility. This rule was suggested by Levi [68] and, like 
Maximality, does not seek to provide an ordered ranking of the feasible decisions. 
Levi's suggestion is that only those decisions that maximise SEU for some distri-
bution in V should be considered admissible, and nothing else can be stated to 
distinguish between admissible decisions. Again ^-Admissibili ty reduces the set of 
feasible decisions to a set of admissible decisions, yet under ^-Admissibility, the set 
of admissible decisions is a subset of the admissible decisions under the Maximality 
choice rule. 
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Like both the T-Maximin and Maximality choice rules, ^-Admissibil i ty reduces to 
the maximisation of SEU when there is only one distribution in V. Its axiomatization 
again transforms the Completeness axiom to one of a strict partial ordering, and 
although it satisfies the property that if two decisions are both inadmissible then so is 
any convex combination of them, i t does not fully satisfy the classical Independence 
axiom. 
A final comment on the choice rules mentioned for imprecise probabilities is that, 
for all three of T-Maximin, Maximality, and E-Admissibility, Schervish et al. [91] 
show that, i f a 'favourable' decision is defined as one that is uniquely admissible 
when considered in a pairwise comparison against the option of making no decision 
selection, then no finite combination of favourable decisions can result in a sure loss. 
Further to the above generalisations which seek to incorporate imprecise probabil-
ities in the choice rule of maximising SEU, there are also generalisations seeking 
to incorporate imprecise utilities, and on a foundational level this setting is consid-
ered by Seidenefeld et al. [93], who extract imprecise probability and uti l i ty state-
ments from preference relations that only satisfy the properties of a partial order. 
Moskowitz el al. [80] also permit both imprecise probabilities and utilities, allow-
ing imprecision over the certainty equivalence for a simple lottery (the sure amount 
which the D M holds in equal preference to the uncertain lottery) in order to intro-
duce imprecise ut i l i ty information. Imprecise probabilities are included as bounds 
over the probability that an event is indeed true. 
Moskovvitz et al. assume a parametric exponential form for the uti l i ty function, 
with information about probabilities of events and preferences between lotteries 
being used to create both a set of possible distributions, and a set of possible uti l i ty 
functions. Progressive questioning over relationships between probabilities and strict 
preferences between rewards is then used to reduce the number of possibilities for 
a precise distribution and a specific uti l i ty function. This questioning continues 
until , regardless of the possibilities that remain, there is a unique decision that wil l 
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maximise SEU. 
In their multi-attribute ut i l i ty setting (where attribute values of rewards are com-
bined to form an overall uti l i ty value for the outcome), Farrow & Goldstein [40] 
also permit imprecise preferences, and this is achieved by permitting imprecision in 
the trade-off values between attributes. A trade-off value is used to describe how 
a relative increase in one attribute in the reward is used to lead to an increase or 
decrease in the overall ut i l i ty of the reward. 
Taking a specific attribute, the D M is permitted to offer a strict, a weak, or an 
indifference preference relation over various possible rewards. Each such preference 
places constraints on the allowable choices for the trade-off value for that attribute, 
and a collection of possible trade-off values consistent wi th stated preferences may 
be considered. Hence, Farrow & Goldstein's use of imprecise trade-off parameters 
greatly eases what would be a very complicated problem of eliciting multi-attribute 
utilities. 
2.3 Sequential Decision Solution 
Having briefly examined a few of the theories seeking to provide rational methods for 
solving a solitary decision problem, we now consider some of the theories developed 
for sequential problems. In particular, we examine the various considerations for 
the form of the uti l i ty function in these theories. 
Usually, sequential decision problems with a finite planning horizon are also solved 
through maximisation of SEU, with dynamic programming used to determine the 
optimal decision sequence (see, for example, DeGroot [34] or Berger [15]). This tech-
nique considers all the possible situations that the D M could find herself in by the 
time she selects her final decision, constructing a decision strategy for each possible 
situation. W i t h knowledge of what the D M wil l do in the final period, next an opti-
mal policy is determined for decision selection at the penultimate choice, considering 
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again all the possible situations the D M could be in at that time. This procedure 
is continued backwards through decision choices until eventually an optimal first 
decision is determined. Again, if the D M is able to learn about probabilities for 
events of interest, then conditional updating is performed similar to that outlined 
in Subsection 2.1.3. Nevertheless, there are alternatives for applying this procedure, 
usually due to the form of uti l i ty function considered. We briefly review a few of 
these. 
2.3.1 Discounting 
Discounting the ut i l i ty of rewards that are to be received in the future is often 
applied to model preference for early receivership. The uti l i ty a D M gains from 
knowledge that a reward wil l be received at some future time need not be the same 
as the uti l i ty for receiving it now, if for no other reason than that the D M wil l have 
access to the reward for a greater duration. However, relative to determining the 
ut i l i ty for receiving a reward immediately, it is often difficult to elicit the current 
ut i l i ty a D M attributes to knowledge that the same reward wil l be received in the 
future. However, if agreed with, discounting functions can provide a link between 
uti l i ty values for receiving the reward at various future times. 
The discount model essentially multiplies the uti l i ty value for receiving a reward 
now by a function of the duration of time before i t is to be received. The most 
common such discounting function is the Exponential Discounting Function (EDF), 
which as a function of time elapse I, is of the form X1, wi th A G [0,1] a parameter 
of the model (see, for example, Ahlbrecht & Weber [2]). A common alternative to 
the EDF is the Hyperbolic Discounting Function (HDF) of the form 1/(1 + i ) 7 , with 
7 > 0 a parameter (see, for example, Harvey [53]). However, whilst the EDF is 
often used in normative models for discounting the ut i l i ty of rewards to be received 
in the future, models that employ the HDF are primarily to be seen as descriptive. 
In particular, and as wi l l be discussed below, the HDF does not satisfy the property 
of dynamic consistency. 
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The advantage of this approach is that, to find the desired solution to a decision 
problem in which rewards are felt at future time points, the D M simply has to 
discount each uti l i ty value by the appropriate amount and apply the result in a 
standard decision problem. When a stream of rewards is to be received, the dis-
counting model discounts the ut i l i ty of each reward and aggregates to form a single 
meaningful number. This is known as the Net Present Value, with the interpreta-
tion being that the D M is indifferent to receiving that amount of ut i l i ty now and 
receiving the stream of future ut i l i ty values (see Meyer [76, p.479]). 
Arguments for discounting utilities of future rewards appear to have been first pre-
sented by von Bohm-Bawerk [100] and Fisher [44], both of whom use economic and 
psychological motivation. I t is certainly mathematically convenient, and for when 
an infinite planning horizon is considered, offers a method for comparing reward 
streams. Nevertheless, there is li t t le normative reason for discounting or agreement 
of an objective discount rate, though there do exist arguments detailing why certain 
discounting functions have more appealing properties than others. 
Strotz [98] argues that only the EDF is a justifiable discounting function (see also 
Weller [105]). He claims that any such function should not change the util i ty of 
immediate rewards, that i t be non-negative and decreasing in time delay, and that 
it be dynamically consistent. Dynamic consistency requires that preferences between 
future rewards should not be changed if receivership is to be hastened or delayed, 
i.e., if one reward is deemed more desirable than another if they are to be received 
at time t\, then the preference relation should remain unchanged if both rewards 
are to be received at time £2 7^  L\- Only the EDF satisfies all of these properties. 
There are indeed axiomatizations for the use of maximising NPV and discounting 
through the EDF, and Meyer [76], Koopmans [67] and Fishburn & Rubinstein [43] 
have all offered similar suggestions. The most controversial axiom in Meyer's ax-
iomatization is that of Successive Pairwise Preferential Independence (SPPI): 
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• SPPI: Trade-offs between uti l i ty (consumption) amounts in periods i and i + 1 
are not dependent on uti l i ty (consumption) amounts in alternative periods. 
Treating a reward stream as a single multi-attributed reward implies that the DM's 
uti l i ty function could, in theory, be any arbitrary function of the entire collection 
of trade-off parameters and multi-period utilities. However, certain independence 
assumptions, if true, can reduce the complexity of this function to varying degrees of 
simplicity. SPPI is such an assumption that keeps the overall ut i l i ty form tractable. 
SPPI is similar to the Stationarity axiom of Koopmans [67], which claims that if 
two streams have identical first period reward, then preferences over the modified 
streams that are obtained by deleting the first period and advancing the timing 
of all subsequent rewards by one period, must be ordered in the same manner as 
the original unmodified streams were. Using this axiom, Koopmans establishes the 
existence of an additive ut i l i ty function for determining the worth of reward streams. 
Many philosophers, however, believe discounting to be irrational. Both Rawls [87] 
and Ramsey [85] criticise the action, with Ramsey claiming time discounting to be 
"a practice which is ethically indefensible and arises merely from the weakness of the 
imagination". Rawls [87, p.293] states that "the avoidance of pure time preference 
is a feature of being rational ... the mere difference of location in time ... is not in 
itself a rational ground for having more or less regard for i t " . 
2.3.2 History Dependent Utility 
One of the complaints of axioms like SPPI or Stationarity is that they do not allow 
previous reward realisation to affect preferences over future rewards. History depen-
dent utilities instead explicitly permit this, though at the cost of a more complicated 
uti l i ty function and the requirement to elicit more trade-off parameters. Discounting 
is then only included to incorporate effects such as inflation or mortality rates (see 
Yaari [109]) and is no longer expected to agree to the principles of the EDF, e.g., 
discount rates are no longer expected to be constant. 
2.3. Sequential Decision Solution 29 
A simple extension suggested by Meyer [77] is to state that future preferences are 
independent of past rewards, but that ordering of future rewards is relevant. This 
assumption does not generally imply the existence of unconditional single period 
utilities (as SPP1 or Stationarity allows), but is the most general assumption per-
mitt ing a solution through dynamic programming. However, the most general situa-
tion is contained within the work of Bell [11], who permits all forms of dependencies 
and independencies in preferences (though at a cost of requiring a great amount of 
trade-off parameters, whose interpretations are difficult to understand). 
One alternative to reduce complexity is to introduce state descriptors that record 
past reward realisations (Meyer [76,77]). Preferences over future rewards are then 
conditioned upon these descriptors, permitting future preferences to depend on the 
decision history. To keep computation tractable, and for ease of elicitation, i t may be 
that only influential summary statistics of the past, rather than a complete record, 
are used to condition future utilities on. 
An axiomatization for the use of state descriptors was provided by Bodily k. White 
[19], who considered an economic sequential decision problem. Bodily & White's 
D M must at each period i, for i = 0 , 1 , . . . , n — 1, select a consumption level 7 - 1 such 
that, if wl is the level of the DM's wealth at time i, r 1 < w'. The DM's problem is 
then to decide upon investment and consumption levels to optimise the consumption 
stream ? , 0 , r 1 , . . . ,rn,wn+1, with w1l+1 being terminal wealth. 
As decisions are made, the DM's decisions will be contingent on the outcomes of 
previous choices. The D M is assumed to base consumption and investment decisions 
on beliefs concerning future returns on investment and preferences for alternative 
consumption streams. Bodily & White permit attitudes towards future consump-
tion to depend upon current wealth and past consumption, and hence a summary 
descriptor is included for this purpose. 
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2.3.3 Evolving Utility 
That utilities may evolve is an additional consideration that is not only used to 
permit a change in preferences as a result of consumption level experienced (such 
as history dependent utilities), but also to allow preferences to change following 
nothing but a passage of time and a change in tastes. 
Witsenhausen [108] suggests a theory of Assumed Permanence in which it is accepted 
that future preferences may not be the same as those currently held. The D M still 
makes current decision selection under the assumption that future preferences wil l 
remain constant to what they currently are, but when coming to a future decision 
she may re-evaluate preferences and seek to select decisions that maximise ut i l i ty 
return with respect to previous choices, and where again i t is assumed that future 
preferences will remain the same as the now re-evaluated levels. Witsenhausen's 
theory has the great practical advantage of not requiring a model of how preferences 
will evolve. Its obvious disadvantage, however, is that early commitments may be 
made which are costly to reverse if preferences are found to have changed. 
White [106] also considers a sequential decision problem in which the DM's future 
preferences are uncertain, but as opposed to the Assumed Permanence of Witsen-
hausen, attempts to model how preferences may change. White achieves this by 
assuming that the DM's preferences are modelled by a vector of trade-off weights 
which may change as the D M progresses through decision selection. 
White considers a finite stage decision problem where preferences may change from 
stage to stage. Uncertainty over the result of decision selection is not considered, 
and hence the D M is assumed to know the result of any choice she makes. Thus 
her problem is, given knowledge of how preferences may evolve, which decision 
sequence should be selected. Three evolution mechanisms are considered, consisting 
of an optimistic scheme where preferences evolve in order to maximise utility, a 
pessimistic scheme where preferences evolve to minimise utility, and a scheme where 
preferences evolve randomly. 
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The final decision theory we mention that is based on evolving utilities is that 
discussed by Meyer [76]. Meyer extends his work with history dependent utilities 
by permitting preferences to be influenced by a time stream of extraneous events 
that are characterised by a sequence of parameter values. I t is assumed that such 
a parameter will influence the DM's uti l i ty function and that it is independent of 
previous rewards realised (the history dependence already allows for this) with the 
parameter value evolving randomly according to some specified probability function. 
Chapter 3 
Adaptive Utility 
This chapter provides motivation for the use of adaptive uti l i ty theory. A review of 
works that have either developed or made use of adaptive utilities is also included. 
3.1 Motivation 
The expected util i ty theory that was discussed in Chapter 2 proves that, provided 
the D M agrees to a certain collection of axioms, there wi l l be a unique (up to a 
positive linear transformation) ut i l i ty function that is in agreement with the DM's 
preferences. However, although we now know that this is the case, there is still 
the problem of determining what this function actually is. To determine the uti l i ty 
value of a particular reward, one can use the system of comparing the gamble which 
pays that particular reward with certainty, to a gamble which either pays the best 
reward or the worst reward. In practice though, i t is common to simply assume that 
a ut i l i ty function has a general form with particular properties, e.g., the logarithmic 
function that was suggested by Bernoulli [18] for monetary rewards. 
Nevertheless, this practice still assumes that a correct uti l i ty function representing 
the DM's true preferences for all possible outcomes can be identified. Furthermore, 
implicit within this is the assumption that the D M actually knows her true prefer-
ences. Yet in the real world this is not always the case, and it is perfectly natural 
for a D M to be unsure of her preferences. 
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A D M could, for example, be considering a reward that would not be received 
until some future time point, and then they need to consider how their preferences 
may have changed by that time point due to them being older and possibly also 
in a different situation. Another common example occurs when a D M is asked to 
consider rewards that are vague or unfamiliar to her. As Simon [97] states, "the 
consequences that the organism experiences may change the pay-off function ... it 
does not know how well i t likes cheese until i t has eaten cheese". 
I t is traditionally assumed, however, that the DM's ut i l i ty function is fully known, 
and that i t is even possible to make hypothetical choices. After a decision is made 
it is assumed that the uti l i ty realised is the same as was indicated by the uti l i ty 
function, and that there can be no surprises. Hence classical theory cannot account 
for uncertain preferences, with preferences over sure things being fixed. Nevertheless, 
in the real world a D M may learn about her likes and dislikes of new and novel 
rewards, a situation that classical theory cannot account for as i t has no element of 
ut i l i ty learning following new information. 
There are plenty of examples in the real-world demonstrating that a D M will not 
always be sure about her preferences, but rather that she may be uncertain of these 
and that she is able to learn about them. A D M seeking to purchase a new car 
and who test drives a possible choice is one such situation, for if the D M knew her 
preference for the car, as would be assumed in classical uti l i ty theory, what would 
be the reason for test driving it? 
Another example is that often companies offer a trial introductory price on a new 
product, or they may even offer free samples, but what would be the motivation for 
this if all potential customers knew precisely how much they liked or disliked the 
new product? Indeed, how many individuals have ever been disappointed with a 
result that was expected, or pleasantly surprised, for example, by how nice a new 
recipe is? 
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In order to illustrate this point, and in order to introduce a basic example that wil l 
be returned to throughout this thesis when demonstrating new aspects of adaptive 
uti l i ty theory, consider the following problem, which will be referred to as the Apple 
or Banana example. 
Example 3.1.1 
A D M faces the problem of deciding upon which f rui t to purchase at lunch. The 
shop has on offer two choices, either an apple or a banana. The D M is experienced 
with eating apples, having done so many times before, but she has never previously 
consummed a banana, and as such, is unsure which f ru i t she would prefer. Nev-
ertheless, she is able to look at the banana, to smell the banana, and to even ask 
the suggestion of friends. What she is not able to do, however, is taste the banana 
herself before making the decision to purchase i t . How then should such a D M make 
her choice? o 
3.2 Adaptive Utility 
Instead of assuming that the DM's actual preferences and corresponding uti l i ty 
function is precisely known, the theory of adaptive uti l i ty allows the D M to be 
uncertain over her true preferences and permits her to learn about them. In this 
sense the theory of adaptive uti l i ty is a normative theory for rational decision making 
when one accepts that there is uncertainty over the DM's true uti l i ty function. I t is 
assumed that the D M is able to envision possible preferences and to form expected 
preferences from these prior beliefs. Such expected preferences can then later change 
as a result of the DM's experiences, wi th some comparison being made between what 
she a priori expected and what she actually realised. In this manner the D M wil l 
be able to learn about her true ut i l i ty function, update her beliefs, and adapt her 
decision making accordingly. 
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However, for a single decision this strategy is no different to classical theory, as deci-
sion selection would be the same as if i t were assumed actual preferences equal prior 
expected preferences. Only in a sequential problem can a difference be observed, 
where the D M may learn about preferences and expected preferences may change. 
Indeed, a D M may make a different choice when faced with an identical but repeated 
problem, an act which is in contradiction to classical theory, but which is common 
in the real-world. Furthermore, in a sequential setting the optimal initial decision 
need not be that which appears to give greatest ut i l i ty under current beliefs. This 
is because information gained following selection of the first decision may depend 
on that decision, and so i t may be optimal to select one which is more informative 
of true preferences, enabling the D M to learn and select better decisions in the fu-
ture. This first decision may then be different to what would be selected in a one-off 
problem, even if outcomes of decisions are known. 
Uncertainty in the ut i l i ty function is incorporated by conditioning the uti l i ty on a 
parameter 9, which we wil l refer to as the DM's state of mind. A particular state of 
mind represents a particular preference ranking and is included within notation in 
a similar way as conditioning is in probability, i.e., the uti l i ty from a reward r when 
9 is the true state of mind will be represented as u(r\9). 
Definition 3.2.1 
Given a set of possible classical uti l i ty functions u(-\9i),... ,u(-\9n) that have been 
suitable scaled to ensure they are commensurable, and given a probability distribu-
tion P0 representing the DM's beliefs over the correct value for the state of mind 9, 
an adaptive utility function a u(-) is defined 1 to have domain the the convex set V 
of decisions and co-domain the set of real numbers K and is such that it equals the 
expectation of u(-\9) with respect to beliefs over 9, i.e., „u(-) = E0[u(-\9)]. o 
'This definition of an adaptive utility function is slightly different to that given by Cyert & 
DeGroot [27-29], As will be mentioned in the following section, Cyert & DeCioot introduce the 
term adaptive utility, but consider it as a function of both 7- and 0. However, for the purpose of 
this thesis, we find it beneficial to use the slightly different definition of u u ( ) = 
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Definition 3.2.2 
Possible classical uti l i ty functions u ( - | # i ) , . . . ,u(-\9n) are said to be commensurable 
if they have been scaled in such a way that i t is meaningful to compare the ut i l i ty 
values of different rewards when conditioned under differing possibilities for 0. That 
is to say, they are considered commensurable if given any three reward and state of 
mind pairs (r\, ( r 2 , # 2 ) , and (7-3,0 3 ) , wi th the property such that u(ri\9\) 7^  0 and 
u(ri\9\) > " ^ ( ^ 2 1 ^ 2 ) > ^ ( ^ 3 ^ 3 ) , then the D M would be indifferent between receiving 
7~2 when 9 = 62 and playing the hypothetical gamble where 7'] is paid and 9 — 9\ 
with probability u(r2\92)/u(ri\9i), and where otherwise r 3 is paid and 9 = #3. o 
Notice that, although it has not been explicitly included in the notation, an adap-
tive ut i l i ty function a " ( ) is not only a function of the reward or decision under 
consideration, but also of the DM's beliefs, Pg, over the state of mind 9. Further-
more, changes in these beliefs over 6 cause the adaptive uti l i ty function to change, 
or rather, the adaptive uti l i ty function adapts to incorporate changes in beliefs. 
Such changes in beliefs over 9 may occur in many ways, e.g., information from 
associates, advertising, or even actual reward realisation. I t depends on the problem 
under consideration, but once a source of information and a likelihood function are 
identified, Bayesian updating will lead to posterior beliefs over preferences. We wil l 
return to the possibility of learning of 9 in Chapter 5. 
3.3 Review of Adaptive Utility 
Adaptive ut i l i ty was introduced by Cyert &; DeGroot [27-29], who argued that 
paradoxes such as Allais' could be constructed because classical theory does not 
incorporate learning of preferences. Cyert & DeGroot also claimed that adaptive 
uti l i ty is consistent wi th casual empiricism, as fads in style and products can be 
observed. Their argument is that new products do not always have a genuine ad-
vantage over past options, but products may no longer be purchased as consumers 
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change beliefs over preferences. Hence, although not directly seen as a descriptive 
theory, Cyert & DeGroot claim that adaptive uti l i ty is a concept that better models 
actual behaviour. 
Although we agree with the normative concept of adaptive utility, we do not agree 
with these additional motivations. The Allais paradox is more connected with DMs 
not understanding the implications of their decisions on the axioms of rational choice, 
and adaptive ut i l i ty can only offer a possible explanation if the D M can learn of her 
preferences by simply being offered a choice between two potential lotteries (and 
learning nothing else). This is similar to another example by Cyert &; DeGroot 
in [27]. In this example a D M is in the process of selling a house and it is argued 
that i t is enough for the D M to be offered her requested price for her to change her 
preference for selling at that price. Also, although we agree that trial of various 
products can lead to a change in preferences over those products, i t is more likely 
that fads and fashions arise due to a change in actual utilities, not a change in beliefs 
over them, and as such, a theory of evolving uti l i ty would be more suitable. 
Cyert & DeGroot primarily considered examples of the use of adaptive uti l i ty in 
implications for economic problems such as consumer demand and income alloca-
tion. They suggested several settings for uncertainty over a DM's uti l i ty form, e.g., 
uncertainty over particular weights in the ut i l i ty function when rewards are mult i-
attributed, with beliefs over correct values possibly changing as a result of directly 
experiencing particular rewards. 
Erdem &; Keane [39] considered uncertain preferences in an analysis of data 2 on 
the sale of liquid detergents in the US over a 3 year period. In their study it was 
assumed that consumers were uncertain about particular brand attributes (especially 
for new brands), and a product wi th uncertain brand attributes was further assumed 
to have uncertain util i ty value at the time of purchase. However, it is assumed that 
2 Daily panel data of laundry detergent purchases for 3,000 households from two test markets. 
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DMs can learn about the ut i l i ty of products through usage and through external 
advertisements. As many purchases may be required for certain attributes to become 
apparent (e.g., how effectively does the detergent prevent colour fading), or because 
certain attributes may only become known on specific occasions (e.g., how effectively 
does the detergent clean a particular stain), a learning model is incorporated where 
noise corrupted observations of the true uti l i ty are observed. 
Erdem & Keane suggest that, rather than being myopic and selecting detergents that 
appear optimal under current ut i l i ty beliefs, consumers may recognise that current 
choices affect their information set, providing them with incentive to t ry new and 
unfamiliar brands. This model of decision making, where consumers consider the 
impact of their choice upon the expected present value of ut i l i ty over the entire 
planning horizon (the same suggestion as Cyert &; DeGroot), is compared to the 
myopic model of maximising immediate ut i l i ty return. Thus Erdem & Keane seek 
to examine the descriptive validity for this decision selection technique, finding i t to 
be slightly superior than the model which seeks immediate ut i l i ty maximization. 
Chajewska et al. [22] consider a sequential decision problem which they refer to 
as adaptive uti l i ty elicitation, the focus of which is solution to the problem an 
analyst faces when seeking to elicit a DM's ut i l i ty function. As the authors note, 
the complexity of ut i l i ty elicitation means that a decision must often be made when 
only partial ut i l i ty information is available. Chajewska et al. consider uti l i ty as 
a random variable drawn from a specific prior distribution, and determine optimal 
strategies for sequentially asking the D M questions about her preferences. This 
process is continued until a unique optimal decision is identified. 
Finally, Boutilier [21] considers foundational issues of adaptive utility, which he 
refers to as expected expected utility. As Boutilier notes, the decision that max-
imises adaptive uti l i ty is sensitive to the scaling of the possible util i ty functions, 
which are only unique up to a positive linear transformation. The term commensu-
rable is used to represent those possible ut i l i ty functions with which i t is meaningful 
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to make comparisons. Boutilier shows that under an assumption of extremum equiv-
alence (where under each possible ut i l i ty function there exists the same best and 
worst reward), ut i l i ty functions can be scaled in a specific manner to make them 
commensurable. Further discussion on foundations of adaptive uti l i ty is included in 
Chapter 4, and in Section 4.3 we wil l return to discussing commensurable utilities, 
demonstrating that possible ut i l i ty functions can be scaled to ensure commensura-
bility without Boutilier's strong assumption of extremum equivalence. 
As Cyert &; DeGroot [28] note, "we have begun to investigate the concept in one 
area of economics, and we are aware that much remains to be done". The work of 
Cyert & DeGroot does not discuss foundational implications for uncertain utilities, 
nor what i t might mean to compare different possible ut i l i ty functions that are only 
unique up to a positive linear transformation. As such, the contribution of this 
thesis towards the subject of adaptive uti l i ty commences in the next chapter where 
we consider the precise interpretation of the ut i l i ty parameter 6 and consider how, 
through repeated use of the classical axioms of rational choice, we can accommodate 
the maximisation of adaptive uti l i ty as a decision selection technique. Furthermore, 
in Chapter 5 we also consider how to determine optimal decision strategies for a 
problem consisting of n sequential decisions (Cyert &; DeGroot only provided a so-
lution for up to 2 decisions), discuss uti l i ty forms that can simplify the computation 
of solution algorithms, and present possible applications for reliability problems. 
Finally, in Chapter 6 we consider implications for the meaning of risk aversion and 
of value of information. These are two diagnostics of the decision problem that have 
been ignored in previous literature on adaptive uti l i ty related works. 
Chapter 4 
Foundations 
I n this chapter we offer discussion on the in te rpre ta t ion of a state of m i n d . We also 
propose a method of employing the classical system of expected u t i l i t y axioms to 
provide an argument for using the maximisa t ion of adaptive u t i l i t y as the logical 
decision selection rule. We conclude the chapter by discussing a method for creating 
commensurable u t i l i t y funct ions tha t does not require Bout i l ie r ' s [21] assumption of 
ex t remum equivalence (see Section 3.3). 
4.1 State of Mind 
As mentioned in Section 3.3, Cyer t & DeGroot [27] int roduce uncertainty in a D M ' s 
u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n by parameterising i t w i t h an unknown variable 6. However, their 
focus is p r ima r i l y on in t roduc ing the uncertain u t i l i t y concept and i n discussing 
impl ica t ions for economics. As such they do not address foundat iona l issues, and 
examinat ion of the precise ontological nature of 0 is avoided. For this reason we 
now offer our own in te rpre ta t ion of this u t i l i t y parameter which we have named the 
D M ' s state of m i n d . 
The true value of the state of m i n d 6 w i l l be used to represent the D M ' s t rue 
preferences. Classical theory, under the Completeness A x i o m A l , states tha t there 
is a t rue preference rank ing over the convex set V of decisions, the state of m i n d is 
s imply used to characterise this. Th i s is i n contrast to u, the state of nature, which 
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determines the actual reward tha t any given decision w i l l lead to (e.g., the horse 
tha t wins the race, when the decision is which horse to back). 
I n discussing the in terpre ta t ion of a state of m i n d we re tu rn to the set t ing of 
Anscombe &; A u m a n n [5] as described i n Subsection 2.2.1. I n this set t ing deci-
sions can either be object ive (roulet te) lotteries or subjective (horse) lotteries, w i t h 
possible rewards included in some f in i te set TZ. A u t i l i t y func t ion is then a func-
t ion, unique up to a positive linear t rans format ion , t ha t is i n agreement w i t h the 
D M ' s preference rank ing >: over the closed convex set of decisions V. Hence, pro-
vided t h a t changing 9 i n the parameterised u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n u(d\9) does not entai l a 
positive linear t ransformat ion , each value of 9 w i l l represent a different preference 
ranking >:#. T h a t is to say, a state of m i n d fundamenta l ly represents a possible 
preference ranking over the set of decisions. Note also tha t , at the risk of entering 
a rather abstract philosophical debate, we assume tha t the D M is not free to affect 
the correct value of 9, i.e., she can not select her t rue preferences. For example, we 
would say tha t the D M can not choose which of apples or bananas she t r u l y prefers 
(or whether they are equally preferable). Instead we c la im tha t the correct value 
of 9 is pre-determined independently of the views or wishes of the D M (hence the 
reference to an hypothet ica l gamble in D e f i n i t i o n 3.2.2). 
Our assumption then is t ha t uncer ta inty in the u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n is represented by 
uncer ta in ty over an unknown parameter 9 representing certain characteristics of the 
D M ' s preferences. T h e D M is assumed to hold pr ior beliefs about 9 and these are 
used to create expected preferences. Once the D M receives i n f o r m a t i o n concerning 
9 she can update beliefs th rough Bayes' Theorem (simultaneously upda t ing beliefs 
over preferences). True preferences are not assumed to change (unlike the evolving 
u t i l i t y theories of Subsection 2.3.3), only the D M ' s beliefs over what these actual 
t rue preferences are can alter, and this is done th rough a change in beliefs over 9. 
As discussed in Section 3 .1 , a D M may not necessarily know her t rue preferences and 
so may be uncer ta in of 9. B y using de F ine t t i ' s classification of the t e rm [31, p. 11], 
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9 is a well-defined random q u a n t i t y 1 , and as such, a p robab i l i ty d i s t r i bu t ion PE may 
be specified. Fur thermore, as preferences are inherently subject ive, i t seems na tu ra l 
to assume tha t PQ is also subjective. I n essence then, the use of adaptive u t i l i t y is 
analogous to the use of a hierarchical prior in Bayesian analysis (see Berger [15]). A 
u t i l i t y , when scaled to fa l l i n the interval [0 ,1] , corresponds to a p robab i l i ty value, 
w i t h the u t i l i t y of any reward r being tha t p robabi l i ty p which makes the D M 
indifferent between playing the gamble paying reward r for sure, and p lay ing the 
gamble tha t pays best reward r* w i t h p robabi l i ty p and worst reward r* otherwise. 
The use of an adaptive u t i l i t y f unc t ion s imply states tha t this u t i l i t y (p robab i l i ty ) 
value p is uncertain, and tha t instead of assuming a specific value the D M may assign 
a p robab i l i ty d i s t r i bu t i on over i t , which is analogous to the use of hierarchical priors. 
Beliefs over 9 can depend on beliefs over the state of nature u> (Cyer t h DeGroot [27] 
also suggest th i s ) , bu t unlike the actual value of 9 w i l l not affect the reward 
to be realised once a decision has been selected, i.e., 9 w i l l not affect the actual 
physical outcome of the decision (a l though i f probabil is t ic dependence exists between 
9 and ui, then i t w i l l also exist between 9 and the reward 7- t h a t w i l l be realised 
fo l lowing selection of any decision d). I n order to demonstrate the role of the state 
of mind 9 in the D M ' s decision problem, Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show influence diagrams 
for the classical s i tua t ion and the adaptive u t i l i t y s i tua t ion , respectively (see, e.g., 
Shachter [95] and the references therein for more details on influence diagrams). Note 
tha t in Figure 4.2 we have exp l ic i t ly pe rmi t t ed the case of probabi l is t ic dependence 
between 9 and u>. Independence between 9 and u could be represented by delet ing 
the arrow connecting these two nodes. 
'This random quantity may be observable (learning apples are preferred to bananas by eating 
one of each) or unobservable (only a noisy observation may be available) and depends on the 
scenario under consideration. We consider how one may learn about 0 in Chapter 5. 
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Figure 4 .1 : Influence diagram for certain u t i l i t y problem. 
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Figure 4.2: Influence diagram for adaptive u t i l i t y problem. 
As a fu r the r demonstra t ion of the role of the state of m i n d i n connection to the 
other decision components w i t h i n an adaptive u t i l i t y problem, we can consider the 
fo l lowing two examples of s i tuat ions in which i t may be reasonable to assume prob-
abil ist ic dependence between 0 and u. I t should be noticed, however, t ha t these 
examples are not intended to represent interest ing adaptive u t i l i t y problems (which, 
and as w i l l be discussed in Chapter 5, are necessarily of a sequential nature) , bu t 
tha t rather they s imply aid in the explanat ion of our intended role for a state of 
m i n d . 
For a f i rs t example of possible probabi l is t ic dependence between 9 and u, we can 
consider the fo l lowing s i tua t ion . A D M must decide which of two cake shops she 
w i l l v is i t . She can only v is i t one of them and must purchase the cake tha t is on offer 
in tha t shop. The f i rs t shop only sells chocolate cakes, whi l s t the second switches 
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between selling carrot cakes and sponge cakes. I n this s i tua t ion we let 9 represent 
the D M ' s t rue preference relat ion over lotteries paying one of these cake types as 
the re turn , whi ls t u> is used to represent the type of cake on sale in the second shop. 
I f the D M believed t h a t the second shop decided each day wha t type of cake to 
sell th rough some random chance mechanism, then there wou ld be probabil is t ic 
independence between 9 and CJ, w i t h the D M ' s beliefs over 9 not inf luencing her 
beliefs over what type of cake is on offer. However, the D M migh t believe tha t the 
owner of the second shop is qui te good at de te rmining the type of cake his customers 
on tha t day are l ikely to prefer, and selects which cake to sell accordingly. I n this 
case the D M migh t believe tha t there exists probabi l is t ic dependence between 9 and 
u>, w i t h the D M believing tha t i f she is more l ikely to t r u l y prefer carrot to sponge 
cakes, then the shop owner is more l ikely to have this type of cake on offer. Notice, 
however, tha t once a decision has been made, the t rue value of 9 has no causal 
influence on the actual reward tha t is realised. 
Another example of possible probabil is t ic dependence between 9 and u arises when 
we consider the fo l lowing s i tua t ion of a D M who is v i s i t i ng a kiosk. O n each day 
the kiosk sells only ice-cream or only hot dogs, w i t h the i t em on sale, represented 
by the state of nature to, being decided by the kiosk manager at the beginning of 
the day according to what he th inks w i l l be the weather on tha t day. The D M ' s 
preferences between ice-cream and hot dogs, as characterised by state of m i n d (9, is 
also assumed to depend on the weather. I n this s i tua t ion beliefs over u and 9 are 
condi t ional ly independent given knowledge of the weather, so the D M ' s beliefs over 
u> and 9 would only be independent i f she knew what the weather on tha t day would 
be like. 
T h e adaptive u t i l i t y concept is closely related to the concept of state-dependent 
u t i l i t y 2 . A state dependent u t i l i t y w i l l alter the D M ' s preferences depending on the 
2 F o r further information on state dependent utilities see the discussions and references included 
in Dreze & Rustichini [37], K a m i [62], or Schervish et al. [90], etc. 
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state of nature or s i tua t ion tha t she finds herself i n . For example, a state dependent 
u t i l i t y would be appropriate i f a r e tu rn of £ 1 0 0 for a correct backing of Red R u m 
was preferred to the same win for a correct backing of Desert Orch id (for the D M 
may jus t like Red R u m more than Desert Orch id) . 
T h e assumption of state dependency is usually removed i n classical u t i l i t y theory (or 
at least the descriptions of the problem is altered to incorporate the state of nature 
as an add i t iona l a t t r i bu te of the re tu rn f r o m decision selection), and is exp l ic i t ly 
removed i n the theory of Anscombe k. A u m a n n [5] who derive only state independent 
u t i l i t ies ( this is a t t r i bu t ed to the Mono ton i c i t y A x i o m A 5 , which is more commonly 
reworded as a state independence ax iom, see, e.g., Nau [81]). State dependency, 
however, is s imilar to the adaptive u t i l i t y concept where the D M ' s preferences may 
change depending on the true state of m i n d 9. Indeed, i n a one-off decision problem 
an adaptive u t i l i t y could be considered a special type of state-dependent u t i l i t y , as 
even though the t rue value of 9 does not affect the physical reward fo l lowing decision 
selection, i t does affect the u t i l i t y value for t ha t reward. 
A l t h o u g h the D M is not free to choose her state of m i n d , she is pe rmi t t ed to choose 
to act i n a way tha t is inconsistent w i t h her beliefs over i t . However, under the 
requirement tha t the D M maximises expected adaptive u t i l i t y , such an act ion is 
i r ra t iona l . To see this assume tha t the j o i n t d i s t r i bu t i on Pug represents t rue beliefs 
over the correct states of nature and m i n d , and let P'u 9 be any other d i s t r i bu t ion . Let 
d\ and d? denote those decisions deemed o p t i m a l under Pug and P^ 0 respectively. 
Then , under PUto, either d\ ~ d2, i n which case the D M achieves the same adaptive 
u t i l i t y level by repor t ing either P.^ o or P^g, or d\ >- d2, in which case the D M w i l l 
be act ing i r ra t iona l ly by repor t ing false d i s t r i bu t i on P^0 and selecting decision d2. 
4.2 Axioms of Adaptive Utility 
The system of classical axioms of ra t ional choice leads to the max imisa t ion of ex-
pected adaptive u t i l i t y as the logical decision selection technique. To achieve this 
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result in the case of independence between the state of m i n d and state of nature we 
use repeated appl icat ion of the theory of Anscombe & A u m a n n , which states that , 
assuming the D M agrees to the relevant axioms out l ined in Subsection 2.2.1, there 
exists a unique u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n (up to a positive linear t rans format ion) tha t is i n 
agreement w i t h the D M ' s preferences, regardless of whether decisions are seen as 
horse lotteries or as roulet te lotteries. Fur thermore, the u t i l i t y of a non-degenerate 
decision is equal to the p robab i l i ty weighted average of the u t i l i t ies of the i nd iv idua l 
possible rewards. Formally, we wish to prove the fo l lowing result: 
Theorem 4.2.1 
Acceptance of axioms A 1 - A 6 of Subsection 2.2.1 implies tha t , for a given d i s t r i bu t ion 
Pe, an adaptive u t i l i t y func t ion au(-) exists and is the unique f u n c t i o n (up to a 
positive linear t ransformat ion) tha t satisfies the fo l lowing two properties: 
1. For al l di,d2EV, di >z d2 au{d^) > tlu(d2). 
2. For all di,d2eV and pE ( 0 ,1 ) , au{pdx + (l — p)d2) = pau{d\) + (l-p)au(d2)o. 
Theorem 4.2.1 is of course a generalisation of the t r ad i t i ona l von Neumann & Mor -
genstern expected u t i l i t y result tha t was discussed in Subsection 2.2.1, r e tu rn ing 
to tha t case when Pe is a degenerate d i s t r ibu t ion . I n effect this means tha t the 
adaptive u t i l i t y func t ion is the D M ' s actual u t i l i t y f unc t ion for this set t ing. T h a t is 
not to say the adaptive u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n represents the t rue under ly ing preferences 
of the D M , and only when P0 is degenerate w i l l this be the case. Rather, the adap-
t ive u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n is representing the D M ' s preferences over decisions when i t is 
accepted tha t t rue preferences are uncertain and when such uncerta inty is modelled 
by d i s t r i bu t ion Pg. 
The proof of existence of the f u n c t i o n is s t ra ight fo rward , using both the fact tha t 
possible classical u t i l i t y funct ions u(-\8i),. .. , u(-\6n) exist and tha t the adaptive u t i l -
i t y f u n c t i o n is defined in Def in i t i on 3.2.1 for a given d i s t r i bu t ion P0. Also, tha t the 
func t ion satisfies proper ty 2 arises as a direct consequence of the analogous prop-
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erty of classical u t i l i t ies and because expectat ion is a linear operator. Hence, what 
remains to be shown to prove Theorem 4.2.1 is t h a t the adaptive u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n is 
the unique func t ion for this set t ing tha t satisfies proper ty 1. 
I n order to proceed we consider a decision outcome set a7Z t ha t consists of al l possi-
ble classical u t i l i t y values for all possible decisions. Th i s means tha t , i n add i t i on to 
a decision being associated w i t h a d i s t r i bu t ion over 1Z, i t w i l l also now be associated 
w i t h a d i s t r i bu t ion over a7l. A d d i t i o n a l use of Anscombe & Aumann ' s result (see 
Section 2.2) then means tha t there exists a unique (up to a posi t ive linear trans-
fo rma t ion ) u t i l i t y func t ion u* : (JZ —> K representing preferences over elements of 
alZ. Such a u t i l i t y func t ion , presuming the set of possible classical u t i l i t y funct ions 
have been scaled to ensure they are commensurable, can s imply r e tu rn the or iginal 
value tha t was the element of aTZ. P roper ty 2 of a classical u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n can then 
be used to extend the preference re la t ion to cover the entire set of decisions tha t 
are equivalent to d is t r ibut ions over aTZ. However, this is exactly wha t an adaptive 
u t i l i t y func t ion does in t ak ing the expectat ion of possible u t i l i t y values, and so as 
the u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n u* is unique, i t must then be the adaptive u t i l i t y func t ion . 
A l l t ha t remains is to question whether or not considering the outcome of a decision 
as a u t i l i t y value, and as such an element of aTZt affects the ra t iona l i ty of any of 
Ax ioms A 1 - A 6 . Th i s is a question the D M must consider herself. However, under 
the assumption tha t such u t i l i t y values are scaled to ensure commensurabi l i ty , and 
that i t is reasonable to consider preferences over hypothe t ica l gambles tha t can never 
actual ly be played (the D M is not pe rmi t t ed to affect the t rue value of 6), i t would 
appear tha t there is no addi t ional reason for not accepting them. T h e only possible 
query would be whether or not preferences over u t i l i t y values depend on the state 
of m i n d tha t occurred. However, this is not the case as once i t is assumed tha t i t is 
meaningful to compare various classical u t i l i t y values, decisions are being viewed as 
lotteries over numerical values, w i t h preference always being in agreement w i t h the 
size of the par t icular value considered. 
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4.3 Constructing Commensurable Utilities 
I n the previous section we argued that , under the assumption tha t Ax ioms A 1 - A 6 
are true, the o p t i m a l decision for selection is t ha t which maximises the expectat ion 
( w i t h respect to beliefs over preferences) of the various possible u t i l i t y funct ions. 
However, as we mentioned in Section 3.3, Bout i l i e r [21] demonstrates tha t such a 
decision rule is not invariant to the linear scaling of the possible u t i l i t y funct ions . 
Furthermore, in def in ing an adaptive u t i l i t y and in the arguments of Section 4.2, we 
had to assume t h a t the various classical u t i l i t ies had been sui tably scaled to ensure 
commensurabil i ty. Thus there exists a problem in de te rmin ing the appropriate scal-
ing of each f u n c t i o n to ensure commensurabil i ty , i.e., t o ensure tha t different u t i l i t y 
values f r o m d i f f e r ing u t i l i t y funct ions can be meaningfu l ly compared. 
To i l lustra te this problem consider two possible u t i l i t y funct ions u(di\9i) = 2i and 
u(di\92) = I{i=\) for i 6 { 1 , 2 } (here / { i = i } is used to represent the indicator func t ion 
tha t returns value 1 i f i = 1 and value 0 otherwise). Assume t h a t pr ior beliefs 
are such tha t P(0 = 0X) — P(0 = 92) = 0.5, so the adaptive u t i l i t y maximiser 
should select decision d2. However, the f u n c t i o n u(d,i\92) = 3 / { ; = i } is a positive 
linear t r ans fo rmat ion of u(di\92) = I{i=\), and thus represents exactly the same 
preferences under 92. Yet when u(-\92) is used, the adaptive u t i l i t y maximiser should 
select decision d\. T h e issue then is, knowing tha t bo th u(-\62) and u{-\92) (and also 
the in f in i t e number of al ternative positive linear t ransformat ions of u{-\92)) represent 
exactly the same preference ordering over the set of decisions, which is appropriate 
for pe r fo rming our adaptive u t i l i t y calculations? Clearly we have to be careful as 
each of u{-\92) and u{-\92) leads to the selection of a di f ferent decision. 
Bout i l i e r [21] resolved this problem by making an assumption of ex t remum equiv-
alence. Th i s assumption requires that , under each possible u t i l i t y func t ion , there 
exists the same most favourable reward r* and the same least favourable reward r t . 
Furthermore, i t is also required tha t each possible u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n is normalised so 
as to give the same u t i l i t y value for r* and the same u t i l i t y value for r t . 
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W h e n ex t r emum equivalence does hold Bout i l i e r shows tha t , by viewing the decision 
problem as the selection of a compound gamble in which the f i rs t stage is a gamble 
over the u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n and the second a s tandard gamble over rewards (similar 
to our repeated appl icat ion of Anscombe &; Aumann ' s theory i n Section 4.2), there 
exists a method for scaling classical u t i l i t ies so tha t commensurabi l i ty is possible. 
This assumption of ex t remum equivalence, however, is unreasonable for many deci-
sion problems. For example, we may wish for a par t icu lar state of m i n d to represent 
a preference reversal. Th i s could indeed be the case i n Example 3.1.1, where one 
state of m i n d may represent a preference for apples, whi l s t an al ternat ive leads to 
a preference for bananas. Furthermore, even in s i tuat ions where i t is reasonable 
to assume tha t there exists a reward tha t is cer ta inly considered best and another 
tha t is cer ta inly considered worst, we may wish for the s t rength of preference, w i t h 
respect to at least one more op t ion , to vary. 
As was discussed i n the previous section, an adaptive u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n is an actual 
u t i l i t y func t ion , rank ing decisions by their expected ut i l i t ies (under the assumption 
of commensurabi l i ty) w i t h respect to beliefs over the correct preference ranking as 
determined by the state of m i n d 6. For this reason we can construct an adaptive 
u t i l i t y func t ion in the same way as classical u t i l i t i es are t r ad i t iona l ly constructed. 
To do this , first assume tha t (r*,0*) is the best reward and state of m i n d pair (i.e., 
receiving reward r* i f 0* were t rue would be at least as preferable to receiving any 
other reward under any other state of m i n d ) , and t h a t ( r t , 6 t ) is the worst reward 
and state of m i n d pair (i.e., receiving reward r„ i f 6„ were t rue is at least as less bad 
as receiving any other reward under any other state of m i n d ) . Under this assumption 
the adaptive u t i l i t y value of any other reward and state of m i n d pair (r, 6) is the 
number p G [0,1] such tha t the D M is indi f ferent between receiving r under state 
of m i n d 6 for certain, or p laying the gamble paying r* under state of m i n d 0* w i t h 
p robab i l i ty p and r , under state of m i n d 0* otherwise. 
Before cont inuing i t is impor t an t to note tha t this const ruct ion method, and the 
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method suggested by Bout i l ie r , requires the D M to consider preferences over reward 
and state of m i n d pairs. Indeed, i n doing this we are now viewing the state of 
m i n d as an a t t r i bu te of decision outcome, rather than as s imply a par t of the state 
space. Th i s task is far f r o m t r i v i a l , requi r ing the D M to make hypothe t ica l choices 
tha t can not be played in real i ty (the D M is not pe rmi t t ed to choose the true value 
of 9). A l t h o u g h in t roduc ing a state of m i n d makes the task of u t i l i t y e l ic i ta t ion 
harder, the assumption tha t hypothe t ica l choices can be made is also included in 
the Completeness A x i o m A l of classical u t i l i t y theory (see Section 2.2). Neverthe-
less, in an adaptive u t i l i t y set t ing the D M must agree to comparabi l i ty between al l 
d i s t r ibu t ions over possible reward and state of m i n d combinations. 
T h e requirement to consider d is t r ibut ions over reward and state of m i n d pairs is 
more than what is required when u t i l i t y is not uncertain, and we note tha t the 
impl i ca t ion of repeated use of A x i o m A l i n the construct ion of an adaptive u t i l i t y 
func t ion requires not only tha t there is a system of classical orderings (one for each 
value of 9), bu t tha t these be grouped and combined together when decisions are 
considered under d i f fe r ing values of 9. The al ternat ive is not to use A x i o m A l , 
leading to interval u t i l i t y theories as discussed in Chapter 2 (the cost being tha t the 
D M may be presented w i t h a s i tua t ion w i t h o u t a f u l l preference ordering over the 
set of decisions). 
I t is assumed tha t i n applications of adaptive u t i l i t y theory, a D M w i l l select various 
possible classical u t i l i t y forms th rough relevant properties tha t the state of m i n d 
u t i l i t y parameter w i l l in troduce in to the problem. Formally, however, a D M should 
be aware of the influence this parameter has on reported preferences, and perhaps 
this task may be made easier by p rov id ing a descript ion of wha t the state of mind 
actual ly represents. 
For example, in our apple and banana example we could say tha t one state of m i n d 
represents the s i tua t ion where "bananas are j u s t as nice as m y favour i te f o o d " , 
whi ls t another could represent the s i tua t ion where "bananas are as bad as my least 
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favouri te f ood" . 
For more interesting problems, in par t icular w i t h many or even an i n f i n i t e 3 amount 
of possible values for 0, this task becomes increasingly d i f f i c u l t or even impossible. 
I n this case i t would appear t h a t there is no other possibi l i ty than to r e tu rn to 
selecting possible classical u t i l i t y funct ions because of appropriate properties they 
have. 
The construct ion method tha t assigns adaptive u t i l i t y values by considering prefer-
ences over lotteries tha t have as their re turn a reward and state of m i n d pair, bounds 
al l adaptive u t i l i t y values to the interval [0 ,1] . However, a suitable t ransformat ion 
can lead to the f u n c t i o n being restr icted to any f in i te interval [a, b] (as an adaptive 
u t i l i t y f unc t i on , just like a classical u t i l i t y func t ion , is unique up to a posit ive l i n -
ear t r ans format ion) . Yet, i f the D M really were to use this const ruct ion method, 
then a m a j o r mot iva t ion for the use of adaptive u t i l i t ies is lost, i.e., preferences 
over rewards are again assumed to be known ou t r igh t (even worse there is a greater 
number of rewards to consider due to the addi t ional a t t r i bu t e of the state of m i n d ) . 
Instead, we demonstrate below tha t i n applications where the D M is able to state 
her collection of possible classical u t i l i t y funct ions , and p rov id ing these are scaled 
so as to be commensurable, she is be able to create her adaptive u t i l i t y f unc t ion 
di rec t ly f r o m them. 
To achieve commensurabi l i ty of classical u t i l i t y funct ions u{r\6\), u ( r | # 2 ) , • • u(r\9n) 
we constrain them all to f a l l w i t h i n the in terval [0,1] and normalise the adaptive 
u t i l i t y func t ion to cover this in terval by specifying u(r*\Q*) = 1 and u(?-»|0») = 0 
(here we i m p l i c i t l y reject the t r i v i a l s i tua t ion where a l l reward and state of m i n d 
pairs are viewed as equally preferable). Note tha t i n de te rmin ing r* and r, i t is 
sufficient to check only those results tha t maximise or minimise some classical u t i l i t y 
3 A derivation of adaptive utility theory for continuous beliefs over 6 has been avoided in this 
work, but to enable (in Chapter 6) examination of the effects adaptive utility has on utility diag-
nostics etc.. we assume that there is no difficulty in allowing continuous distributions over 0. 
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func t ion . We then scale each classical u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n u(r\9k) as follows: 
W i t h the no ta t ion ( p i c i ] , . . . ,pnan) representing the lo t t e ry paying a; w i t h probabi l -
i ty pi, and (rk,0k) representing receiving rk when 9k is the t rue state of mind : 
• I f u(r\9k) is such tha t u(i'^\9k) = u(r2\9k) for all r i , r 2 € 1Z, then we set 
u(r\Ok) = p w i t h p 6 [0,1] such tha t ( l ( r , 0 t ) ) ~ (p ( r* ,0*) , (1 - p ) ( r » , 0 , ) ) . 
• Otherwise there exists fok,rgk £ 7Z such tha t , for any other r G we have 
u ( f f l J 0 f c ) > u(r\9k) > u(r8k\9k) and s t r ic t re la t ion u ( f 6 k \ 9 k ) > u(rgk\9k). We 
scale such a u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n by using the two constraints u ( f 0 k \ 9 k ) = qe and 
u(rgk\9k) = where Q o k i % k e [0,1] are respectively determined by con-
sidering the lo t te ry making ( l { f 6 k , 9 k ) ) ~ (qek(r\9*),{l - q 0 k ) ( r „ 9 9 ) ) and 
( l f o t A ) ) ~ ( ^ ( ^ . ^ . ( 1 " 9 f l f c ) ( ^ . ^ ) ) t rue. 
Under this scaling of classical u t i l i t ies , commensurabi l i ty is ensured w i t h o u t the 
assumption tha t ex t remum equivalence holds. The fo l lowing example i l lustrates how 
knowledge of the f o r m of each of a collection of classical u t i l i t y funct ions simplifies 
f o r m u l a t i o n of the adaptive u t i l i t y f unc t i on . 
Example 4.3.1 
A D M has been given a diagnosis for which there are several incompat ible treat-
ments. The result r i n this scenario is a two dimensional vector (s,t), w i t h s mea-
sur ing severity of the side-effect and L measuring the relative t ime u n t i l complete 
recovery. B o t h ,s and t, run between 0 and 1, w i t h a higher score representing a better 
s i tua t ion . T h e D M has no experience of requir ing such medical t reatment and is 
thus uncer ta in over her preferences for di f ferent possible values of m u l t i - a t t r i b u t e d 
r . Hence we assume tha t her two possible states of m i n d are: 
• 9\\ I t is most impor t an t the D M recovers as quickly as possible. 
• 92: The D M views recovery t ime as only being f a i r l y impor t an t . 
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We assume tha t these possibilities are represented by a posit ive linear t r ans fo rmat ion 
of the classical u t i l i t y funct ions u(?*|#i) = t and u(r\92) = 0.5t + 0.5s, respectively, 
and w i l l seek to scale these funct ions in order to ensure they are commensurable. 
Rather than t r y i n g to construct an adaptive u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n based on compar ing a l l 
combinat ions of possible results r and possible states of m i n d 9, we a im to f i n d a 
suitable scaling of the above classical funct ions so t h a t a u ( r ) = Ee[u(r\9)]. F i rs t the 
D M must provide the best and worst combinat ion of r and 9. Suppose tha t these 
are ( r* ,0*) = ( ( 1 , 1 ) , 0 i ) and ( r . , 0 , ) = ( ( 0 , 0 ) , r e s p e c t i v e l y . As b o t h of these 
relate to the case where 9 = 9\, we scale the f u n c t i o n u(r\9^) to cover the interval 
[0,1] which , as i t current ly does so, requires no a l tera t ion. 
Next the D M considers the best and worst results under 62- These are again the 
pairs (1 ,1) and (0 ,0) respectively. We now determine probabi l i ty values qg and 
q(h such t h a t bo th the relations ( l ( ( 1 , 1 ) , 92)) ~ (q02((1,1),^), (1 - q92){{0, 0 ) , 0 , ) ) 
and ( l ( ( O , O ) , 0 2 ) ) ~ l ) , ^ i ) , (1 — 3 t f a ) ( ( 0 , 0 ) , ^ 1)  hold . Assuming that , upon 
consideration, the D M assigns qg„ = 0.7 and q = 0.2, we are able to determine the 
values of constants a and b i n the generic f o r m for a u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n representing 
the same preferences as u(r\92), i.e., u(r\92) = a(0.5s + 0.5/) + b. 
The scaling is then f ixed by f ind ing constants a and b which simultaneously solve 
the equations a ( 0 . 5 ( l ) + 0.5(1)) + 6 = 0 7 and a(0.5(0) + 0.5(0)) + b = 0.2. Th i s 
leads to 6 = 0.3 and a = 0.4, and provides us w i t h our scaling for u(r\d2), i.e., 
u(r\92) = 0.4(0.5s + 0 . 5 0 + 0.3. To determine au(r) only the D M ' s subjective beliefs 
P(9 = 0 j ) = 1 - P(9 = 92) are now required. © 
Example 4.3.2 below also i l lustrates this system for construct ion of an adaptive 
u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n , and is specifically concerned w i t h uncer ta inty over the diagnostic 
of risk aversion (a concept later discussed i n Chapter 6) . 
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Example 4.3.2 
We assume tha t TZ = [0,100], 6 G { 1 0 , 2 0 , 3 0 } , and tha t classical u t i l i t ies are such 
tha t u(r\0) = a0 log(y + 6) + b0 w i t h ao > 0 (here 0 influences local risk aversion 
and ao and bo set the scale). To place these u t i l i t y funct ions on a suitable scale to 
be used i n const ruct ing the adaptive u t i l i t y f unc t i on , we make the assumption that , 
under any value of 6, u(10Q,9) = 1 and u(0,9) = 0 ( this is ex t remum equivalence). 
Th i s provides 6 independent linear equations w i t h 6 unknowns: 
a 1 0 log(110) + 6 1 0 = 1, a 1 0 log(10) + 6 1 0 = 0 
a 2 0 log(120) + 62o = 1, a20 log(20) + 6 2 0 = 0 
a 3 0 log(130) + &30 = 1. G30 log(30) + 6 3 0 = 0 
This results i n (where numeric answers are given to 2 decimal places): 
a , ° = iog(iio)-iog(io) = a 9 6 ' 6 1 0 = -iog(no)(-°iig(io) = - ° ' 9 6 
n 1 i on . _ lQg(20) 1 f i ? 
a 2 ° " log(120) - log(20) - L 2 9 ' 6 2 0 - -log(120)-log(20) ~ ^ 
a 3 ° " log(130) - log(30) - L 5 ? ' 6 3 0 - -log(130)-log(30) ~ ~ 2 ' 3 2 
Approp r i a t e ly subs t i tu t ing these into the funct ions u ( r | 0 ) results in ensuring com-
mensurabil i ty. 
Chapter 5 
Applications 
Thi s chapter focuses on the use of the adaptive u t i l i t y concept in sequential decision 
making. We consider impl ica t ions for decision selection strategies and possibilities 
for the D M to learn about her u t i l i t ies as she progresses th rough her decision se-
quence. The chapter concludes w i t h discussion and examples of the use of adaptive 
u t i l i t y i n the specific area of re l i ab i l i ty theory. 
5.1 Sequential Decision Problems 
I n a one-off sol i tary decision problem, the use of adaptive u t i l i t y and the pe rmi t -
tance of uncer ta inty over preferences does not lead to any difference in selection 
strategy f r o m tha t arising f r o m the assumption tha t the D M ' s t rue u t i l i t y func-
t ion equals the expectat ion of possible u t i l i t y funct ions . Adap t ive u t i l i t y is thus 
a generalisation of classical expected u t i l i t y theory tha t is of l i t t l e benefit in this 
sett ing. Nevertheless, there are many si tuations i n l i fe where a D M is required to 
make a sequence of decisions, and where the outcome and selection of previous de-
cisions may well be relevant for changing beliefs and options for f u t u r e decisions. 
I n such si tuations connections over the whole sequence of choices are relevant when 
de termining an o p t i m a l decision selection strategy. The solut ion to such sequential 
decision problems is o f t en the focus of Bayesian s ta t is t ical decision theory (see, for 
example, [15,34,46]). 
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The type of problem under consideration i n this chapter can be described in the 
fo l lowing way. We assume tha t the D M has to make a sequence of n decisions 
d\d?,. .. ,dn, and tha t fo l lowing the selection of each decision d1 the D M receives 
a re turn r l . Fur thermore , when considering the selection of decision d\ the D M is 
aware of past decisions d1, d 2 , . . . , dl~l she had previously selected and the returns 
r l , r 2 , . . . , r 1 _ 1 they respectively led to. T h e D M ' s object ive is to maximise the 
u t i l i t y of the entire sequence of decisions given by a f u n c t i o n u(d} ,d2,... ,dn). A n 
influence d iagram of a two stage problem is given in Figure 5.1 below, w i t h the arc 
connecting node 7 - 1 to r2 representing the set t ing tha t beliefs over outcome r2 of 
decision d2 can depend on the outcome r 1 t h a t was observed fo l lowing selection of 
decision d1. Also note tha t , i n order to keep the d iagram reasonably simple, Figure 
5.1 now omits the state of nature u>; however, i n a f u l l graphical representation ui 
would be included as an addi t iona l node w i t h arcs entering b o t h r 1 and r2. 
d 1 
0 U 
Figure 5.1: Influence diagram for classic 2-period sequential problem. 
Interest ing problems in this area arise when there is i n i t i a l uncer ta inty over what 
the actual outcome of any decision selection w i l l be, bu t where observations of past 
outcomes are relevant i n de te rmining likely outcomes of f u t u r e decisions. For this 
reason i t can o f t en be beneficial, in a decision sequence of suitable length, to i n i t i a l l y 
select decisions in which there is large uncerta inty as to the l ikely outcome. The 
reason for this is t ha t the observation of the i n i t i a l r e tu rn provides i n f o r m a t i o n tha t 
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can be used i n fu tu re decision selection. 
I f a decision which has large pr ior uncerta inty over its outcome is selected and is 
noted to lead to a beneficial outcome, then i t would appear tha t the selection of tha t 
decision w i l l lead to a beneficial outcome i n general, and so i t should be selected 
again. However, i f the outcome of such a decision was seen to be bad, then the D M 
can learn about this and avoid t h a t decision in the fu tu re , hence only suffer ing the 
bad outcome once. 
De te rmin ing an op t ima l selection strategy for a f in i t e length decision sequence is a 
dynamic p rogramming problem, and is solved th rough the use of backward induc t ion 
and Bel lman's Equa t ion [12, 13]. Th i s solut ion requires the D M to consider a l l 
possible histories she may have observed by the t ime she comes to selecting the 
n-th decision. She then determines wha t would be the o p t i m a l decision dn for 
each possible decision history, and this w i l l f o r m her decision strategy for tha t t ime 
point . Formally, given a decision his tory H" t ha t details al l her past decisions 
d 1 , . . . , dn~l and the rewards r l , . . . ,rn~l t ha t they respectively led to, the D M 
determines a func t ion n11 which takes as i ts argument Hn and returns a feasible 
entry f r o m X>"(/• /") , the set of decisions available at the n - t h selection poin t given 
his tory Hn. 
Fol lowing dynamic programming, w i t h knowledge of nn the D M seeks to determine 
•nn~l, a f u n c t i o n tha t takes history Hn~l as its argument and returns an element 
of V n ~ 1 ( H n ~ l ) . Th i s is done by considering the D M ' s beliefs about the outcome of 
various decisions i n V n ~ 1 ( H n ~ l ) and the l ike l ihood of moving to any of the histories 
in Hn (and wha t tha t entails for the decision d" t ha t w i l l be selected according 
to o p t i m a l strategy IT11). Cont inu ing in this manner of considering current beliefs 
and no t ing f u t u r e o p t i m a l strategies permits the D M to keep determining o p t i m a l 
strategies for earlier decisions u n t i l eventually she has found TT1. 
Formally, w i t h U{ = u(d\ . . . , d\ T T , + 1 { H i + l ) , . . . , Ttn(Hn)) and U n = u ( d \ . . . , d n ) , 
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the D M should select decision strategy ir', for i = 1 , . . . , n — 1, i n the fo l lowing 
manner: 
n ' ( H L ) = axg m a x EH>+ilHi4i[- • • " - ' ^ " - ' ( H " - ' ) ^ ' ] ] (5.1) 
The D M should select nn such that : 
7r n ( / - / ' 1 ) = arg m a x U n (5.2) 
Equa t ion (5.1) contains a nested sequence of expectations, each of which requires 
the D M to consider a d i s t r i bu t ion of the f o r m PH3\H3-1 ^-^(Hi-1)- Th i s condi t ioning 
argument implies tha t given and 7 r : ' ~ 1 ( / - / J ~ 1 ) , only the reward r J _ 1 fo l lowing 
decision 7 r J ' _ 1 ( / P _ 1 ) remains uncertain. Also note tha t b o t h Equations (5.1) and 
(5.2) use the more fo rmal version of u t i l i t y as a f u n c t i o n w i t h argument the decision 
tha t was selected. As mentioned i n Subsection 1.1.1, however, one usually considers 
a u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n as a func t ion w i t h the re tu rn f r o m the selected decision as its 
argument, and in Equa t ion (5.2) i t is the his tory HN tha t is used to determine 
updated beliefs for the re tu rn r n fo l lowing decision selection d n . 
I n an adaptive u t i l i t y set t ing, we no longer assume tha t the D M ' s t rue preferences are 
known, but rather tha t her actual u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n n{d),.. . , d n ) for decision stream 
d 1 , . . . , d n is uncertain, w i t h such uncerta inty being represented by uncerta inty over 
the state of m i n d 9. I n such a s i tua t ion , Chapter 4 demonstrated tha t the D M 
should make decision selection by seeking to maximise thei r adaptive u t i l i t y func t ion 
a u { d \ . . . , d r ) = E0[u(d\...,<F\6)]. 
However, i f the D M is not able to learn about 6 as she is moving th rough her 
decision sequence, then once again we r e tu rn to the classical s i tua t ion , w i t h the 
only difference tha t Eg[u(d},..., d.n\0)] replaces u,(dl,..., d,n) i n Equations (5.1) and 
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(5.2). For this reason we w i l l assume in this chapter tha t the D M is able to learn 
about 6 as she progresses th rough her decision sequence. Section 5.2 w i l l look in to 
the specific details of how this could be the case. 
Assuming the D M is able to learn about 0 as she moves th rough her decision se-
quence, by the t ime she considers decision cP, pr ior d i s t r i bu t ion P6 w i l l no longer be 
relevant in representing beliefs over her state of m i n d . Instead posterior d i s t r i bu t ion 
Pe\Gi should be used, w i t h G-7' the addi t ional i n f o r m a t i o n about 6 received by the 
t ime d? is to be selected. Th i s is different to the classical theory, as now the func-
t ion tha t the D M is seeking to maximise, „ u ( d 1 , . . . , d") , w i l l no longer be assumed 
constant over the du ra t i on of the decision sequence, hence p rov id ing mot iva t ion for 
referr ing to this u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n as an adaptive u t i l i t y func t ion . Nevertheless, for-
mal ly we should state tha t an adaptive u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n also uses the D M ' s beliefs 
about state of m i n d 8 as an addi t ional argument, i n which case (v iewing an adaptive 
u t i l i t y as a f u n c t i o n of bo th decision selection and beliefs over 6) the f u n c t i o n to be 
maximised does not change. However, as opposed to decisions, the D M is not free 
to select her beliefs over 6 and as such we have chosen to drop i ts inclusion as a 
fo rmal argument of the func t i on . 
I n order to learn about 9 we assume the D M observes u t i l i t y i n f o r m a t i o n zl fo l lowing 
selection of decision d\ and an influence diagram representing this s i tuat ion for a 2-
period sequential decision problem is given in Figure 5.2. Note tha t , as w i t h Figure 
5.1, a f u l l representation should include a node for LJ w i t h arcs entering bo th r1 and 
r 2 , bu t this has again been removed in order to s i m p l i f y the diagram. Also note tha t 
Figure 5.2 represents a s i tua t ion in which the i n f o r m a t i o n learnt about the D M ' s 
u t i l i t y func t ion , as represented by the z1 node, does not depend on the reward r 1 
obtained fo l lowing selection of decision d1. However, i f the u t i l i t y i n fo rma t ion d id 
depend on the actual reward obtained, as may be appropriate i n some si tuations, 
then an addi t ional arc would be required going f r o m node r 1 to node z 1 . 
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Figure 5.2: Influence diagram for an adaptive u t i l i t y 2-period sequential problem. 
T h e u t i l i t y i n f o r m a t i o n zl can be any th ing tha t the D M deems relevant for learning 
about her t rue preferences as characterised by her state of m i n d 9. Depending on 
the part iculars of the problem zl may or may not depend on the reward 7*' obtained 
fo l lowing the selection of decision d', b u t as w i l l be discussed below, interest ing 
adaptive u t i l i t y problems only arise i f zl does i n some way depend on the actual 
selection of decision d ' . Section 5.2 w i l l fu r the r ment ion how such u t i l i t y in forma-
t ion may arise and w i l l also discuss how the learning of u t i l i t y takes place in some 
l i tera ture examples tha t consider a s imilar set t ing. 
As discussed above, Figure 5.2 exp l ic i t ly includes an arc f r o m d) to z l , meaning tha t 
the i n f o r m a t i o n received about u t i l i t y parameter 9 w i l l depend on the decision d) 
tha t is chosen. However, i n [29, pp. 133-135] Cyer t & DeGroot make the fo l lowing 
statement (where they use no ta t ion such tha t 9 is the uncertain u t i l i t y parameter 
and 5i is the i-th per iod decision): 
"Indeed, even in a two-per iod problem i n which ... the in fo rma t ion 
obtained about 9 in the first period does not depend on which decision 5i 
is chosen or which consequence ?'i occurs, the decision maker must take 
possible changes i n u t i l i t y in to account when choosing 6^ ... The impor-
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t an t feature of this result f r o m our present po in t of view is t ha t when 
the decision maker chooses 8^, he or she must consider the f u l l range of 
possible new expected u t i l i t y funct ions ... t ha t migh t be obtained f r o m 
the observation ... I t should be noted tha t b o t h 8\ and 82 w i l l be differ-
ent f r o m the decisions tha t would be op t ima l in t r ad i t i ona l theory ... I t 
should be emphasised, moreover, t ha t even though the decision maker 
has no control over the i n f o r m a t i o n about 9 t ha t w i l l be generated in the 
f i r s t per iod, the o p t i m a l 81 i n our approach w i l l also be dif ferent f r o m 
the one i n t r ad i t iona l theory." 
We believe Cyer t &; DeGroo t are mistaken in this statement. We interpret i t as 
ind ica t ing tha t a different d1 could be selected i f u t i l i t y i n f o r m a t i o n were expected 
after i ts selection, even i f such i n f o r m a t i o n is independent of d ] . However, this would 
be s imilar to suggesting tha t pr ior beliefs over what w i l l be the D M ' s posterior 
d i s t r i bu t ion over a parameter of interest, fo l lowing observation of relevant data, can 
be di f ferent to the current prior d i s t r ibu t ion over tha t parameter. 
I n s i tuat ions where the selection of d1 has no influence on the observation zl tha t is 
in fo rmat ive about 9, the D M should select the same decision tha t they would have 
selected i f i t were assumed tha t no i n f o r m a t i o n about the state of m i n d would be 
made available. On ly i f the D M is able to influence zl by selection of d1 would there 
be an addi t iona l value to selecting a par t icular d1 due to the i n f o r m a t i o n gained 
over 9. Th i s would appear the more interest ing case due to i ts difference to classical 
theory, and hence the inclusion of the arc between dl and 2 1 i n Figure 5.2. 
I f u t i l i t y i n f o r m a t i o n is independent of decision selection, the sequential adaptive 
u t i l i t y set t ing is similar to the Assumed Permanence approach of Witsenhausen 
[108] t h a t was discussed in Subsection 2.3.3. I n tha t theory i t was accepted tha t 
'In the original text this term is given as 9\, yet we believe this to be a typing error. Also, 
omissions in the quotation, represented by ellipses, refer to material irrelevant to this discussion. 
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fu tu r e preferences may not be the same as current preferences, bu t t ha t decisions 
should be made under the assumption tha t they w i l l be the same. Once fu r the r 
i n fo rma t ion is known, new preferences are ident i f ied and new decisions are made 
under the assumption tha t such preferences w i l l again remain constant, and this 
f o r m of decision making continues indefini tely. 
I n the adaptive u t i l i t y set t ing we do not require t rue preferences to change, instead 
i t is only assumed tha t they are uncertain. Yet , when u t i l i t y i n f o r m a t i o n is inde-
pendent of decision selection, decisions should be made under the assumption tha t 
t rue preferences are equal to current expectations, even though i t is accepted tha t 
in the fu tu re there may be reason for the D M to change her beliefs over her t rue 
preferences. W h e n such i n f o r m a t i o n is gained, expectations of t rue preferences may 
change and f u t u r e decisions w i l l again be selected under the assumption tha t t rue 
preferences are equal to the new expectations, and so on. Th i s idea of equating 
expected fu tu r e preferences w i t h current expected preferences, b u t p e r m i t t i n g the 
possibi l i ty t ha t i n the fu tu r e the D M ' s expectations may be found to be incorrect, 
is analogous to Goldstein's Tempora l Coherence concept for compar ing current and 
fu tu re beliefs (see, e.g., [50]). 
In [29], Cyert & DeGroot restrict a t tent ion to offer ing a solut ion to the two-per iod 
sequential decision problem for uncer ta in u t i l i t y . However, fo l lowing a s imilar ar-
gument as out l ined above for the classical sequential problem, we can provide the 
solut ion to a generic 7i-period problem. I n this case, assuming independence between 
the state of nature and the state of m i n d , we use a / 7 J to represent the relevant deci-
sion mak ing his tory pr ior to selection of decision d?\ i.e., aW lists the past decision 
sequence d 1 , . . . , d?~l, the outcomes r 1 , . . . , r J ' - 1 , and u t i l i t y i n fo rma t ion z l , . . . , z J _ 1 
tha t these respectively led to. Fur thermore, under the nota t iona l convention tha t 
a ( / i = a u ( d \ . . . , d \ T T i + 1 ( a H i + l ) , . . . , 7 T n ( a / / " ) ) and a U n = a u ( d \ . . ., d n ) (where the 
expectat ion over 0 in the adaptive u t i l i t y is performed w i t h beliefs condi t ioned on 
history „ / / ' ) , the D M should select decision strategy 7r*, for i = 1 , . . . ,n - 1, in the 
fo l lowing manner: 
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n l ( a H l ) = arg max EaHi+ilaH.]d,[- • • E a H . % H ( . « - » ) [ - ^ ] ] (5.3) 
T h e D M should select ?rn by: 
( a / / " ) = arg max aU it 7T 
dn£Vn(aHn) 
it (5.4) 
Note tha t Equat ion (5.3) contains a nested sequence of expectations, each of which 
requires the D M to consider a d i s t r i bu t i on of the f o r m PaH3\aHj->,ni-1(aHi-})- Th i s 
condi t ion ing argument implies tha t given a # J _ 1 and 7 r ' ~ 1 ( a / / : ' - 1 ) , only the reward 
r J _ 1 and u t i l i t y i n f o r m a t i o n z J _ 1 fo l lowing decision 7 r J ' ~ 1 ( a / / J _ 1 ) remain uncertain. 
Also note tha t in b o t h Equations (5.3) and (5.4) we have again used the more fo rmal 
version of an adaptive u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n as a f u n c t i o n tha t has as its argument the 
decision t h a t was selected. Aga in , however, i t is presumed tha t i t would be easier 
for e l ic i ta t ion purposes to consider the adaptive u t i l i t y func t ion as a f u n c t i o n w i t h 
argument the re turn f r o m the selected decision, w i t h a H n used to determine updated 
beliefs for the re tu rn r n in Equa t ion 5.4. 
Equa t ion (5.3) details how the D M should select decisions given the history she 
has so far observed. The D M starts by considering Equa t ion (5.4) and determines 
the f ina l decision she would make for each conceivable his tory a H n t h a t could have 
been observed by t h a t t ime. Once the D M has determined decision strategy 7r", she 
considers how she wou ld make decision r f 1 " 1 . Now Equa t ion (5.3) is used and the D M 
determines the o p t i m a l decision dn~l for a l l possible histories aHn~* t ha t she would 
have observed by tha t t ime. Th i s is done by considering updated beliefs over the 
l ikely reward outcome for each decision, bu t also now by considering updated beliefs 
over 9. De te rmin ing the p robab i l i ty of moving to any history a H n for each decision 
c f t _ 1 , the D M seeks to pick decisions to maximise expected adaptive u t i l i t y . Th i s 
process continues backward through decisions u n t i l an op t ima l f i rs t per iod decision 
is found. T h e impor t an t difference in the adaptive u t i l i t y set t ing is tha t , provided 
decision selection influences the u t i l i t y i n fo rma t ion tha t is to be received, the D M 
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can f i nd decisions which, whi ls t under current beliefs over preferences would appear 
to be sub-opt imal , are i n fact o p t i m a l due to the greater source of i n fo rma t ion over 
preferences they are l ikely to reveal. T h a t is to say, adaptive u t i l i t y allows the D M 
to be ' f o rward looking ' i n bo th learning of decision outcomes and of preferences. We 
i l lus t ra te this using the App le or Banana example (see Example 3.1.1). 
E x a m p l e 5.1.1 
The D M is seeking to determine whether to select an apple or banana, bu t is un-
certain of her preference relat ion between the two. We assume in an n-per iod 
problem tha t T>1 = {dAld,B}, w i t h d' = d A representing selection of an apple in 
period i, and ds the selection of a banana. The D M ' s adaptive u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n 
is au{d\ . . . , r f " ) = I [ d i = d A ) + 0Y™=1 I{u^B}} = Ee[k + ( n - k)0], w i t h k 
the number of t imes dl = d A (note tha t this f u n c t i o n does not dis t inguish between 
ordering in the decision sequence, only the number of times decisions are selected). 
Here 9 represents the addi t iona l increase in u t i l i t y f r o m selecting dx = cfg, and we 
assume commensurable u t i l i t y (see Section 4.3) such tha t 9 £ { 0 O = 0,6\ = 2 } . 
We assume tha t selection of the banana informs the D M of her preferences (i.e., 
she becomes certain of the correct value for 0), and tha t never selecting the banana 
means tha t she never observes any addi t iona l i n fo rma t ion . I n this case u t i l i t y infor-
ma t ion z1 w i l l correspond to the value of 9 i f the decision is made to select a banana, 
whi ls t i f an apple is selected no u t i l i t y i n fo rma t ion is available. Also assume prior 
beliefs P(9 = 90) = p. I n this s i tua t ion we can consider, for a given length n of the 
problem, a value for p such that the D M w i l l make i n i t i a l decision selection d1 = dg-
Cer ta in ly this w i l l always be the case i f p < 0.5, as this represents a s i tua t ion where 
prior beliefs are such tha t the D M expects tha t she w i l l enjoy the banana more than 
the apple. However, even when p > 0.5, meaning the D M expects t ha t she w i l l not 
prefer the banana over the apple, there exists a smallest value rig such that , for a l l 
> " s , the D M w i l l find tha t i t is s t i l l o p t i m a l to select the banana in the f irst 
per iod. 
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We only consider possible decision sequences in which, i f decision d B is ever chosen, 
then i t must be chosen in the f i rs t period. We w i l l demonstrate the i r ra t iona l i ty of 
selecting dx = d A and then, for some i > 1, selecting dl = ds when we discuss value 
of i n f o r m a t i o n in Chapter 6 (see Example 6.1.3). Hence, selecting d1 = d.A means 
tha t dl = d A for all i = 1 , . . . , n and so, for an n-per iod problem, the adaptive u t i l i t y 
r e tu rn w i l l be a u ( d 1 = d.A, • • • ,dn = d A ) = n. 
However, i f d} — B, then w i t h pr ior p robabi l i ty p the D M discovers tha t her t rue 
preferences are for apples (the case tha t z 1 = 0 ) , otherwise she discovers tha t her 
t rue preferences are for bananas (the case tha t z 1 = 2 ) . I n the former case the D M 
w i l l select dl — d A for a l l i > 1, and in the la t ter the D M w i l l select dl = c/g for al l 
i > 1. Th i s results in an expected adaptive u t i l i t y value of a'u{d} = d B , d?,... , r / n ) = 
p(n — 1) + 2(1 — p)n. Hence, for n > 2 the D M should select d1 — ds when p is such 
tha t p < ^py. Clearly is a monotonica l ly increasing func t ion of n w i t h l i m i t 
equal to 1 and hence, provided the D M accepts the possibi l i ty tha t bananas could 
be preferred to apples (p ^ 1), there w i l l be some smallest value UB = for the 
length of the decision sequence f r o m which on i t would be o p t i m a l to select d1 = d^. 
o 
The use of backward induc t ion for solving dynamic p rogramming problems suffers 
f r o m the so-called 'curse of dimensional i ty ' (see Be l lman [13, p . X I I ] ) , the effect of 
which means tha t a smal l increase in the number of variables i n the sequential prob-
lem leads to a drastic increase i n the number of calculations required for its solut ion. 
I t is computa t iona l ly very expensive to solve dynamic op t imisa t ion problems in this 
manner when the dimensions of state variables are large. T h i s is the case for classical 
problems, where the D M has to calculate a nested sequence of expectations before 
f i n d i n g the o p t i m a l decision strategy. In the case of generalised d is t r ibut ions (where 
a m i x t u r e of p robab i l i ty densities and discrete probabi l i t ies are used to represent 
beliefs) i t may be tha t , given the current state in the solut ion of integrals, this is 
an impossible task and a solut ion must instead be approximated . The addi t iona l 
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requirement i n adaptive u t i l i t y of considering a possibly mul t i -d imensional state of 
m i n d enlarges the dimension of the problem's variables, thus exasperating the sit-
uat ion. Hence in using adaptive ut i l i t ies the D M should be aware tha t the benefit 
of p e r m i t t i n g uncertain preferences comes w i t h an increased cost in computa t iona l 
complexity. 
T h e computa t iona l complexi ty of solving an adaptive u t i l i t y p roblem is current ly the 
greatest hindrance i n i ts use for solving real-world problems. Nevertheless, i t may 
well be possible to i den t i fy forms of u t i l i t y funct ions tha t are not only reasonable 
for model l ing possible preferences, bu t which also greatly reduce the computa t iona l 
requirements of solut ion algori thms. Just as the theory of conjugate p robabi l i ty 
d is t r ibut ions simplifies computa t ion of posterior d is t r ibut ions by s imply keeping 
t rack of a few summary statistics (see, e.g., RaifTa &; Schlaifer [84]), i t may be 
possible to iden t i fy fo rms of u t i l i t y funct ions tha t allow a D M to quickly determine 
the value of a nested sequence of expectations. A s imilar problem was considered by 
Lind ley [70], who sought to find a conjugate f a m i l y of u t i l i t y funct ions tha t would 
be sui tably 'matched ' to d is t r ibut ions of the exponential fami ly , and which would at 
the same t ime also be suitable for model l ing realistic preferences. Unfor tuna te ly , the 
ideas which Lindley employs for easily de termining the expected u t i l i t y of a sol i tary 
decision do not appear to generalise readily to the sequential case, and there appears 
to have been no fu r the r development in the l i te ra ture for ident i f ica t ion of a conjugate 
u t i l i t y f ami ly for this s i tua t ion . 
To demonstrate what might be possible, consider the po lynomia l u t i l i t y f unc t ion 
tha t takes the fo l lowing fo rm: 
u{r\.. . , r " | 0 ) = a k o M ^ ( r 1 ) * ' • • • ( r " ) * " * * (5.5) 
ko=0ki=0 kn=0 
Thi s f u n c t i o n appears as a po lynomia l i n a l l the arguments of r 1 , . . . , 7 - n , and 6. 
However, as demonstrated in A p p e n d i x C, i t has the proper ty tha t , when beliefs take 
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the f o r m of a series of N o r m a l d i s t r ibu t ions and upda t ing occurs th rough Normal -
Norma l conjugacy, i t allows a closed and tractable solut ion for when we sequentially 
take expectations w i t h respect to beliefs over all the variables r 1 , . . . , r n , and 6. 
A l t h o u g h this class of u t i l i t y funct ions is not suitable for model l ing a l l realistic 
preference relations, there are si tuations where i t would be reasonable. For example, 
the u t i l i t y f unc t ion - u ( r ] , . . . ,rn\9) = X3"=i 1S included as a special case and is 
suitable for representing the s i tua t ion where the D M is uncertain of the appropriate 
discounting rate 9 to be used w i t h i n the Exponent ia l Discount ing Mode l of sequential 
decision mak ing (see Subsection 2.3.1). Another possibi l i ty would be i f n = 2 and 
u(rl, r2\9) = 6ui(iA) + (1 — 9)u2{r2), w i t h ix, a known po lynomia l func t ion of r1. 
Here 9 may represent an unknown trade-off weight. Unfor tuna te ly , however, the 
extension to n > 3 is not contained w i t h i n the po lynomia l class discussed above, 
but may be included i f we allow 9 to be mul t i -d imensional and consider polynomials 
of its components. I n such a case i t may well be suitable to use a mul t i -var ia te 
N o r m a l d i s t r i bu t ion w i t h the hope tha t this s t i l l allows a s imilar result to tha t 
discussed in A p p e n d i x C. 
A fu r the r extension for a m u l t i - a t t r i b u t e u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n tha t does not make such 
strong independence assumptions between preferences over re turn levels in d i f fe r ing 
periods is tha t of the mul t ip l i ca t ive u t i l i t y func t ion : 
u(r\.. .,rn\9) = [ n ^ J f l ' f W r ' ) + 1] - l}/9* (5.6) 
Here the parameters 9 — ( 9 l : . . . ,6n) ( w i t h 0, 6 (0 ,1 ) ) and 6* > —1 represent non-
zero scaling constants (see, e.g., Keeney [63]). Aga in , provided is a po lynomia l 
func t ion of r l and tha t only two components of 9 are uncer ta in , this func t ion is a 
member of the po lynomia l class discussed above. I f more than two of the 0j are 
uncertain, then again there may be a possibi l i ty of using a mul t i -var ia te N o r m a l 
d i s t r i bu t ion for 9. 
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Despite those si tuat ions mentioned above, there are many preference relations tha t 
can not be represented by a po lynomia l u t i l i t y func t ion , e.g., exponential or log-
a r i thmic ut i l i t ies , the lat ter of which is a common assumption for the f o r m of a 
D M ' s preferences over monetary returns (see Bernou l l i [18]). Nevertheless, we can 
approximate such funct ions th rough Taylor Polynomials , wh ich have been previ-
ously considered for approx imat ing u t i l i t y funct ions by D iamond & Gelles [36] and 
Hlawitschka [55]. 
For an in f in i t e ly d i f f e r e n t i a t e func t ion / of a single variable x, the Taylor Series is 
defined on an open interval around a as T(x) = Y^=o "'/J"^ U = « ( x — a)n/n\. The 
func t ion / can then be approximated to a specified degree of accuracy by t ak ing 
a par t ia l sum of this series, and each such pa r t i a l sum w i l l be of the f o r m of a 
po lynomia l in x. T h i s result can also be generalised for approx imat ing mul t i -var ia te 
funct ions , hence a l lowing a greater class of u t i l i t y funct ions to be approximated by 
the po lynomia l class discussed above. 
5.2 Utility Information 
I n the previous section i t was argued tha t , when using adapt ive u t i l i t y , interest ing 
problems are of a sequential nature, and are such t h a t the D M is able to influence 
the i n fo rma t ion she receives about her state of m i n d 6 t h rough appropriate decision 
selection. We now discuss a few forms tha t such i n f o r m a t i o n may take. 
I n the Apple or Banana problem, last encountered in Example 5.1.1, i t was assumed 
t h a t 9 was f u l l y revealed once the D M made the selection of a banana. Such a 
s i tua t ion may well model a sequential decision problem i n which there are one or 
more reward types t h a t have never been experienced by the D M , and in this set-
t i n g the selection of decisions leading to such novel rewards provides the D M w i t h 
valuable i n f o r m a t i o n about her preferences. Indeed, in this case, and depending on 
the dura t ion of the sequential problem, i t w i l l be of benefit for the D M to begin her 
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decision sequence by selecting decisions tha t are l ikely to lead to such novel rewards 
so as she may learn of her preferences for them. O n l y once a l l reward types have 
been experienced should the D M begin to select decisions tha t have known higher 
u t i l i t y . 
I t may be, however, tha t there is residual error and only a noisy observation of the 
t rue u t i l i t y value is possible. For example, this could be the case i f 6 represented 
the t rue u t i l i t y value of a perfect ly ripe banana, and the D M is unsure i f she had 
consumed an under-ripe or over-ripe banana. I n this case the state of the banana 
being either under-ripe, over-ripe, or perfect could be represented by an unobserv-
able state of nature, and a l ikel ihood f u n c t i o n then ident i f ied for de te rmining the 
p robab i l i ty t ha t the observation z' equaled the t rue value of 0. I f i n f o r m a t i o n about 
0 is indeed based upon such noisy observations, then the D M w i l l never be certain of 
her t rue preferences. Moreover, the usefulness of such i n f o r m a t i o n (as measured by 
i ts value, a concept to be in t roduced in Chapter 6) w i l l be less than for observations 
which i n f o r m the D M of the t rue value of 6, thus the du ra t i on of the sequential 
problem may have to be increased to warrant i n i t i a l selection of a decision tha t has 
uncer ta in u t i l i t y . 
I n [29], Cyer t & DeGroot suggest tha t a D M may be able to determine whether the 
actual u t i l i t y value was above or below tha t which had been previously expected, 
and tha t this is then a source of i n fo rma t ion relevant i n upda t ing beliefs over state 
of m i n d 6. I f t rue preferences are addi t ive, u ( d 1 , . . . , d " ) = 5Z"=i w i t h u 
considered a one-period u t i l i t y func t ion tha t the D M is uncertain of. I n this case 
the suggestion of Cyer t &; DeGroo t can be incorporated th rough categorical da ta 
z', arising fo l lowing selection of d\ such tha t zx = 0 i f au(dl) < u(d') and z' = 1 
i f au(d') > u(d'). T h e true value of u(d') does not need to be known, indeed, t ha t 
case was discussed above where the D M observed true u t i l i t y value by appropriate 
decision selection. Instead, a l l tha t is required is to know whether or not au{dl) 
was greater or less than u(dl), or in other words, whether the adaptive u t i l i t y was 
based on beliefs t ha t tu rned out to be op t imis t ic or pessimistic ( this f o r m of u t i l i t y 
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i n f o r m a t i o n w i l l be employed in Example 5.3.2). 
We refer to the case z ! = 1 as a negative surprise, for i t represents a s i tua t ion 
where the D M ant ic ipated to achieve a greater u t i l i t y amount t han was actual ly 
experienced. Similar ly , the case zl = 0 w i l l be referred to as positive surprise, for 
the D M anticipated a lower u t i l i t y level than tha t wh ich was actual ly noticed. 
There are many ways in which i n f o r m a t i o n about u t i l i t y can be gained fo l lowing 
decision selection. I t w i l l of course depend on the par t icular problem under con-
sideration, and examples f r o m the l i te ra ture on problems s imilar to the adaptive 
u t i l i t y se t t ing developed here are given below. However, once a f o r m of i n f o r m a t i o n 
has been ident i f ied (and we appreciate t h a t this can be a d i f f i cu l t task) , a l ikel ihood 
func t ion can be devised deta i l ing the probabi l is t ic connections between dl, z 1 , ?•*, 
UJ and 9. Bayesian upda t ing can then be performed fo l lowing the observation of z' 
f r o m selection of dl and outcome r\ and relevant posterior probabil i t ies concerning 
9 determined in the usual way (see Section 5.1). 
Crawfo rd &; Shum [26] and Erdem &; Keane [39] consider sequential decision prob-
lems where a t t r i bu te values of possible returns can be uncertain. I n the case of [26] 
the decision is which anti-ulcer d rug prescr ipt ion should be given, and the a t t r ibutes 
of the rewards are the curat ive effects and the symptomat ic effects of the d rug cho-
sen. I n this case learning occurs t h rough direct prescr ipt ion experiences, leading to 
noisy signals of t rue values. 
The work of Erdem & Keane was discussed in Section 3.3 and uses known data 
to model the decision mak ing strategy of US customers. T h e decision relates to 
selection of a l iqu id detergent brand, and there is uncer ta inty over various a t t r ibutes 
of those brands. In addi t ion to direct experience of using a specific brand, learning 
also occurs th rough external advertisements the D M had been subjected to . B o t h 
these sources of i n fo rma t ion are assumed to provide noisy signals of correct values, 
and E r d e m & Keane derive a func t iona l f o r m for a Bayesian learning f ramework. 
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A note should be made here tha t b o t h [26] and [39] c la im tha t u t i l i t y is uncertain only 
because of uncer ta inty in some specific a t t r i bu te levels. Indeed, [39, p.4] contains 
the quote "the u t i l i t y to be derived f r o m a product is not known w i t h cer tainty at 
the instance of purchase due to consumer uncerta inty about brand a t t r ibu tes" . Th i s 
is d i f ferent to the type of uncerta inty in u t i l i t y being discussed i n this thesis, where 
even i f a t t r ibu tes of rewards are known, we pe rmi t the D M to remain uncer ta in of 
her preferences. 
Final ly , and as described i n Section 3.3, Chajewska et al. [22] also consider a s imilar 
problem to the adaptive u t i l i t y set t ing discussed here. However, whi l s t we consider 
the s i tua t ion of a D M being uncertain of her own preferences, Chajewska et al. 
consider the problem an analyst faces when seeking to determine the u t i l i t y f unc t ion 
of a medical pat ient . T h e pat ient is considering some f o r m of prenatal test for 
diagnosing the presence of a chromosomal abnormali ty , and her u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n 
is assumed to have a m u l t i - a t t r i b u t e argument, w i t h a t t r ibutes consisting of fetus 
status, possibi l i ty for loss of fetus, knowledge of fetus status, and possibi l i ty for 
fu tu re successful pregnancy. 
The analyst faces a sequential decision problem in which decisions relate to questions 
the analyst can p u t forward for de te rmining the patient 's preferences. Such questions 
are of the form of whether the pat ient would agree or disagree to t ak ing par t i n some 
specified s tandard gamble (Section 1.1.1 discusses how u t i l i t y values can be elicited 
i n this manner) , and a pr ior d i s t r i bu t i on about the patient 's u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n is 
formed f r o m in fo rma t ion held about a popula t ion of s imilar patients. T h e feedback 
f r o m such questions places constraints on the patient 's t rue u t i l i t y f unc t ion and 
provides i n f o r m a t i o n regarding its f o r m . T h e analyst decides which question to ask 
by seeking to maximise expected value of i n f o r m a t i o n (see Section 6.1) f r o m the 
feedback, cont inuing in this process u n t i l no question would provide expected value 
above some specified threshold. 
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5.3 Adaptive Utility in Reliability Problems 
The possible use of adaptive uti l i ty for decision making within the area of reliability 
theory was illustrated by Houlding &; Coolen [56], and the material within this 
section draws heavily upon that work. The use of Bayesian statistical decision theory 
for solving system reliability problems has been applied, for example, in [23,75,78], 
and further references are available therein. However, to permit uncertainty over 
preferences through the use of an adaptive util i ty function is a novel approach which 
prevents unnecessary restriction to an assumed measure of preference. 
Classical ut i l i ty theory assumes known preferences over all possible outcomes. How-
ever, when considering vague or novel outcomes this is often an unreasonable as-
sumption. In reliability theory, the cost of system failure, especially for a newly 
designed system, is a possible outcome that a D M may wish to avoid specifying 
a fixed constant, for. For this reason we concentrate in this section on two exam-
ples in reliability theory where adaptive uti l i ty could be considered to be of use. 
As mentioned in Section 5.1, the solution algorithm for sequential adaptive uti l i ty 
problems is intractable, currently making the theory's use in interesting problems 
extremely computationally expensive. Hence we restrict attention to considering 
problems consisting of sequences of 3 decisions, with this duration being selected 
as it allows demonstration of the differences between classical and adaptive uti l i ty 
sequential decision making, but also only requires relatively easy computations. 
Example 5.3.1 considers a system which has known failure modes, but where sys-
tem failure leads to unknown damage for the manufacturer, e.g., loss of customers, 
decrease in reputation, or financial cost for warranty etc. I t is assumed that the 
manufacturer (DM) has opportunity to fix these failure modes for a known financial 
cost, and the decision must then be made whether or not to do so. The decision 
problem is thus to determine the optimal strategy of correcting system failures when 
damage through non-action is uncertain and with optimality defined by maximis-
ing expected adaptive utility. In this case the adaptive util i ty setting permits the 
D M to be initially uncertain of the trade-off between the loss in reputation and/or 
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customers following system failure and the financial cost of fixing failure modes, 
with opportunity to learn about this trade-off parameter following trial runs or pilot 
schemes. 
Example 5.3.1 
Consider a newly designed system that has associated with i t two known failure 
modes, types A and B, which occur independently of each other. First let the time 
between decision epochs be split into three periods of equal duration (e.g., three 
clays or three weeks). Assume that in any given period there is the possibility that 
one failure of type A and one failure of type B can occur. Hence, it is assumed 
that at most two failures can occur in each period (i.e., at most one for each type of 
failure) and the number of failures per type within a decision epoch will be modelled 
through a Binomial distribution. 
The true state of nature is u> = (uA,u:B) e H = [0,1] x [0,1], with uA and uB 
representing the unknown probabilities of a failure of type A or B, respectively, in 
any given period. Prior beliefs are elicited and are such that W / i . U f j G {0.005.0.1} 
with P(uA = 0.005) = 0.7 and P(uB = 0.005) = 0.2. 
Failure of the system incurs a cost or damage. However, the D M is assumed to 
be uncertain over how she will feel about the effects of such a cost, and she does 
not currently know whether i t will be viewed as Severe (S) or Mild (M). In both 
cases the actual cost for a given failure type is known and fixed, i t is only the DM's 
perceived attitude towards this cost that is uncertain. For example, each failure of 
the system may lead to the loss of a certain number of customers, or may lead to a 
certain financial penalty, but the effects that these situations will have are unknown. 
Failures of type A or B are both modelled by an independent Bernoulli distribution. 
The DM's state of mind wil l be denoted as 0 = (0A)OB) £ 0 = [0,1] x [0,1], with 
9A and 9B respectively representing the true, but unknown, trade-off parameter 
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concerning damage from system failure of type A or B and the known financial cost 
of permanently fixing them. Prior beliefs over 9 stipulate that 9A,9B € {0.3.0.7}, 
with distributions specified by P(9A = 0.7) = 0.8 and P{6B = 0.7) = 0.3. 
The first decision occurs immediately and subsequent decisions occur after three 
periods each. At each decision epoch the D M can permanently fix one failure mode 
(assuming they have not already done so), and hence, depending on the decision 
history, the set of all available decisions in period i is given by V1 C {dAl dB, d^}. 
Here decisions dA and dB represent the permanent fix of failure modes .4 or B 
respectively, whilst decision d^ represents the null decision in which no permanent 
fix is undertaken. The set of feasible decision sequences consists of those decision 
streams t/ 1, c/2, c/3 from the set V ] x V 2 x "D3 where decisions dA and dB appear at 
most once (we assume the D M is not permitted to fix a failure type that has already 
been permanently fixed). 
We do not seek to claim the form that a DM in this situation should take for her 
util i ty function, but to illustrate the theory, and for the purpose of this example, we 
will assume that the DM's utility, once categorised by 9, is the following function of 
feasible decision stream dl,d2,d? and beliefs over state of nature u>: 
3 3 
u(d], d2, d'\0) = Ew[- 1 0 0 0 ( 0 ^ J ] [ l - l[d,=dA}\ + 9BuB - l [ d , = d B } } ) 
-20(gA + gB)] (5.7) 
Here the terms gA and gB are used to represent: 
0 d\d2.c?^dA 0 dl.d?,(P ? d B 
<JA = <i . fJB = ( 
•i if dA selected at epoch i I i if dB selected at epoch i 
(5.8) 
This uti l i ty function reflects a situation in which the D M prefers low failure rates 
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and low probability of any failures being kind S. Also note that observed failures 
over the 3 epochs do not lead to any direct loss of utility. 
Such a situation could arise when conducting laboratory tests before market launch, 
where failures in testing are assumed to be negligible, but where failures following 
launch lead to loss (either financial or otherwise) for the company. The util i ty func-
tion also penalizes the D M for making decisions to fix failures late in the decision 
stream. However, by later periods it is expected that more information over uncer-
tain parameters will be available for the D M and so she will be better placed to make 
decisions that reflect her true preferences. The state of mind 9 = {9^,9^) plays the 
role of either increasing or decreasing the importance of probability of system failure 
in contrast to the known cost of permanently fixing such failures. The values of con-
stants involved make this problem non-trivial, i.e., i t is not immediately apparent 
that a specific strategy dominates another. Indeed, once the first decision has been 
chosen, all feasible decision streams are optimal for some collection of observations. 
Information received between epochs consists of the number of failures that occurred 
over the three periods in that epoch, whether they were of type A or B, and also 
whether these failures were perceived to be of kind S or M. Such information is 
clearly relevant for updating beliefs over u> and 9, and the information received in 
epoch i wil l be represented by zl = { z A S , z l A M , z)3S, zlBM}. Here zljk represents the 
number of failures observed in epoch i that were induced by failure type j and were 
perceived to be of severity level k. 
This problem can be solved by the adaptive util i ty algorithm given in Section 5.1, 
and the relevant results are summarised below. Table 5.1 allows the D M to de-
termine the optimal final epoch decision strategy 7r 3 given the relevant history up 
to that point. Unfortunately some of the expressions are too long to include and 
are instead briefly discussed in Appendix B. In Table 5.1, expected adaptive uti l i ty 
equations are represented by /7's, and these are functions of the observations z1 
and z2. L's represent lists of observed histories. Table 5.2 gives the optimal second 
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Ordered Decision History d* Expected Uti l i ty Max 
d A , d n dpi -60 Always 
d,A, d N dB -80 Otherwise 
d A , dpi dpi £ 1 If history in L I 
d B . d A dp, -60 Always 
d B , dpi d A -80 Otherwise 
d B , dpi dpi El I f history in L2 
d N , d A d B -100 Otherwise 
d p i , d A dp/ E3 I f history in L3 
di\<, du d A -100 Otherwise 
dpi, d B dpi £ 4 If history in L4 
f/,V, dpi d A E5 If history in L5 
dpi, dpi d B £ 6 If history in L6 
dpi, dpi dpi El I f history in L7 
Table 5.1: Summary of i\s for Example 5.3.1. 
epoch strategy ir2 given knowledge of decision strategy 7 r 3 , and Table 5.3 gives the 
optimal initial decision given knowledge of future strategies ir2 and 7r 3 . 
The conclusion is that the optimal first epoch decision is dl = dB, and further 
decisions should be selected as indicated by Tables 5.1 and 5.2. Decision d.B is the 
optimal first period decision primarily because, based upon prior beliefs, the D M 
perceives she wil l only solve one system failure type, so i t is unlikely that both 
decisions dA and dB wi l l be included within the decision stream, yet also her prior 
beliefs are such that i t would be more beneficial if failure type B were fixed as 
A[E0A[UJA9A]\ < £ W B [ £ < ? B [ w s 0 e ] ] . I t is unlikely that decisions dA and dB will both 
be selected in the sequence because, before making her first decision, the D M can 
determine which collection of observations would lead to her making the choice to 
fix both failure types. However, under the prior beliefs specified in this example, 
such decision histories have small associated probability of occurring. 
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Decision History d2 Max Expected Uti l i ty Max 
dA dB -60 Otherwise 
dA dN E8 I f history in L8 
dB dA -60 Otherwise 
dB dN E9 If history in L9 
dN dA E10 I f history in L10 
dN dB Ell I f history in L l l 
dN dN E12 I f history in L12 
Table 5.2: Summary of n2 for Example 5.3.1. 
t/1 Max Expected Uti l i ty Max 
dA -53.1 ( ldp) 
dB -39.3 ( ldp) Yes 
dN -52.6 ( ldp) 
Table 5.3: Summary of 7T1 for Example 5.3.1. 
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As an example of reading Tables 5.1-5.3, consider the history where no failures are 
observed in any period. Because the optimal first decision does not depend on 
observed histories, the DM selects c/1 = c/e, so it is only possible to observe histories 
in which a failure of type A can occur. In Table 5.2 we only need to consider rows 
with decision dB as the decision history, and we check if the history with no failures 
of type A is included in list L9 or not. The list L9 contains just two possibilities, one 
where no failure of type A occurs (which has prior probability approximately 0.91) 
and one where 3 mild failures occur (which has prior probability approximately 
2.7 x 10" 5 ) . As the considered history is included in L9, the D M should select 
decision in the second epoch. 
For the final epoch the D M considers rows in Table 5.1 where the ordered history 
is di3,du, and thus the relevant question is whether the observed failures of type 
A (between all three decision epochs) falls into the list LI. At this stage there are 
100 possible combinations for recorded failures of type A, and 45 of these fall into 
list L2. However, only 10 of the possible 100 histories obtain no observed failures 
of type A between the first and second decision epochs, with 6 of these falling in 
L2. Given that no failures were observed before the second epoch, the updated 
prior probability (as viewed at the time of the second epoch) that no failures will 
be observed after the second epoch is approximately 0.92. Furthermore, the history 
with no failures of type A observed after the first or the second decision epochs does 
indeed fall in L2 (see Appendix B). Thus for our considered decision history we find 
that the D M should select decision dN again. 
Tables 5.1-5.3 are created without, knowledge of earlier optimal decisions, and so 
include decision histories that become redundant when optimal strategies have been 
found. For example, the history in L I which consists of no failures of type B between 
decision epochs is redundant once we know that the D M should select dl = dB, hence 
failures of type B will not occur. If, for whatever reason, the D M did not make the 
optimal decision dB in the first period, then knowledge of the optimal decision given 
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such an alternative decision history could once again prove to be useful. 
An interesting feature of this example is that, in certain situations, the observation 
of system failure can lead to an increase in expected adaptive uti l i ty (in the classical 
situation, such an observation can only lead to a decrease in expected uti l i ty due 
to an increase in the expected value of u;). This result arises because the uti l i ty 
function does not include a specific cost for observed failures, but rather only takes 
into account their associated probability of occurring and the probability that such 
failures are of type S. Although the observation of a system failure wil l tend to 
increase the expected value for either ujy\ or u)B, if such a failure were of type M, 
then i t is likely that i t would lead to a decrease of the expected value for one of 9A 
or 9B, and hence also possibly to a decrease of one of the products U>A9.>\ or w B # B . 
An intriguing note to make on this feature is that i t can result in situations, such 
as the list L9 described above, whereby a failure type is only not rectified provided 
the DM observes no failures or observes a certain number of failures of type M 
(depending on the number of failures of type S also to be observed). Indeed, the 
suggestion is certainly true in this example for all the decision histories considered 
at the end of the first decision epoch, i.e., lists L8, L9 and L12. This shows an 
interesting form of a monotonic relation that would appear in line with intuition, as 
it would appear reasonable to not exert cost to fix system failures if they were seen 
not to be a serious impediment upon the usefulness of the system, even if they were 
seen to occur frequently. o 
Example 5.3.1 sought to illustrate the potential for adaptive util i ty within reliability 
problems. In particular, we envision that i t demonstrates potential for decision 
problems such as those a company could face when it has opportunity to test run 
a new system before commencement of ful l market launch. I t could be that new 
software is tested by releasing Beta versions, and that feedback can be gained over 
how potential customers felt if an aspect of the software were to fail, i.e., whether the 
software were still deemed useful with or without this aspect, and the implication 
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this has on determining preferences over reliability and financial cost for fixing the 
failure. Another example could be a new machine that is useful to hospitals, with 
trial runs made in several hospitals to determine user feedback before launch across 
the entire health service. The use of adaptive util i ty in such settings allows the D M 
to remain uncertain and not to commit to a presumed trade-off parameter between 
finance and reputation. 
Example 5.3.2 below also illustrates the use of adaptive util i ty within reliability 
decision problems, and considers a situation that is motivated by the hypothesis that 
individuals may tend to overweight the subjective cost of system failure compared 
to that which is the true effect. 
Example 5.3.2 
A DM has use of a machine that is in working order 100(1 — u>)% of the time (we do 
not assume deterioration of the machine). The proportion of time that the machine 
is in working order thus represents the true state of nature, hence u 6 Q. — [0,1]. A t 
each decision epoch the D M has the opportunity to permanently replace the possibly 
unreliable machine with one that is known to work perfectly (provided she has not 
already done so). The cost of making this exchange at decision epoch i = 1,2,3 
is assumed to be c - i/2, i.e.. the cost of the new machine decreases over time. 
Depending on the decision history, the decisions available in epoch / are represented 
by V 1 C [ds, (IR, dp}, where d$ means stick with the possibly unreliable machine, 
r/ft is to replace it , and dp is a dummy decision used to construct feasible decision 
sequences. We thus assume that the set of feasible decision sequences are those in 
P 1 x V 2 x V S where the decision dn is included at most once and where decision dp 
is selected if and only if da had been previously selected. The DM's util i ty function 
for this problem is assumed to be: 
u(d],d2,ds\9) = { 1 J ' (5.9) 
Eu\—c + i/2 — (i — 1K'°] if dn selected first in epoch i 
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The state of mind 9 is interpreted as a parameter that alters how the DM views 
specific reliability levels LO. In this case we assume that 9 G 0 = [1/2,2] and that 
prior beliefs are represented by the triangular distribution with probability density 
function over this range f(9) — 8(2 - B)/9, i.e., under prior beliefs the D M assigns 
higher probability density to regions that overweight the subjective cost of reliability 
level u> than would be the case i f true preferences were known to coincide with the 
linear rule with 9 = 1. This ut i l i ty function is an additive function where the D M 
loses uj0 in each period she uses the older machine. However, if in epoch i the D M 
switches to the new machine, she no longer looses any more uti l i ty but has to pay 
a one-off cost of — c + i/2. If to = 0 i t does not matter what value 9 takes and the 
D M should never switch (both machines would be just as good as each other). 
To prevent the example becoming too complicated, it is assumed that tu is known 
and is such that u> = 1/2. We also assume c = 2. Hence the only remaining 
uncertainty is with respect to beliefs over the correct state of mind 9. I t is assumed 
that the D M can learn about this parameter through util i ty information z' that is 
received in epoch i. Noting that, for feasible decision streams, the parameterised 
util i ty function can be decomposed into the equivalent expression Y^=i u{dl\9), with 
ti(c/'|#) given below, the D M is able to evaluate an expected value for u(dl\9) with 
respect to beliefs she holds over 0 at the beginning of epoch i: 
u{d'\9) 
EU,[-UJ0} ltdl = d s 
-c + i/2 if dl = dR 
0 if d' = dD 
(5.10) 
To give the form of information z\ it is assumed that, following selection of decision 
<-/', the D M can compare her prior expected value for u(d'\6) with the value it was 
actually noted to have. However, it is not assumed that the precise difference can 
be stated, only that the D M can determine whether or not her expectations were 
too pessimistic or too optimistic, and this will form categorical data where zl = 0 
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in the first case and zi = 1 in the latter (Section 5.2 discussed this form of util i ty 
information). 
Noting that u(d'\0) is known for certain when either of decisions dR or dD are 
selected, ut i l i ty information zl is only informative over 0 i f decision ds can still be 
selected in a future epoch. The probability of observing zx = 0, given 9, in this case 
is equal to: 
>(V = o|<9 = 9, d s ) = p(Ee\u(ds\e)} < i,.(ds\9) 
= p ( E , [ - ( l / 2 ) ' ] < - ( 1 / 2 ) 
e > 
log(E,[(l /2) 9 ]) 
log(l/2) 
6 = 9) 
0 = 9 
1 H ' « > W g | ^ 
0 otherwise 
(5.11) 
This problem is again solved via the sequential adaptive uti l i ty algorithm given in 
Section 5.1, and summary results are now discussed. Table 5.4 determines 7r 3 given 
the decision history „ /7 2 by the time of the final decision. Note that the observation 
z 2 does not have any effect on this decision, because if rf1 = ds then zx provides 
enough information about the ut i l i ty function for the D M to know which decision she 
should select, and if dl = dR then all future decisions must be the dummy decision 
do- For the second epoch, knowing decision strategy 7r 3 , optimal strategy 7r 2 can be 
found through Table 5.5. Finally, for the first epoch, knowing decision strategies 7r 2 
and 7 r 3 , the optimal first period decision n1 is determined through Table 5.6. 
The optimal strategy is thus to stick with the unreliable machine before possibly 
replacing i t depending on whether expected util i ty for sticking was found to be too 
optimistic or too pessimistic. Note that in the classical situation, where i t is assumed 
that preferences are characterised by the expectation of 9 under prior beliefs, and 
where such a preference structure is enforced throughout the problem (i.e., no uti l i ty 
information is available), the D M would do best to replace the machine immediately. 
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This is because under expected prior beliefs EH[u(ds\9)} < -0 .5 . So to never replace, 
or to replace at the second or third opportunity, leads to expected uti l i ty return less 
than -1.5. However, to change immediately leads to ut i l i ty return of -1.5 exactly. 
Thus, due to the extra information that such a decision offers, incorporating the 
possibility that the DM's current expectations over preferences may be wrong leads 
to the more conservative decision strategy (in the sense that an irrevocable decision 
is not immediately selected) of selecting decision ds in the first epoch. o 
Ordered Decision History Max Expected Uti l i ty Max 
d s , d s ds EouHi[u{ds,ds,ds\6)] I f Z1 = 0 
d s , d s d R Eo\„nAu(ds,ds,dR\6)\ I f 2 1 = 1 
d s , d R d D Eo\ntn[u{ds,dR,dD\9)} Yes 
dri, d p d D 
Eo\aHAu(dR:dD,dD\9)} Yes 
Table 5.4: Summary of IT3 for Example 5.3.2. 






E„Hi\niv [E0\u tf i [u{ds, d,u dp\9)\] 
I f z 1 = 0 
If z1 = 1 
da dp Ean*\aio [E()\aH>[u{dit, dp, dp\9)]] Yes 
Table 5.5: Summary of IT2 for Example 5.3.2. 






Table 5.6: Summary of 7T1 for Example 5.3.2. 
The sequential problem discussed in Example 5.3.2 is similar to the maintenance 
problems that are discussed by Baker [9]. Risk aversion (a concept to be discussed 
in Section 6.2) relates to a DM's dislike of entering into actuarially fair gambles, i.e., 
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gambles with expected return 0. The greater the level of a DM's risk aversion, the 
greater the amount of uti l i ty she would be prepared to forgo in order to avoid entering 
such gambles. Baker considers how a general trend of risk aversion in DMs and 
organisations can lead to overmaintenance of systems, and considers implications in 
principle-agent theory, where the principle relates to an organisation (not wanting 
overmaintenance), and where the agent relates to a maintenance engineer (who 
overmaintains due to excessive risk aversion). Baker finds that incentives based on 
the total cost of maintenance and failures can reduce over maintenance, and that it 
may be optimal for management to pay such an incentive. 
I f the ut i l i ty function of Example 5.3.2 had been expressed as a function with the 
reliability measure to as argument, then we could represent one-period preferences 
through U(UJ\0) = -ui°. In this case 0 affects the level of risk aversion, with a larger 
value for 6 representing a reduced level of risk aversion2. Thus the implication of 
using adaptive uti l i ty in this setting, is that the D M can now remain uncertain over 
whether or not she is undermaintaining or overmaintaining the system (through ei-
ther replacing the unreliable machine too late or too early, respectively). Beliefs over 
state of mind 0 can in this sense be seen as beliefs over the DM's risk aversion, and 
through the connection identified by Baker, beliefs over supposed overmaintenance. 
Additionally, in a general principle-agent theory problem, adaptive uti l i ty could be 
of use for permitting a situation in which the principle is initially uncertain of the 
util i ty function of the agent and vice versa. 
"For this utility function the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion, which is introduced 
in Chapter 6, is given by 
Chapter 6 
Adaptive U t i l i t y Diagnostics 
This chapter considers the implication of uncertain preferences for two classical 
uti l i ty diagnostics. First we consider the relationship between value of sample infor-
mation and ut i l i ty uncertainty. Following this we consider implications of uncertain 
preferences upon classical risk aversion, and we introduce the concept of trial aver-
sion. 
6.1 Value of Information 
The classical concept of value of sample information, that arises as a uti l i ty di-
agnostic in the type of decision problem under consideration here, is discussed by 
DeGroot [35]. Further discussion can be found in [16,33,84]. 
Let observable random quantity X represent a currently unknown piece of infor-
mation. In discussing the expected amount of information in A', or the expected 
value of X, we are referring to its fair uti l i ty value, i.e.. the maximum amount of 
utility the DM would forgo in order to know X. In a decision problem, the expected 
value of X is the expected difference (with respect to beliefs over X ) between the 
maximum expected uti l i ty obtainable through decision selection with knowledge of 
X, and the maximum expected uti l i ty obtainable without knowledge of X 1 . 
'See ['18, p.529] for common alternative meanings not considered here. 
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The set of possible information statements for X will be denoted by X, and a par-
ticular statement by x. Under this notation, problems of interest in the classical 
treatment of value of sample information occur when X can inform the D M about 
the likely outcome of an available decision. That is to say, there exists a possi-
ble combination of return 7', decision d, and information statement x such that 
P(r\d,X = x) / P(r\d). The value of such information x is denoted by /^ (x ) , and 
the value of unknown information X is denoted by IW(X) (the subscript u> is used 
to show what the information relates to). Note that as X is a random quantity, so 
is L{X). 
In [35,84], the expected value of information X, Ex\Iw{X)], is defined by: 
EX\L{X)\ = Ex[max{Ew\x[u(d)]}] - max{Eu[u{d))} (6.1) 
A particular consequence of Definition (6.1) is that EX[IU{X)] > 0. 
Although in some situations a D M may wish not to observe X = x (e.g., discovering 
X = x caused oilier knowledge to be forgotten or had a specific uti l i ty attachment 
itself due to emotional effects), DeGroot [35] argues that, for standard statistical 
decision problems, Iu(x) > 0 for all x £ X. As DeGroot notes, once X = x is known, 
the use of determining the expected uti l i ty of a decision with respect to beliefs over 
u as represented by distribution P^ is only relevant in so far as i t permits calculation 
of what the D M believed was the optimal decision before knowledge of x. Actual 
beliefs are now represented by Pu\x, and all expected utilities of decisions should be 
evaluated through use of this distribution. Hence both Raiffa & Schlaifer [84] and 
DeGroot [35] define Iu(x) as follows: 
lu(x) = m a x { ^ , , [ u ( f / ) ] } - E.Aj\u{d% with d' = arg max{E w [u(rf ) ]} (6.2) 
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This definition implies that f.^(x) > 0 and leads directly to Equation (6.1). However, 
to ensure I^x) is well-defined, we make the additional condition that d! is the 
decision the D M would have selected before she knew X — x. 
As a heuristic justification for this, note that, whilst Ex[Iu,(X)] is an ex ante statis-
tic. /w(.x') is an ex post, diagnostic, the calculation of which requires the D M to have 
considered her decision problem without the knowledge that X = x. Thus the D M 
should have been able to determine decision d! she would have selected. I t is im-
portant to do this because, if d! = arg ma.x(i&v{Eu[u(d)]} is not unique, then whilst 
alternatives do not affect expected uti l i ty before X = x is known, they can affect 
the value of JbJ(x) after X = x is known. However, before X = x is known, the only 
relevant quantity is Ex[Iu{X)], which does not depend on selection of such d!. 
Before moving to an adaptive uti l i ty setting, we note that Ex\Iw{X)] and Iu(x) 
were referred to by Raiffa &c Schlaifer [84, Ch.4] as the Expected Value of Sam-
ple Information (EVSI) and the Conditional Value of Sample Information (CVSI), 
respectively. We also note that EVSI depends only on the following: 
• The set of feasible decisions V. 
• The uti l i ty function u representing preferences. 
• The distribution P.^ representing prior uncertainty over u. 
• The likelihood function PX\W that is combined with Pw to produce posterior 
Pu\x O I " predictive P\. 
The introduction of uncertain preferences, however, leads to interesting questions 
regarding the classical treatment of value of information. Equations (6.1) and (6.2) 
must be generalised to deal with adaptive utilities, but also, value of information 
concerning ui may be affected by the level of uncertainty the D M has about her 
preferences. Furthermore, there is a value for information z relating to the DM's 
true preferences, and this should also be quantifiable. 
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To tackle such problems, we first assume tha t 6 and u> are independent, and we begin 
w i t h the case of X being only relevant for de te rmining u>. Under these assumptions 
we propose tha t the E V S I and the C V S I are as defined in Equations (6.3) and (6.4), 
respectively (the nota t ion is replaced by a l M to h ighl ight t ha t we are considering 
value of i n f o r m a t i o n when preferences are uncertain) : 
ExUUX)} = E x [ m ^ { E u | x [ 0 u ( d ) ] } ] - max{Eu[au(d)]} (6.3) 
„Iw{x) = max{ Ew\x[„u(d)]} - E.A.d\tlu(d')\, w i t h d' - a r g m a x { E u [ n u ( d ) ] } (6.4) (ieu (/el? 
Equat ions (6.3) and (6.4) are analogous to Equations (6.1) and (6.2), respectively, 
the only difference is tha t u(d) is replaced by the adaptive u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n „u(d). 
They can be jus t i f i ed in precisely the same manner as Equat ions (6.1) and (6.2), 
and again the E V S I , as given by Equa t ion (6.3), follows f r o m the fo rmula for the 
C V S I , as given by Equat ion (6.4). Equations (6.3) and (6.4) generalise Equations 
(6.1) and (6.2), r e tu rn ing to them in the case tha t preferences are known w i t h 
certainty. Fur thermore, bo th a L { x ) and Ex[aL{X)} are non-negative. However, 
the i m p o r t a n t poin t is tha t now, in add i t ion to those components listed above, the 
E V S I and C V S I , for i n fo rma t ion re la t ing to u>, also depend on beliefs over state of 
m i n d 0 ( th rough the effect this has in de te rmining the adaptive u t i l i t y f unc t ion au). 
I n the adaptive u t i l i t y set t ing, the E V S I keeps the property of add i t iv i ty , whereby 
the expected value of receiving two pieces of i n fo rma t ion X\ and X2 simultaneously 
equals the expected value of receiving them one after the other (provided tha t no 
decision was made in the in t e r im) . T h a t is to say, the fo l lowing property is t rue 
(where, when X\ = X\ is known and beliefs have been updated based solely on this, 
the expected addi t ional value of X2 is denoted by EX2\Xl ( n A x X ^ l ^ i ) ] ) : 
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E X l , x 3 [ . M ^ , X 2 ) ] = E x ^ E x ^ U U X t l X ^ + M X t ) ] (6.5) 
= E x ^ x A J M X ^ } + E X l [ a U X x ) \ 
This result is derived in the same way as is done in the classical s i tuat ion: 
E\ux2[aL(Xi..X2)} = E . V l i A - 2 [ m a x { f ; U | , Y , I . Y 2 [ „ u ( r f ) ] } ] - max E w [„w((/)) (6.6) 
d£V d&V 
= EXliXi[mm{Eu[XliX2[aii.{d)]}\ - E X l [max{E„{Xl [Md)]}\ 
d£X> d£T> 
+EXl[max{E„\X,[au(d)}}] - max{Eu[au(d)]} 
= E X l [ E X 2 l X l [max{Eu\Xl,X2[uu(d)}}] - max{Eu\Xj [„u(d)]}] 
+ EXl[aL{Xl)} 
= E x A E ^ X U X i l X i ) } } + £ v , [ , , U * i ) ] 
= E . ^ ^ l U X ^ X i ) ) + EXt [„L(X})} 
Example 6.1.1 below demonstrates how the EVS1 can depend on the D M ' s beliefs 
over her state of m i n d 8. I n par t icular , this example leads to the possible suggestion 
tha t a decrease in uncertainty over 9 necessarily leads to an increase in E V S I . T h i s 
suggestion w i l l be fu r the r discussed fo l lowing the example. 
Example 6.1.1 
Consider a one-period problem w i t h V = {c/ .4,ds} and pay off m a t r i x as below. 
U ) 2 
7*1 
d,s r 2 r\ 
Prior beliefs are such tha t Id(LJ\) = P{u2) — 0.5, and the D M ' s l ike l ihood func t ion is 
such tha t i n fo rma t ion X w i l l f u l l y i n f o r m her of ui, i.e., P X \ u { ^ j \ ^ i ) = $ij for j = 1,2 
( w i t h 6ij representing the usual Kronecker del ta) . Thus the predict ive d i s t r i bu t ion 
is P(.i: ,) = P(x2) = 0.5. 
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Beliefs over preferences are assumed to be such that P{9-1) = p = 1 - P(02), w i t h 
p G [0,1] . Commensurable ut i l i t ies are assumed to be u(r}\0-i) = i / . ( r 2 | 0 2 ) = 1 
and u(r2\0i) = u('/-i|&2) = 0 ( in what follows u(r\0) and u(d\0) are interchanged as 
discussed in Subsection 1.1.1). I n this case the EVS1 is maximised when p 6 { 0 , 1 } , 
i.e., when the D M knows her preferences w i t h certainty, and is minimised when 
p = 0.5, i.e., when the D M believes either state of m i n d is equally likely. To see this 
note tha t ]nax c / 6 x>{£' u , [ Q u(f /)]} = 0.5 regardless of p: 
m a x { p E ( X d | 0 i ) ] + (1 - p)Eu,[u{d\92)}} (6.7) 
(/(ED 
max{0 .5p + 0.5(1 - p ) , 0.5p + 0.5(1 - p )} 
0.5 




E x [ m a x { £ w | x [ a u ( d ) ] } ] = 0 . 5 [ m a x { £ w | X l [au{d)]} + max{Eu\X3[au(d)]}] (6.8) 
d€T> d£T> d£u 
= 0 .5[max{p, 1 — p} + m a x { l - p. p } ] 
= m a x { p . 1 — p } 
Hence £ A ' [ m a x d € p { £ W | , Y [ a u ( d ) ] } ] is maximised when p 6 { 0 , 1 } , and is minimised 
when p = 0.5. 
Representing 9\ and # 2 v ia numerical values permits calculat ion of the variance of 
9, V[0] , as a func t ion of p. I f we assume tha t 9\ = 1 and 0 2 = 0, then Figure 6.1 
presents a s tandard plot ( le f t hand side) and a parametr ic plot ( r ight hand side) 
of Ex[alu{X)\ and V[0] over the range p € [0 ,1] . B o t h plots demonstrate tha t 
Ex[alu{X)] decreases as V\0) increases. o 
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Figure 6 .1 : E V S I and state of m i n d variance V[9] i n Example 6.1.1 for p £ [0.1] 
As mentioned previously, a possible suggestion arising f r o m Example 6.1.1, is tha t a 
decrease in uncerta inty over 9 necessarily leads to an increase i n E V S I for i n f o r m a t i o n 
relat ing to the outcome of a decision. The argument could be that , i f the D M is 
uncertain about wha t she prefers, then she w i l l not know which type of reward to 
a im for i n decision selection, and thus i n f o r m a t i o n concerning the l ikely re tu rn of 
any decision is of l i t t l e use. Nevertheless, a l though t rue in Example 6.1.1, i t is not 
generally t rue tha t E V S I concerning the outcome of a decision can only increase i f 
uncer ta inty concerning preferences decreases. Th i s w i l l be demonstrated i n Example 
6.1.2. 
There are several potent ia l methods for measuring uncertainty. I n the classical 
problem w i t h known u t i l i t y . Gou ld [51] considers measuring uncerta inty by, for 
example, variance, the Shannon measure of entropy [96], and the Rothschi ld &; 
St igl i tz measure of spread i n d i s t r ibu t ions w i t h equal mean [88] (under which Y\ 
is deemed more uncer ta in than Vg i f ^ i = ^2 + e i where, condi t ional upon Y2, e is 
uncor rec ted random noise w i t h mean 0 and positive variance). Gou ld demonstrates 
tha t in the classical s i tua t ion , w i t h finite f l , E V S I does not necessarily increase when: 
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• The number of elements in fl having non-zero probabi l i ty increases. 
• Less p robab i l i ty is concentrated on any single element of Cl. 
• T h e variance of to increases. 
• Uncer ta in ty over to in the Rothschild Sz S t ig l i tz sense increases. 
Seeking a s imilar result to tha t found by Gould , Example 6.1.2 below provides a. 
counter example to the possible suggestion that , all else constant, a decrease in 
uncertainty over state of m i n d 9 necessarily leads to an increase in E V S I . 
Example 6.1.2 
Consider again the set t ing of Example 6.1.1, bu t where commensurable ut i l i t ies are 
now such tha t u(rx\6\) = it(r 2 |£>i) = 1, u{'i'i\02) = 0, and u ( r 2 \ 9 2 ) = 2. 
I n this set t ing, Ex[aL{X)} monotonical ly increases as p decreases. To see this, note 
tha t m a x r / 6 - D { E u , [ „ u ( d ) ] } is again independent of p: 
m a x f p E u K t / l f l , ) ] + (1 - p)Ew\a{A^)]} (6.9) 
m a x { p + (1 - p)., p + (1 - y)} 
1 
Hence p influences E V S I only through the t e rm Exlmax^-plE^xl^d)}}: 
E x [ m a x { £ w | x [ „ u ( d ) ] } ] = 0.5 max{Eu\Xl [aa{d)}} + 0.5 max{EulX2[au{d)}} (6.10) 
tt^T) d^iD d€TJ 
= 0 . 5 m a x { p , p + 2(1 - p)} + 0 . 5 m a x { p + 2(1 - p ) , p } 
= i n a x { p , p + 2 ( l - p ) } 
= 2 - p 
ma,x{Ejau(d)]} = 
it<EV 
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Figure 6.2: E V S I and state of m i n d variance V[9] i n Example 6.1.2 for p 6 [0,1] 
Assigning 9\ = 1 and 92 = 0 again allows for the relat ionship between E V S I and 
V[9] to be p lo t t ed , and Figure 6.2 contains a s tandard p lo t ( lef t hand side) and a 
parametric p lo t ( r ight hand side) of £ ^ [ a / u ( ^ ) ] and V[9] for p E [0 ,1] . o 
Example 6.1.2 thus demonstrates that : 
• E V S I does not necessarily decrease as more elements of 0 have non-zero prob-
abi l i ty . 
• E V S I does not necessarily decrease as greater p robab i l i ty is assigned to any 
single element of 6 . 
• E V S I is not necessarily m i n i m a l when elements of 0 are equally probable. 
Example 6.1.2 also demonstrates tha t E V S I is not necessarily increased when V[9\ 
is decreased. Fur thermore , this result is invariant to the numerical representation 
assigned to 9i and 92. 
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To see this, note tha t the numerical assignment only affects V[9], and not the E V S I . 
Assigning the generic representation of Q\ = vx and 92 = v2, where v u v 2 G R and 
v\ ^ v2, the variance of 9 is V\0\ = p(l -p)(vi ~ v 2 ) 2 . Hence, as a func t ion of p, V[0] 
is maximised when p = 0.5 and monotonical ly decreases as p moves away f r o m 0.5 
towards either 0 or 1. The E V S I , however, is monotonica l ly decreasing in p. Thus , 
regardless of the assignment v\ and v2, as p increases f r o m 0.5 towards 1, bo th E V S I 
and V[9] decrease. 
I n the classical set t ing, Gould [51] claims tha t no simple relat ion exists between 
E V S I and uncer ta inty over u. He notes that , w i t h al l other factors of the prob-
lem constant, a change in uncerta inty affects bo th the m a x i m u m expected u t i l i t y 
considering X , Ex[ma,x(i&T,{E,_L,\x[n{d)]}}, and the m a x i m u m expected u t i l i t y not 
considering A' , maxd e -p{£^[tt ( f / ) ]} , the difference of which forms the E V S I , as given 
in Equat ion (6.1). Th i s argument, sui tably generalised, also explains why an in-
crease in uncerta inty over 9 does not necessarily lead to a decrease in E V S I . A 
change in beliefs over 8 can affect bo th the value of the m a x i m u m expected adap-
t ive u t i l i t y considering X . Ex[max,i^v{Eu\x[au{d)}}], and the m a x i m u m expected 
adaptive u t i l i t y not considering X , max, / e 7 3 {E ' w [„?i (d) ]} , the difference of which gives 
the E V S I for the adap t iv i ty u t i l i t y case as specified in Equat ion (6.3). 
For an increase in uncer ta inty over 9 to lead to a decrease in E V S I , i t must be tha t 
the former is decreased (increased) by more (less) than the lat ter . In Examples 6.1.1 
and 6.1.2, m a , x ( / e x > { E u [ a u ( d ) ] } d id not depend on the value of p. However, whi ls t 
i n Example 6.1.1 Ex[mcLX-d€v{Ew\x[au{d)]}} decreased as V[9] increased, the oppo-
site happened in Example 6.1.2 for p G [0.5,1]. Essentially, this al ternat ive result 
occurred because increasing p away f r o m 0.5 in Example 6.1.2 meant tha t i t was 
more likely tha t bo th outcomes would be equally desirable. However, the problem 
description implies tha t bo th outcomes are equally l ikely under either decision, and 
hence increasing p towards 1 leads to a reduct ion in value for i n fo rma t ion as the 
decision tha t is actual ly selected becomes increasingly irrelevant. 
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I n f o r m a t i o n X need not only be in fo rmat ive of state of nature to, and alternatives 
include the case tha t X is only in fo rmat ive of 9, or the case tha t X is a vec-
tor of independent values ( X l , X 2 ) , w i t h X^ being in fo rmat ive of u> only and X2 
being in format ive of 0 only. I n these si tuat ions an analogous argument to tha t 
given previously w i l l demonstrate tha t the EVS1 is (where no ta t ion is such tha t 
i f X is relevant to 9, then i t is included as a condi t ioning argument in the adap-
t ive u t i l i t y func t ion ) Ex[aIe\ = Ex[m&Xdev{Eu,[au{d\X)}}} - m a x ( ) e D { £ w [ Q i i ( r f ) ) } , 
and Ex[aL,o(xi:X2)\ = £ A ^ x 2 [ m a x d e E , { E w | X l [ a ( i ( d | X > ) ] } ] - m a x r f e X , { E u , [ a u ( c / ) ] } , 
respectively. 
As mentioned in Chapter 5, interesting problems for adaptive u t i l i t y are necessarily 
of a sequential nature, hence we now consider an n-per iod sequential problem under 
the assumption tha t pr ior beliefs over 9 and tu are independent. In this s i tua t ion we 
demonstrate tha t the value of observed in fo rma t ion X, relevant for de termining u>, 
decreases i f i t is observed later in the sequence of decisions. Using no ta t ion 0 / u ; ( . i 1 ; j ) , 
w i t h ; denot ing the period X = x is to be observed, the C V S I is as indicated below: 
„/ u , ( . r ; j - 1) = max { E w \ x \ a i i { d \ , d j , ( / „ ) ] } (6.11) 
-E;\AMd\,- . . , < ) ] (for j > 2 ) 
„ / W ( . T ; 0) = max {Eu]x[au(du ..... dn)}} - ^ [ ^ ( c / ' i , . . . , d'n)\ 
d\,...,il„€V 
w i t h d\.... , d'n = arg max { E w [ a u ( d i , dn)\] 
d\ ,...,dn£T> 
Because increasing j in Equat ion (6.11) means tha t the necessary maximisa t ion 
must be performed under an extended number of constraints (decisions d\,... , dj_x 
w i l l have been fixed before X = x is known) , we f ind tha t alu(x\ j ) can only decrease 
as j increases. 
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This implies tha t the value of specific i n fo rma t ion can only d imin i sh i f i t is observed 
later in the decision sequence. Furthermore, because of its connection to the C V S I , 
the E V S I for unknown in fo rma t ion X can also only decrease i f X is to become 
known later in the decision sequence. Such a result is indeed in line w i t h i n t u i t i o n , 
where we expect i n fo rma t ion to be of greater use, and hence of larger value, i f i t is 
available for an increased number of decisions. 
In the set t ing of Chapter 5, i n f o r m a t i o n was made available v ia two sources. F i rs t , 
the D M was able to learn about the t rue state of nature u> by observing the par t icular 
re turn r' tha t decision dl led to. Second, the D M was able to learn about her t rue 
state of m i n d 0 by observing u t i l i t y i n f o r m a t i o n z', also fo l lowing decision dl. B y 
the t ime the D M selects decision r/1, beliefs w i l l thus be represented by d is t r ibut ions 
PuUH* a n d P()\„ni- J n this c a s e the E V S I for X1 = {rl1z'1) is as given below (where 
„(/•' = Md\- • ..d'-\.n'(aI/'):..... rr" ( a H n ) \ a H1)): 
Ex'ULAX^UH*)) = ^ . ^ | „ W . [ C ] - EUt„UHi[C) (6.12) 
G = EaHj+l\X>•^••(nH'-),w,e • • • EaHn\1,n-\^Hn-\yul 0\aUl) 
G' = G, bu t w i t h X1 omi t t ed and w i t h r ' and z' removed f r o m all histories. 
Equat ion (6.12) shows tha t the E V S I of X ' w i l l depend on the decision c/' tha t is 
chosen in period i. T h e previous decisions d l , . . . , < f w i l l also influence the E V S I . 
Example 6.1.3 
To demonstrate the use of Equat ion (6.12), we re turn to the apple or banana example 
tha t was last discussed in Example 5.1.1. We assume a sequence length of n = 3, 
and tha t pr ior beliefs are P{6= 1.5) = 0.4 = 1 - P{6 = 0.5), so E\6) = 0.9. We fu r the r 
assume tha t selection of a banana leads to the correct value of 0 being observed w i t h 
p robabi l i ty 0.7, whi ls t nothing is learnt i f the selection of an apple is made. 
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To determine the E V S I for the i n fo rma t ion concerning 0 tha t is gained i f the D M ' s 
first decision is selection of a banana, we must consider the possible fu tu re op t ima l 
decision streams tha t would arise depending on the actual i n fo rma t ion received. I f 
an apple is i n i t i a l l y selected no i n f o r m a t i o n w i l l be observed, which clearly has value 
0. I f the banana is selected in the first per iod, then either u t i l i t y i n fo rma t ion z1 is 
such tha t 2 1 = 1.5 or 2 1 = 0.5, w i t h prior predict ive probabil i t ies determined v ia 
P ( 2 ] = y ) = P(zl = y\0 = 1.5)P(9 = 1.5) + P(z1 = y\6 = 0.5)P(6 = 0.5). Hence we 
find tha t P(z] = 1.5) = 0.46 = 1 — P(z} = 0.5). The m a x i m u m expected adaptive 
u t i l i t y for the three cases of z 1 = 1.5, zl = 0.5, and for not receiving in fo rma t ion 
zx ( though a banana is s t i l l selected), are 3.37, 2.72, and 2.92, respectively. P u t t i n g 
these values in to Equa t ion (6.12) results in an E V S I of 0.1005 ( to 4 s.f.). o 
A remark about Example 6.1.3 is tha t the expected adaptive u t i l i t y for the decision 
to choose a banana in the first period is equal to E V S I + £ [ 0 ] = 1.0005. Indeed, 
when i t is meaningful to ta lk about expected adaptive u t i l i t y of a single decision 
w i t h i n a sequence of decisions (i.e., when adaptive u t i l i t y is of an addi t ive f o r m ) , we 
can decompose the ' f u l l ' expected adaptive u t i l i t y of any decision in to the fo l lowing 
two components: 
• The 'pure ' expected adaptive u t i l i t y arising f r o m receiving the re turn itself. 
• The expected adaptive u t i l i t y of the i n f o r m a t i o n tha t is gained regarding true 
preferences. 
Th i s can be seen v ia Equa t ion (6.12), where Ex-\AL.o(X*; i]aH1)} represents the 
expected adaptive u t i l i t y of the in fo rma t ion tha t is gained regarding true preferences 
and likely outcomes of decisions, whi ls t EU0\UH<[C] represents the pure expected 
adaptive u t i l i t y arising f r o m jus t the re turn itself (and no i n f o r m a t i o n is recorded). 
The f ina l t e rm in Equa t ion (6.12), Ex< Eufi\aii>\G], represents the f u l l adaptive u t i l i t y 
of selecting a par t icular decision. Suitable rearrangement then shows: 
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Ex< EWi0\nni [G] — Ex<[aIu,o{Xx\i\„Hl)\ + Ew^aHi[G'\ (6.13) 
Also note tha t the E V S I is a na tura l method for measuring the usefulness of infor-
ma t ion . I f we had assumed in Example 6.1.3 tha t selecting a banana would certainly 
i n f o r m the D M of her true state of m i n d , which is clearly a more useful source of 
i n fo rma t ion , then we would have found tha t the E V S I was equal to 0.3, a greater 
value than the 0.1005 reported above. 
We conclude this section by considering and i l l u s t r a t ing impl icat ions of E V S I for 
uncer ta in preferences in a re l iab i l i ty example. For this reason we re tu rn to the 
set t ing of Example 5.3.2. 
Example 6.1.4 
Example 5.3.2 considered a 3-period sequential decision problem where, at each deci-
sion epoch, the D M had to decide whether she wished to remain w i t h an unreliable 
machine (assuming i t had not previously been replaced), decision d s , or whether 
she wished to change to a new and f u l l y reliable machine, decision d R . A d u m m y 
decision dp was used to create feasible decision streams and was selected i f and only 
i f the D M had previously selected decision d.R. 
I n tha t example i t was assumed tha t the D M ' s true preferences for decision streams 
were represented by the addi t ive u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n u(dl, d2, d3\9) = u{dl\9), w i t h : 
Pr ior beliefs about 9 were assumed to be given by p robab i l i ty density func t ion 
- ( 1 / 2 ) ° i f r f ' = d s 
7 2 - 2 i f d' = d 
; 
u 
i f d d 0 
(6.14) 
f ( 9 ) = 8 ( 2 - 0 ) / 9 , for 0 G [1 /2 ,2 ] . 
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I n f o r m a t i o n z' observed after selection of decision d,' = d$ in formed the D M whether, 
pr ior to its selection, her expected adaptive u t i l i t y for t ha t decision had been too 
great, zl = 1 (negative surprise), or too small , z' = 0 (posit ive surprise). No 
in fo rma t ion about preferences could be observed i f decisions d R or dp were selected. 
I n this se t t ing i t was o p t i m a l to select d 1 = d$, and then to either continue selecting 
dl = ds i f z 1 — 0, or replace in the second period i f z 1 = 1, leading to m a x i m u m 
expected adaptive u t i l i t y o f - 1 . 4 2 . 
As no i n f o r m a t i o n is available to the D M i f she selects either of decisions dn or 
dp, bo th of these have an associated E V S I equal to 0. Hence al l adaptive u t i l i t y 
for them is associated w i t h the actual reward outcome they lead to . Furthermore, 
Equa t ion (6.14) leads to au(d' = da) = i/2 — 2. However, i f the D M selects decision 
d$, then not only does she spend a period work ing w i t h the unreliable machine, bu t 
she also gains i n fo rma t ion about her preferences, and bo th of these events have an 
associated expected adaptive u t i l i t y value. I n the f i r s t per iod, under prior beliefs, 
au(dl = ds) = —0.51, whi ls t the E V S I for z 1 is approximate ly 0.06 ( the m a x i m u m 
expected adaptive u t i l i t y w i t h o u t no t ing z 1 is approximate ly -1.49, whi ls t this is 
approximate ly -1.23 and -1.61 for z 1 = 0 and z 1 = 1, respectively). Hence the f u l l 
con t r ibu t ion of d1 = ds is the sum of these two values (-0.51 and 0.06) and is thus 
approximate ly -0.45. 
B y the second period, w i t h o u t t ak ing into account possible knowledge of Z\ (we have 
incorporated its E V S I into the f u l l expected adaptive u t i l i t y of decision d\ = d s ) , the 
pure (and also f u l l ) expected adaptive u t i l i t y of decision d2 = d R is equal to -1 (and 
because i t is known tha t in period 3 there w i l l be no u t i l i t y loss, this is equivalent 
to -0.5 in each of the next two periods). The decision d2 = ds, not t ak ing into 
account Z\, again has pure expected adaptive u t i l i t y value approximate ly -0 .51, bu t 
also has E V S I approximate ly 0.04 (reduced f r o m the E V S I for (/] = d s because the 
observation is being made later in the decision sequence), mak ing its f u l l expected 
adaptive u t i l i t y value approximate ly -0.47. 
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Final ly , in per iod 3, fo rge t t ing previous i n fo rma t ion z 1 and z 2 , the decision d R 
has expected adaptive u t i l i t y value exactly -0.5, whi l s t a l ternat ive d s again has pure 
expected adaptive u t i l i t y value approximate ly -0 .51. Furthermore, as this is the f inal 
decision and there w i l l not be fu r the r o p p o r t u n i t y to use any u t i l i t y i n fo rma t ion , 
the decision dA = d s has associated E V S I equal to 0 and so -0.51 is the f u l l value 
for decision d? = ds-
Due to the addi t ive nature of the u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n in this example, and because 
in such a s i tua t ion i t is meaningful to consider the one period u t i l i t y value of a 
decision, we can decompose the m a x i m u m expected adaptive u t i l i t y o f -1 .42 into the 
contr ibut ions f r o m the f u l l m a x i m u m expected adaptive ut i l i t ies of the one period 
decisions. In this case we f i n d tha t -1.42 equals the f u l l expected adaptive ut i l i t ies 
of decisions d1 = d s (-0.45), d2 = d s (-0.47), and c/3 = d R (-0.5). 
Note tha t this decomposit ion, whi ls t a l lowing the D M to determine m a x i m u m ex-
pected adaptive u t i l i t y , does not i n f o r m the D M of the op t ima l decision selection 
strategy, which is instead found th rough appl icat ion of Equations (5.3) and (5.4). We 
fu r the r note that , i f z 1 had been recorded fo l lowing selection of decision dl = ds, 
then z 2 has E V S I equal to 0. Th i s can be verified either d i rec t ly f rom Equat ion 
(6.12), or by no t ing tha t according to Table 5.4, the f ina l per iod decision does not 
depend upon the value of z2. o 
6.2 Risk and Trial Aversion 
The fo l lowing in t roduc to ry review on the concept of classical risk aversion is based 
upon the theory developed independently by A r r o w [6] and P r a t t [83]. I n classical 
u t i l i t y theory, risk aversion is a diagnostic re la t ing to a D M ' s preference for avoiding 
actuarial ly fair gambles. A D M who seeks to partake in such gambles is referred to 
as risk seeking, whi ls t a D M who is indifferent to such gambles is referred to as risk 
neutral . 
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I f the reward set TZ is suff ic ient ly rich tha t i t can be ident i f ied w i t h a f in i te interval 
of R, i.e., TZ = [a,b] C R, then for any decision d w i t h i n the convex set of feasible 
decisions, the expected u t i l i t y of d w i l l equal u(r) for some suitable reward r € TZ. 
Such r is referred to as the certainty equivalence for decision d, and w i l l be denoted 
here by Q. Thus the certainty equivalence of a decision is t ha t reward 7- = c,i making 
the D M indifferent between receiving cd for sure, or selecting the possibly uncertain 
( w i t h respect to its outcome) decision d. Furthermore, we are able to determine 
the expected value of the reward arising f r o m any given decision, and this w i l l be 
denoted by e,/. T h e risk p remium associated w i t h decision d, denoted pd, is then 
defined to be the difference of cd f r o m ed, i.e., pd = ed — cd. 
Over a subset \a.Ji\ C R, the D M is said to be risk averse i f , for any decision d w i t h 
al l possible returns fa l l ing in \a,0\, the risk p remium pd > 0. Similar ly , the D M 
is said to be risk seeking i f pd < 0, and is said to be risk neutral i f pd = 0. Thus 
we see tha t , under such a de f in i t ion , risk aversion is a concept related to the D M ' s 
aversion or willingness for selecting a decision tha t has greater uncertainty over its 
likely outcome in comparison to another w i t h equal expected re tu rn , but which 
has reduced outcome uncertainty. A n addi t ional result is tha t , presuming tha t the 
func t ion u(r) is non-decreasing and twice-differentiable over region [a, ,0], the D M 
is risk averse over region [a, 0\ i f and only i f her u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n for rewards in tha t 
region is s t r i c t ly concave. Similar ly , a s t r i c t l y convex u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n relates to the 
D M being risk prone, and a linear u t i l i t y f unc t ion corresponds to risk neutral i ty . 
A closely related method of measuring a D M ' s level of risk aversion is the A r r o w -
Pra t t measure of absolute risk aversion, see e.g., A r r o w [6] and P r a t t [83] (P ra t t 
refers to this as risk aversion in the small , i.e., over a region [a,0\, rather than 
global risk aversion). I f u(r) is a twice continuously d i f f e r e n t i a t e func t ion w i t h 
positive f i rs t derivative, then absolute local risk aversion l(r) is given by: 
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l ( r ) = ( 6 - 1 5 ) u'(r) 
Because u'(r) > 0, the sign of l{r) depends on, and is opposite to , the sign of 
u"(r). Th i s in t u r n determines whether u(r) is convex or concave. However, the 
absolute local risk aversion l(r) also has addi t ional useful features. For example, 
for two u t i l i t y funct ions u and u, l(r) = l(r) for al l possible r i f and only i f u is a 
positive linear t rans format ion of ii, i m p l y i n g tha t they represent the same preference 
relations. Moreover, i f / ( r ) > / ( r ) for a l l r in an interval [a , /y] , then for any decision 
d w i t h al l possible returns in interval [a./?], pd > pa- Hence, / ( r ) also gives an 
indicat ion of the s trength of a D M ' s risk aversion. 
Furthermore, given only the absolute local risk aversion l(r), an analyst, knowing 
the general solut ion to a homogeneous second-order O D E w i t h variable coefficients, 
can derive the D M ' s u t i l i t y func t ion : 
l ( r ) = -VL^l =j. u " { r ) + l{r)u'{r) = 0 (6.16) 
u'(r) 
=> e ^ " r l J r [ « " ( r ) + / (rK(r)] = 0 
^ l { e / ^ > d r i i . ' ( r ) } = 0 
=> e J l { r ) d T u { r ) = k,x 
= > 7t(r) = fc,y e- Sl(r)dTd,r + k2 
As a u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n is only unique up to a positive linear t rans format ion , the values 
of constants k\ and k2 are irrelevant. On ly the sign of k) is impor t an t , and this can 
be determined th rough the constraint tha t u'(r) > 0. Equa t ion (6.16) also has an 
impor t an t impl ica t ion for adaptive u t i l i t y . As was discussed in Chapter 4, a state 
of m i n d 6 characterises the D M ' s preferences and hence characterises the D M ' s t rue 
u t i l i t y func t ion . Thus, Equat ion (6.16) demonstrates tha t a state of m i n d w i l l also 
characterise the D M ' s true absolute local risk aversion. 
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The connection between the D M ' s absolute local risk aversion and her u t i l i t y func-
t ion means that , rather than only considering possibilities for the t rue u t i l i t y func-
t ion u(r\6), a D M can derive her adaptive u t i l i t y func t ion f r o m a list of possible 
candidates for her absolute local risk aversion, l(r\0), and their associated subjec-
tive probabi l i t ies of being true. This is demonstrated in the fo l lowing example. 
Example 6.2.1 
A D M has oppor tun i ty to invest in a new venture, w i t h V meaning investment and 
V non-investment. Event S (S) indicates tha t the venture was (not ) successful, and 
prior beliefs are such tha t P(S) = 0.4 = 1 - P(S). I f the D M invests and event S 
occurs, then she w i l l receive £ 2 0 0 0 0 0 , bu t i f she invests and event S occurs, then 
she w i l l receive £ 0 . I f she does not invest, then she w i l l keep the £ 5 0 0 tha t was 
necessary for the investment. 
The D M is uncertain of her u t i l i t y func t ion for monetary returns over the interval 
[0,200000], bu t is comfor table w i t h considering possibilities for her own level of 
risk aversion. Indeed, w i t h p robabi l i ty 0.8 she believes tha t she has a positive 
risk aversion, b u t one which diminishes as her weal th increases. Al te rna t ive ly , she 
considers she has a positive risk aversion, but constant over a l l monetary values 
considered in this problem. 
The D M ' s t rue absolute local risk aversion over this region w i l l be denoted by l{r\9), 
and f r o m the above we assume tha t w i t h probabi l i ty 0.2, l{r\9) = l(r\0\) = 0.001, 
and w i t h probabi l i ty 0.8, l{r\9) = l(r\92) = ^ y . A p p l i c a t i o n of Equat ion (6.16) thus 
results i n (where Ai , A 2 , / J i , / ^ 2 S R): 
l(r\6) = l(r\0x) = 0.001 = • u ( r | 0 , ) = - A ^ " 0 0 0 1 ' ' + A 2 , ( w i t h A] > 0) (6.17) 
Z(r|0) = l(r\02) = — ! — => u ( r | 0 2 ) = /x, l n ( l + r) + / L I 2 , ( w i t h /z, > 0) 
r + 1 
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As described in Section 4.3, such possible classical ut i l i ty functions require scaling 
to ensure that they are commensurable, i.e., so they can be meaningfully compared. 
Hence the D M must now consider her preferences over rewards that are conditioned 
on different possibilities for the state of mind 0. Assuming that the correct value 
for the local risk aversion will not influence the DM's preferences for receiving the 
particular amounts 2 of £200000 or £ 0 (e.g., the D M is just as happy to receive 
£200000 if 9 = 6\ as she is if 9 = 92). we can scale each of the two possible classical 
uti l i ty functions by suitably choosing values for constants A], A 2 , H\ and (.12 to ensure 
that ^(.£20000010,) = u(X2OOOOO|02) = 1 and u(£Q\9x) = u(£0\92) = 0. 
We find A[ = 1, A2 = 1, = 0.08 and /.t2 = 0. The adaptive util i ty is thus: 
au{r) = E0[u(r\9)} = 0.2(1 - e ' 0 0 0 1 ' ) + 0.8(0.08ln(l + / )) (6.18) 
Using this adaptive util i ty function in combination with beliefs over the state of 
nature allows the D M to determine the adaptive uti l i ty of the two decisions V and 
V. In this case we find aa(V) = 0.49, whilst au(V) = 0.4. Thus the D M should 
invest in the venture. Note, however, that if i t were assumed that 9 — 92 with 
certainty, then the D M should not invest. o 
As discussed above, risk aversion is a concept relating to the curvature of uti l i ty 
as a function of 7'. However, in an adaptive uti l i ty setting, there is more than one 
possible uti l i ty function, and the uti l i ty function u(r\9) can be considered a function 
of both v and 9. We consider the implication of this by first returning to the apple 
or banana example. 
2 T h i s s tatement can only be true for two amounts . T o include a th ird would lead to no solutions 
for the scal ing of the two possible c lassical util ities. O n c e two values have been selected, the true 
absolute local risk aversion will affect preferences over every other part icu lar reward. 
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Example 6.2.2 
Consider again the apple or banana example, last seen in Example 6.1.3, but now 
with three possible states of mind, 9 € { 1 , 2 , 3 } . The case 0=1 corresponds to a 
preference for apples, the case 9 = 2 corresponds to indifference, and the case 9 = 3 
corresponds to a preference for bananas. 
We assume prior beliefs over 9 are such that P(9 = i) = 1/3 for i = 1,2,3. Thus 
E\9] = 2. corresponding to the situation that the D M is indifferent between apples 
and bananas. However, consider possible classical ut i l i ty functions ui(b\9) = 9 — 1, 
a2{b\B) = t° - e2 + 1, u3(b\&) = ln(0/2) + 1, and Uj(a|0) = 1 for i = 1,2,3, with 
commensurablility assumed within each over the various possible values for the 
state of mind. Each of the utilities Ui agrees with the above meanings for the possible 
values of 9, however, all three lead to different decision selection in a one-period 
adaptive uti l i ty problem: 
U l ( b \ 9 ) = e - 1 => „u(6) = l (6.19) 
u2(b\9) = e° - e2 + 1 => au{b) = 3.7 
u 3 ( f r | 0 ) = l n ( 0 / 2 ) + l => au(b)= 0.9 
We see that, if possible classical utilities are as expressed by u2, the D M should 
select the banana, whilst if they are expressed by u ; J , she should select the apple. 
This is despite the DM's prior beliefs being such that, in expectation, bananas are 
just as good as apples. o 
In Example 6.2.2 there is no risk in the result of decision selection, as selection of 
either f ru i t leads to consumption of that f rui t with certainty. Indeed, the only form 
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of risk in the problem arises through uncertainty over true preferences. 
Al l three uti l i ty possibilities have the same prior beliefs about the state of mind 6. 
The only difference is the effect that various values for 0 have on the possibilities 
for the DM's uti l i ty function. Thus, just as a D M may be averse to actuarially 
fair gambles with uncertain outcomes, certain forms of adaptive uti l i ty functions 
demonstrate an aversion to decisions whose uti l i ty values depend on an uncertain 
state of mind. 
Such a form of adaptive util i ty would be appropriate if, despite prior beliefs making 
preferences indifferent in expectation, the D M would prefer the apple because she 
feels safe in the knowledge of what to expect from i t . She may be averse to trying 
the banana because, even though there is the potential for even greater pleasure, she 
does not wish to take the chance of consuming something she dislikes. To distinguish 
this form of aversion from classical risk aversion, as reviewed at the beginning of 
this section, we will refer to it as trial aversion. In Example 6.2.2, we would refer to 
ui as a trial neutral function, u2 as a trial seeking function, and u a as a trial averse 
function. 
To formally define trial aversion, we require that 0 be a continuous space3, so as to 
ensure that E[0] always has a meaning as a possible state of mind itself, i.e., that 
E[0] € 6 . In this is indeed the case, then we claim trial aversion to be a geometrical 
feature of u(r\0) when viewed as a function of 9 only (i.e., r is assumed constant). 
Given a reward r with uncertain uti l i ty value, we define a D M as being trial averse 
with respect to r i(u(r\E[6]) > au(r). In addition, the D M is said to be trial seeking 
\{ u(r\E[9}) < au(r), and trial neutral \[u(r\E[6}) = au{r). Note that this definition 
implies that a D M will be trial neutral for any reward she knows the true uti l i ty 
value of. 
3 W e assume this is possible, yet, accept, thai, C h a p t e r 4 assumed discrete 0 when presenting 
arguments for selecting decisions so as to maximise expected adaptive utility. F u r t h e r discussion 
on the development of adaptive utility theory lor continuous 0 is presented in C h a p t e r 7. 
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I f u(r\9) is a non-decreasing and twice differentiable function of 0, then, for a given 
reward r, a D M is trial averse if u(r\0) is strictly concave as a function of 9. Similarly, 
a D M is trial seeking if u(r\0) is strictly convex in 0. and is trial neutral if u(r\0) is 
linear in 0. 
We use the term 'trial aversion', not only to distinguish i t from the classical meaning 
of risk aversion, but also because in an n-period sequential problem the greater the 
trial aversion the less likely the D M is to select the uncertain reward in order to 
learn about it . For example, if there exists an alternative reward r' with known 
uti l i ty value such that it(r|£?[0]) > u(r') > au(r) (i.e., the true uti l i ty of?-' does not 
depend on the value of 0), then, in a one-period problem, the D M should select r' 
over r. The reason she should not select r if 0 were uncertain is because her trial 
aversion implies that the potential cost of discovering that 9 is worse than expected, 
outweighs the potential benefit of discovering that 0 is better than expected. 
When u(r\0) is considered over the region K x 0 . risk aversion is a geometrical 
feature concerning the curvature of the function along the 7--axis for a fixed value of 
9. Trial aversion is instead an orthogonal concept relating to the curvature of the 
function along the 0 axis for a fixed value of r. Another difference between the two 
is that, as discussed above, i t is meaningful to discuss local risk aversion, where all 
possible outcomes of decisions fall in some subset of TZ. However, trial aversion is 
necessarily a global concept, as the D M must consider all possible states of mind 
when determining E[9] or au(r). 
Just as a risk aversion, for a given state of mind 9, can be measured through the 
Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion, a DM's degree of trial aversion for 
a given reward level r can be measured through an analogous measure of absolute 
trial aversion. Provided ti,(r\0) is a twice continuously differentiable function with 
positive first derivative, we denote this measure by l.r{0) H I K I define it by: 
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d\,{r\0) du{r\0) 
l r { 9 ) ~ W ~ / ~ d 9 ~ ( 6 2 0 ) 
The function t,.(0) has analogous properties to the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute 
risk aversion l(r). Indeed, i t applies the same calculation as the Arrow-Pratt mea-
sure, but simply upon a different variable. In particular, the D M is trial averse if 
l,T{0) > 0, tr ial seeking if l.T(0) < 0, and trial neutral if t,T(9) = 0. This is because we 
required du(r\0)/d0 > 0, and so the sign of Lr(8) is opposite to that of d2u(r\0)/d02 
and hence determines whether u(r\0) is a convex or concave function of 0. 
Applying this measure to the three uti l i ty functions considered in Example 6.2.2, 
we find that for ult k(0) = 0, for u 2 , U,(6) = - 1 , and for i i 3 , U,(0) — 1/0. A l l of 
these are in line with the description of U\ as being trial neutral, u2 as being trial 
seeking, and as being trial averse. 
Since the expected util i ty hypothesis of Bernoulli [18], i t has been assumed that 
most DMs act in a risk averse manner, especially when decisions concern monetary 
returns (an exception being the act of gambling, but this can be explained through 
a util i ty for the exhiliration that such an activity provides). As Arrow [6] notes, 
this hypothesis explains many economic activities such as insurance, or the aversion 
for entering high risk investments. Indeed, the assumption that a ut i l i ty function 
is bounded implies that eventually the D M must be risk averse beyond a certain 
reward level. 
However, i t would appear that DMs are not necessarily trial averse in their attitudes 
towards decision selection. Trial aversion relates to an unwillingness to experiment, 
or to select the uncertain. Nevertheless, the opposite to this form of behaviour 
can be observed frequently in everyday life. Indeed, every experience that a D M 
encounters must have been novel to her at some point. DMs often order meals they 
have never tasted before over others they are more familiar with, or a D M with a 
severe medical problem may readily select a remedy which offers only the faintest 
possibility of providing a lifestyle which she has never before experienced. 
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That is not to say DMs are generally trial seeking, and not always do DMs wish 
to try novel rewards. For example, a D M may be averse to trying a new pastime 
such as attending a football match, or on holidaying in a new and different location. 
Although we do not wish to over-generalize, it may be that there is a connection 
between level of trial aversion and the age of a D M . with a potential hypothesis 
being that at a younger age DMs demonstrate a level of trial seeking, with trial 
aversion increasing as experience increases. 
Perhaps the most obvious example of trial aversion within society, however, is the 
preference of some DMs to stick with products that are produced by a familiar 
brand. Indeed, Erdem &; Keane [39] state "estimates indicate that consumers are 
risk-averse"1 with respect to variation in brand attributes, which discourages them 
from buying unfamiliar brands." 
Just as risk aversion can explain the existence of insurance companies, in this situ-
ation trial aversion can be used to explain the existence of marketing companies. If 
a D M was not trial averse with respect to trying a new brand, then all that would 
be needed for her to select a new product would be to know of its existence. No 
longer would there be any need for marketing companies to attempt to 'sell' the new 
product over existing possibilities, e.g., by offering trial samples. Indeed, i t was for 
real world observations such as this that Cyert &. DeGroot [27] first considered a 
mathematical model for decision making with uncertain preferences. 
U n d e r the arguments presented in this section, we would refer to this behaviour as trial aver-
sion. 
Chapter 7 
Conclusions and Future Directions 
This chapter provides a short summary of the main results of this thesis, followed 
by a discussion of potential directions for further research. 
7.1 Conclusions 
This thesis has extended the adaptive uti l i ty concept that was first introduced by 
Cyert &; DeGroot [27]. In Chapter 2 we reviewed various suggestions in the decision 
theory literature for solving single and sequential decision problems. Chapter 3 pro-
vided motivation for permitting uncertain uti l i ty and offered a formal definition of 
an adaptive uti l i ty function. An interpretation of a uti l i ty parameter, our so-called 
state of mind, was proposed in Chapter 4, and we discussed its role within decision 
analysis. Chapter 4 also focused on important foundational issues of adaptive ut i l -
ity that had been previously overlooked in the literature. The main result of the 
chapter is that, under the assumption that the D M agrees with the classical system 
of expected uti l i ty axioms and has scaled possible uti l i ty functions to ensure com-
niensurability, the logical strategy is to select decisions so as to maximise expected 
adaptive utility. 
Applications within sequential decision problems were illustrated in Chapter 5, 
where an algorithm was developed for solving n-period sequential problems and 
a discussion was given on how decision selection had to influence likely ut i l i ty infoi-
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mation for the theory to deviate from classical, known utility, solutions. Chapter 5 
also discussed some possible methods for receiving uti l i ty information and a couple 
of small hypothetical examples were presented to illustrate the potential of adaptive 
utility for sequential problems within reliability theory. 
Chapter 6 considered the implication of uncertain preferences for the classical ut i l -
ity diagnostics of value of information and risk aversion, an area that has not been 
discussed in any previous work on adaptive utility or related uncertain uti l i ty the-
ories. Whilst it was shown that the DM's beliefs over her state of mind could 
influence the expected value of sample information, i t was demonstrated that no 
simple monotone relation exists. Moreover, the hypothesis that a decrease in un-
certainty over the state of mind would necessarily lead to an increase in expected 
value of sample information was shown to be false. Section 6.1 also considered the 
value of information relating to the DM's true preferences, and it was shown that, 
when it is meaningful to talk about the uti l i ty value of a single decision within a 
sequence, the expected adaptive uti l i ty of that decision could be decomposed into a 
part arising from expected decision outcome, and a part arising from expected value 
of information related to the DM's preferences. 
Section 6.2 considered effects on risk aversion, and it was shown that the state 
of mind not only characterised the DM's true complete preference ordering over 
decisions, but also has a one-to-one relationship with the Pratt-Arrow measure of 
absolute risk aversion. For this reason we demonstrated that a DM could derive 
her adaptive uti l i ty function from only considering possibilities for her absolute risk 
aversion. Finally, we introduced trial aversion, a concept relating to a DM's aversion 
or willingness to try rewards or select decisions that are novel, or are such that the 
DM is uncertain about her preferences for them in comparison to alternative options. 
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7.2 Future Directions 
Following the formal approach to the development of adaptive uti l i ty presented in 
this thesis, there are many areas for further development of the theory. In particu-
lar, we accept that, though of philosophical interest, the current state of the theory 
means that the benefit of allowing the D M to remain uncertain over her preferences 
is overshadowed by the complexity of implementation in non-trivial decision prob-
lems. For this reason we conclude the thesis with a number of options for future 
development that we have identified and believe to be necessary before the theory 
can be applied to a wide variety of interesting problems. 
As was mentioned at the end of Section 5.1, the employment of dynamic pro-
gramming and backward induction for solving sequential decision problems suffers 
from the so-called curse of dimensionality, and the inclusion of a possibly multi-
dimensional state of mind for representing uncertainty over preferences only exas-
perates the situation. A D M must then consider whether or not the relative benefit 
of remaining uncommitted to a specific and assumed correct ut i l i ty function out-
weighs the increased cost of computational complexity that is required in solving 
an adaptive util i ty problem. Such computational complexity is currently the great-
est hindrance in solving an adaptive util i ty problem, but as is discussed in Section 
5.1, it may well be possible to identify forms of uti l i ty functions that are not only 
reasonable for modelling possible preferences, but which also greatly reduce the 
computational requirements of solution algorithms. 
In addition to seeking combinations of probability distributions and forms of ut i l i ty 
functions that reduce the computational complexity of a sequential adaptive uti l i ty 
problem, there are further issues that can be considered for enhancing the use of the 
theory in solving real-world decision problems. For example, issues involving the 
elicitation of the DM's beliefs should be addressed, and additional problem types 
in which it would be regarded as highly beneficial to permit the D M to remain 
uncertain over preferences should be identified. 
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Work on elicitation is required as now a collection of possible uti l i ty functions must 
be considered and a probability distribution over them specified. This is a non-trivial 
task, especially if the D M is not trained to think about uncertainties. Bedford el 
al. [10] consider the problem of probability elicitation 1 , whilst Chajewska et al. [22] 
consider the problem of eliciting utilities (see the discussion of this work in Section 
5.2). However, there appears to be no discussion in the literature on how a DM who 
is uncertain of her preferences may elicit her own possible uti l i ty functions and the 
probabilities of each representing true preferences. The identification of a source of 
util i ty information following decision selection and determination of an appropriate 
likelihood function will also be difficult, yet necessary, hence any method of easing 
this task will be of much use. 
In addition to developing the theory so as to make it more suitable for real-world ap-
plication, there are a number of possibilities for development on a theoretical level. 
For example, the adaptive util i ty setting considered here requires the DM to have a 
known and precise prior probability distribution over her true preferences. However, 
it may be that this is too strong a requirement for some DMs to commit to, and 
instead imprecise or nonparametric extensions may be more reasonable. Sections 
2.1.2 and 2.2.3 discussed recent research into imprecise probability and uti l i ty the-
ories, but the combination of imprecise uti l i ty information with learning following 
decision implementation may be an interesting area for further development. 
Augustin & Coolen [8] and Coolen [25] discuss nonparametric predictive inference 
as an alternative to a precise parametric probability distribution for quantifying 
uncertainty, and it may be that such a theory could also be useful for quantifying 
uncertainty over utilities. For example, suppose a DM has known util i ty values for 
ten types of frui t , with fruits numbered from 1 to 10 such that u(i) < u(i + 1), 
with i = 1,. . . ,9, and where utilities are bounded in the interval [0,1]. Further 
suppose that the D M is afforded opportunity to select a new frui t x with unknown 
1 Bedford et al. consider el ic itat ion problems wi th in reliable system design, discussing the need to 
support decision making with suitable subject ive assessments about likely future system reliability. 
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utility. The nonparametric setting of Coolen [25] would assume that beliefs are 
P(u{x) e [0 ,u( l ) ] ) = P(u{x) € [u{t),u(i + 1)]) = P(u(x) E [u{\0), 1]) = 1/11. The 
advantage of such a setting is that it allows the D M to remain uncommitted to 
specifying a precise probability distribution over the value of u(x). Furthermore, 
the values of known utilities u(l),... ,n(10) will influence the DM's decision as to 
whether or not she should try frui t x, for if many fruits were seen to have low utility, 
with only one or two having larger values, then with high probability the new fruit 
x will also have low utility. The number of fruits the D M has knowledge of will also 
affect the DM's decision to try the new frui t , for if only 1 or 2 fruits had known 
utility, then there would be increased uncertainty over u(x). 
Unfortunately, as with the theories that imprecisely quantify uncertainty (see Sub-
section 2.2.3), such a nonparametric setting leads to a class V of possible probability 
distributions for the value of u(x). This means there will be a set of possible ex-
pected uti l i ty values, and so the theory can not guarantee the identification of a 
uniquely admissible decision. 
The argument in Section 4.2 for the existence and uniqueness of an adaptive util i ty 
function was only applicable in the context that decisions are lotteries with finite 
support, i.e., the set of possible rewards TZ was assumed finite. This argument also 
assumed a finite set 0 of possible states of mind. Nevertheless, we later assumed that 
an adaptive uti l i ty function could be defined for when either TZ or 0 are continuous, 
e.g., the discussion of risk aversion in Section 6.2. To be meaningful and ensure 
that E{6\ £ 0 , the concept of trial aversion that was introduced in Section 6.2 
specifically required a continuous set of possible states of mind 0 . For this reason 
development of adaptive uti l i ty theory for continuous TZ or 0 is required. However, 
as with our repeated application of Anscoinbe &; Aumann's subjective uti l i ty [5], 
we expect this simply requires repeated application of traditional expected util i ty 
results for permitting continuous TZ (for example, Herstein &; Milnor [54] provide 
the expected uti l i ty result in the case that decisions are discrete distributions over 
a continuous reward space). 
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There are also a number of possibilities in extending the work of Chapter 6 con-
cerning uti l i ty diagnostics. For example, i t was demonstrated in Section 6.1 that 
a decrease in uncertainty over the state of mind does not necessarily lead to an 
increase in expected value of information. However, i t may be that such a relation 
does exist for certain uti l i ty forms or decision settings, and identification of these 
cases, and understanding why they display such a property, wil l be of interest. The 
relationship between expected value of information and trial aversion also requires 
investigation. In comparison to a trial seeking D M , we would expect that the length 
of a sequential problem must be extended before a trial averse D M would select an 
unfamiliar decision or reward (assuming that such decision selection leads to infor-
mation concerning preferences). Whether this is because a trial averse D M places 
less expected value on uti l i ty information than does a trial seeking D M , or whether 
it is because a trial averse D M places less 'pure' value on decisions, is also of interest. 
Other types of sequential decision problems, as opposed to that considered in this 
thesis, may also be considered in an adaptive ut i l i ty setting. For example, the 
sequential problem of sampling termination is considered by DeGroot [34], and i t 
may be of interest to consider generalising classical results in that setting, e.g., the 
Sequential Probability Ratio Test. 
Finally, a suggested hypothesis in Section 6.2 was that DMs become increasingly 
trial averse with age. Though we have sought to provide a normative theory for the 
problem of sequential decision making, the descriptive validity of adaptive util i ty 
and uncertain preferences, along with such hypotheses concerning tr ial aversion, 
may well be of interest to psychologists and economists. 
Appendix A 
Glossary 
c, i Certainty equivalence of decision d. 
d, V d G V is a decision, with V the set of possible decisions. 
e, i Expected return of decision d. 
i r . a l l l IP lists history of decisions and returns prior to i-th decision, „ / / ' also 
lists observed information about the state of mind. 
ly.aly ly is a function for determining value of information about uncertain 
quantity y, wi th a I y used when uti l i ty is uncertain. 
I Function detailing absolute local risk aversion 
P./P P G V is a probability distribution, with V the set of 
probability distributions. 
r,lZ r G TZ is a return following decision selection, wi th TZ the set of possible 
returns. 
t.T Function detailing absolute trial aversion at reward level r. 
u, au u is a traditional util i ty function, au is an adaptive uti l i ty function. 
2, Z z G Z is information about the state of mind, with Z the set of possible 
information statements. 
9, 6 9 G 0 is the true state of mind, with 0 the set of possible states of mind. 
7T' Decision strategy for period i. 
p,i Risk premium for decision d. 
u,Q u> G fi is the state of nature, with Q the set of possible states of nature. 
>:,>-, ~ Binary preference relations. 
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Extension to Example 5.3.1 
The calculation of expected adaptive utilities and the maximisation over various 
decision histories that were necessary in Example 5.3.1 (denoted by the £"s and 
L's in that example) were performed using the software package Maple 10. I t is 
not feasible to include them in full detail within this thesis. For example, lists 
L5, L6 and L7 must between them contain all 8 dimensional vectors representing 
possible observed failure histories by the final period, of which there are 10,000. 
The expected adaptive uti l i ty functions are also rather messy calculations of up to 8 
variables. Nevertheless, given the problem description, the adaptive uti l i ty function 
and prior beliefs, these calculations can easily be verified using the algorithm given 
in Section 5.1. 
Example 5.3.1 is based on a hypothetical scenario and it is hoped that the omission 
of these calculations do not prevent the reader from appreciating the implications 
of, and possibilities for, adaptive util i ty theory. However, as an example of how 
these calculations are performed, and as a demonstration of the general procedure, 
the description of how list L2 was determined is included below. Examination of 
the row in Table 5.1 containing E2 and LI informs us that these were relevant if 
decision clu had previously been made. Thus the current decision is whether or not 
to permanently fix failure types A, and as beliefs over the number and severity of 
future failures of type A will not depend on previous observed failures of type B, 
attention is restricted to the timing and perceived severity of failures of type A. 
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Because Table 5.1 represents the decision to be made in the final epoch, entries in 
L2 will be of the form of a 4 dimensional vector ( z \ s , z \ M , z A S , z2AM), with z'Aj being 
the observed number of failures of type A that occurred with perceived severity j 
in epoch i. Furthermore, as there can be at most 3 type A failures of any perceived 
severity within an epoch, there are 100 possible decision histories that must be 
considered. 
To evaluate the expected adaptive ut i l i ty of the decision d3 = dN, the updated 
beliefs over 6 A and uiA for all possible histories must be determined (examination 
of the adaptive ut i l i ty function assumed for this problem demonstrates that beliefs 
over OQ and u>B are no longer relevant). Those histories that lead to updated beliefs 
over these parameters being such that the expected adaptive uti l i ty of c/3 = c//v is 
greater than -80 are then placed in list L2. 
Application of Bayes' Theorem and use of independencies within the problem leads 
to the result that for given history H = (z\s> zAM> ZAS-- ZAM)-. updated beliefs over 
0A are such that P(dA = 0.7|/7) = 1 - P{6A = 0.3|/7), wi th P{6A = 0.7|/7) described 
following simplification by: 
Similarly, updated beliefs over parameter LUA given history H can also be determined 
and are such that P{uA = 0.005|W) = 1 - P{uA = 0.1|/7), with P(uA = 0.005|/7) 
described following simplification by: 
P{BA =0.7\H) = 
4 X 7ZAS + ZAS X y'AM+zAM 
(B.0.1) 
4 X lZAS + lAS X 3ZAM+ZAM + 3ZAS + ZAS X 7Zl\M+ZAM 
P{LOA = 0.005|//) = 
7 x I996~k 
(B.0.2) 
7 x 199fc + 2 1 2 x 5 6 x 3 U ! - 2 f c 
with k. * = ZAS + Z\M+*AS + ZA AM 
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Determining the updated expected values of parameters 6A and uA from the above 
distributions, and putting them into the example's adaptive uti l i ty function, then 
provides expected adaptive util i ty equation E2. Finally, list L2 is generated by 
considering each possible history and determining whether or not for that history 
equation E2 has a greater value than —80 (the expected adaptive uti l i ty of decision 
dA = d N ) . The ful l list of histories in L2 is given below (note that these are expressed 
in the form ( z \ s , z \ M , z2AS, z2AM)): 
(0,0,0,0) (0,0,0,1) (0,0,0,2) (0,0,0,3) (0,0,1,0) (0,0,1,2) (0,1,0,0) (0,1,0,1) (0,1,0,2) 
(0,1,0,3) (0,1,1,1) (0,1,1,2) (0,2,0,0) (0,2,0,1) (0,2,0,2) (0,2,0,3) (0,2,1,0) (0,2,1,1) 
(0,2,1,2) (0,2,2,1) (0,3,0,0) (0,3,0,1) (0,3,0,2) (0,3,0,3) (0,3,1,0) (0,3,1,1) (0,3,1,2) 
(0,3,2,0) (0,3,2,1) (1,0,0,0) (1,0,0,2) (1,0,0,3) (1,1,0,1) (1,1,0,2) (1,1,0,3) (1,1,1,2) 
(1,2,0,0) (1,2,0,1) (1,2,0,2) (1,2,0,3) (1,2,1,1) (1,2,1,2) (2,0,0,3) (2,1,0,2) (2,1,0,3) 
Appendix C 
A Conjugate Utility Class 
This appendix demonstrates how the use of a uti l i ty function from the polynomial 
class of functions, as defined in Equation (5.5), leads to a closed and tractable 
solution to the nested sequence of expectations in Equations (5.3) and (5.4) when 
beliefs over the problem's variables are represented by Normal distributions. 
First we assume prior beliefs over the state of nature u are such that it follows a 
Normal distribution with known mean /.i and known variance a2. We also assume 
that the distribution of reward r following decision d is Normal, with unknown mean 
/j.d(u) = otdu + Pd (with ad and fid known constants) and known variance a2d. 
Due to the conjugacy property of members of the exponential family of distributions 
(see, for example, Bernardo & Smith [17] or DeGroot [34]), posterior beliefs for UJ 
can be easily found following the observation of rewards r 1 , . . . , r7' when decisions 
d1,. . ., d? were made, respectively: 
U *(>-', • • • = IT/„<(>•>) ex exp | - E ' " ' " ^ ' " ' ' 2 } ' 0 - 0 '' 
v «' i = i d' > 
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Using that fid(uj) = adu + (3d and making suitable rearrangement then leads to: 
/ M K t / ' l U c x e x p J -3-L — ! - ! _ ) 1 
Hence posterior beliefs for u follow a Normal distribution with mean rj[ and variance 
7?2, where: 
.7 _ (C.0.2) 
Similarly, assuming that prior beliefs about # follow a Normal distribution with 
known mean u and known variance r 2 , and assuming that the distribution of ut i l i ty 
information zl following selection of decision dl is also Normal with unknown mean 
ud{6) = 4>d9+ipd (with (fid and ipd known constants) and known variance r j , then after 
the observation of z \ . . . ,zj posterior beliefs about 8 follow a Normal distribution 
with mean X\ and variance A2 , where: 
X\ = \\ = — (C.0.3) 
In this setting it can also be shown that, knowing that previous decisions dx,. .., dj~] 
led to rewards r 1 , . .. , r J " \ respectively, the posterior predictive distribution of re-
ward r j following selection of decision d? is also Normal wi th mean 7^ = adrri[~x +(5di 
and variance j{ = o:^-?^-1 + a^. 
Equations (5.3) and (5.4) detailed the solution algorithm for an n-period sequential 
adaptive util i ty decision problem. However, as was discussed in Chapter 5, such an 
algorithm requires that the D M compute a nested sequence of expectations, which 
in most cases leads to an intractable solution. 
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Nevertheless, if the DM's beliefs over problem variables are as detailed within this 
appendix, then one possibility for ensuring a closed form solution to such a sequence 
of expectations is to consider the use of a uti l i ty function that is a member of the 
the polynomial class that was given in Equation (5.5). 
In determining optimal decision d? when decision history a H j is known, the DM 
is required to compute two types of expectations. The first of these is of the form 
Ee\aHj[u(r\ . . . ,rn\d)]. whilst the second is of the form EaHk+\\aHk(lk[au(rl,.. . , r " ) ] 
for k = j , . . . . n - 1. 
Presuming u^r1,..., rn\d) is a member of the polynomial class of Equation (5.5), we 
may solve E0\nHj[v.(r\ • • • / ' ' " l ^ ) ] by the following: 
EOUHAU{T\. . . , r" |0)] = I u(r\. . . , rn\6)I{6\n IP) (C.0.4) 
Je 
= / E E - E a ^ .U'-T'• • • (rnk"0kone\ai-p) 
J & k o =(U-i=0 fc„=0 
mo mi ?>i „ ,. 
= E E • • • E a ^ • • • (7"n)fc" / ^ f W o " * ) 
k0=0ki=0 kn=0 9 
rno ">) mn 
= E E • • • E *-(rl)fcl • • • %." '^°] 
ko=0k,=0 k„=0 
Given JV\ posterior beliefs over 9 follow a Normal distribution with known mean 
and variance. Hence determination of E0\„Hi [0k°] is the same as the determination 
of the raw moments of a Normal distribution, and these can be expressed as a 
polynomial function of the mean and variance of the distribution (see Papoulis [82]). 
The same technique can also be applied to determine Eatlk\ -i\niik,dk[au(rl, • • • >r")]i 
and although the following can be equally well applied when determining predictive 
beliefs over both rk and zk, we will assume uti l i ty information is not included in 
decision histories. 
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Noting that au(rl... . , r " ) = E0\aHj[u(rl,. .. ,rn\0)] is a polynomial function of 
r 1 , . . . , ? ", we use the result that, given a H k , the predictive distribution of rk when 
decision dk is selected is Normal with known mean and variance. Hence again the so-
lution is equivalent to determining the raw moments of a Normal distribution, again 
leading to another polynomial of the returns 7- 1 , . . . , r f c _ 1 , ? , f c + 1 , . . . ,rn. Sequentially 
solving expectations of the form EaHk+niiHkidk[au(r1,... , r n ) ] by taking k backwards 
from n to 1 then permits calculation of necessary expected adaptive utilities. 
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